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German Responses to the June 2019 Mission of the Sea-Watch 3
Klaus Neumann

migrants from the Sea-Watch 3 ( Longhin, 2019 ). 15 On the history of the DGzRS, see Anders et al. (1997) and Claußen (2015) . 16 On the sinking of the Johanna , see Schramm (2009) . 17 Arguably, the idea of Europe was also challenged by the Eurozone countries’ response to the Greek debt crisis, and the German Willkommenskultur was also a reaction to the reputational damage perceived by Germans as a result of Germany’s role in that response (see Neumann, 2016 ). 18 An article in the online edition of the Bremen daily Weser

Journal of Humanitarian Affairs
The external image of Germany’s foreign policy
Siegfried Schieder

more ‘normal’ – that is, more like that of established nation-states such as France, Great Britain and the US. 4 In an attempt to further examine this question, scholars have assessed whether Germany’s foreign policy is still that of a ‘civilian power’, as is so often claimed. Berlin’s increasing engagement in international crises and its role in crisis-ridden Europe have proven key factors in leading some foreign policy observers to doubt whether Germany is still a ‘civilian power’. 5 In particular, the eurozone crisis has pushed the German government into the

in Prussians, Nazis and Peaceniks
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Changing images of Germany
Jens Steffek
Leonie Holthaus

-wing critics, Germany is a highly developed capitalist state whose elite profits from arms export to war-torn regions. In their view, descriptions of Germany as a civilian power are a farce. In particular since 2010, German positions in the financial crisis of the eurozone also triggered much foreign and domestic criticism. Germany is here seen as an irresponsible power because it denies its contributions to the crisis, such as its enormous surplus in trade with Southern Europe. From the critics’ point of view, German politicians and central bankers instead impose an

in Prussians, Nazis and Peaceniks
Michael Baun

, and the continued economic and political fallout from the Eurozone debt crisis. This section, however, focuses on two threats in particular that are of special relevance for Eastern European security, the growing efforts of external great powers – Russia, China, and the United States – to sow division and exert influence within the EU, and the growth of illiberal nationalism within the EU, and Eastern

in Defending Eastern Europe
Abstract only
Claire Sutherland

acceding to the FRG and without any further formal proceedings. Catapulted from the Warsaw Pact into the emerging eurozone, which would be set in train by the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, East Germans did not share in the identity politics of either European integration or the Deutschmark. Since the GDR had laid all responsibility for Nazism at West Germany’s door, there had been no official reckoning with its citizens’ identity as

in Soldered states
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Debating the distribution of power and status in the early twenty first century
Benjamin Zala

. Regions can also be sites of local contestation over power and legitimacy, areas of economic turmoil that are hard to escape (the eurozone crisis from 2009 helped to raise questions about British, French, German, and even the European Union's (EU's) potential for great power status), and flashpoints of insecurity – or what Andrew Hurrell describes as ‘snares that reduce rather than increase the projection of power’. 17 The scholarly distinction between (global) great powers and

in National perspectives on a multipolar order
Stanley R. Sloan

large questions about the future of the process of European integration. One of the looming issues was how the British departure from the EU would affect the union’s future. The Greek debt crisis not only raised questions about whether Greece could remain in the 19-member Eurozone but about whether the Euro and the process of European integration could survive the disruption of the crisis over the long term. While some American analysts and European protagonists would like to believe that “Europe” not only exists but will become more and more coherent as years go by

in Defense of the West (second edition)
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new tasks, new traumas
Stanley R. Sloan

and investment continued to decline, that the European Union was struggling to keep the Eurozone 47 together while recovering from the “Great Recession,” and that the Obama administration was in the process of trying to “pivot” or “rebalance” toward Asia. On the positive side, the summit celebrated the many successes of NATO’s partnership program. (See table 8.1 below for participation in European security organizations.) Based on the fact that the Lisbon Strategic Concept had made “cooperative security” one of NATO’s core missions, the leaders pledged to

in Defense of the West (second edition)
A philosophical and practical understanding
Elena Chebankova

and Mexico, the eurozone covering the territory of the European Union and its closest trading partners, the yuan zone that would include some Asian and a number of African countries, and the Brazil real zone which could also emerge to include other countries in Latin America. Russia aims to create the rouble zone, which would encompass the EAEU and countries that would like to form a free trade agreement with it. While such plans have a future-oriented character and revolutionary changes are not expected, Russia proposes to take the first steps towards world

in National perspectives on a multipolar order
The transformation of Turkey’s diaspora engagement policies
Ayca Arkilic

candidate for full membership to the EU in 1999, Ankara enjoyed a more balanced set of conditions and incentives. 116 Following the beginning of full accession negotiations at the 2005 Luxembourg Summit, Turkey’s negotiation position vis-à-vis the EU grew progressively stronger. 117 The 2007–08 global economic recession and the 2009 Eurozone crisis further altered Turkey

in Diaspora diplomacy