migrants from the Sea-Watch 3 ( Longhin, 2019 ). 15 On the history of the DGzRS, see Anders et al. (1997) and Claußen (2015) . 16 On the sinking of the Johanna , see Schramm (2009) . 17 Arguably, the idea of Europe was also challenged by the Eurozone countries’ response to the Greek debt crisis, and the German Willkommenskultur was also a reaction to the reputational damage perceived by Germans as a result of Germany’s role in that response (see Neumann, 2016 ). 18 An article in the online edition of the Bremen daily Weser
Since 2010, five Eurozone governments in economic difficulty have received assistance from international lenders on condition that certain policies specified in the Memoranda of Understanding were implemented. How did negotiations take place in this context? What room for manoeuvre did the governments of these countries have? After conditionality, to what extent were governments willing and able to roll back changes imposed on them by the international lenders? Do we find variation across governments, and, if so, why?
This book addresses these questions. It explores the constraints on national executives in the five bailed out countries of the Eurozone during and beyond the crisis (2008–2019).
The book’s principal idea is that, despite international market pressure and creditors’ conditionality, governments had some room for manoeuvre during a bailout and were able to advocate, resist, shape or roll back some of the policies demanded by external actors. Under certain circumstances, domestic actors were also able to exploit the constraint of conditionality to their own advantage. The book additionally shows that after a bailout programme governments could use their discretion to reverse measures in order to attain the greatest benefits at a lower cost. It finally explores the determinants of bargaining leverage – and stresses the importance of credibility.
The European Union (EU) is faced by the Eurozone crisis, the rise of anti-EU populism and 'Brexit'. In its immediate neighbourhood it is confronted by a range of challenges and threats. This book explores the origins of the term 'Europeanisation' and the way in which its contemporary iteration-EU-isation-has become associated with the normative power of the EU. The concept of European identity is discussed, with an indication that there are different levels of identity of which a European consciousness can be just one. An overview of different mechanisms the EU uses to promote EU-isation in the neighbourhood and a discussion on the limits of conditionality when membership is not on offer is also included. The book discusses these themes in more detail. It powerfully states the salience of Russia in establishing an alternative geopolitical pole to the EU. The presence of Russia as the Eurasian Economic Union appears to play the role of being a way of preserving traditional conservative values in contrast to the uncomfortable challenges of EU-isation. The Balkans' and Turkey's reception of EU-isation is not affected by the experience of being in-betweeners. The book examines the issue of EU-isation and the relationship between values (norms), interests and identity based on various sectors/themes which cut across different neighbours and are core elements in their relations with the EU.
This highly original book constitutes one of the first attempts to examine the problem of distributive justice in the EU in a systematic manner. The author starts by arguing that the set of shared political institutions at EU level, including the European Parliament and the Court of Justice of the EU, generate democratic duties of redistribution amongst EU citizens. Furthermore, he claims that the economic structure of the EU, comprising a common market, a common currency, and a free-movement area, triggers duties of reciprocity amongst member states. He contends that the responsibilities to fulfil these duties should be shared by three levels of government – local, national, and supranational. More specifically, he argues that the EU should act as a safety net to the national welfare systems, applying the principle of subsidiarity. In turn, the common market and the Eurozone should balance efficiency targets with distributive concerns. Concrete policy proposals presented in this book include a threshold of basic goods for all EU citizens, an EU Labour Code, a minimum EU corporate tax rate, and an EU Fund for Global Competitiveness. These proposals are thoroughly examined from the standpoint of feasibility. The author argues that his proposals fit in the political culture of the member states, are economically feasible, can be translated into functioning institutions and policies, and are consistent with the limited degree of social solidarity in Europe. This book is a major contribution to the understanding of how a just Europe would look and what it takes to get us there.
Cooperation and trust were increasingly scarce commodities in the inner councils of the EU. This book explores why the boldest initiative in the sixty-year quest to achieve a borderless Europe has exploded in the face of the EU. A close examination of each stage of the EU financial emergency that offers evidence that the European values that are supposed to provide solidarity within the twenty eight-member EU in good times and bad are flimsy and thinly distributed. The book aims to show that it is possible to view the difficulties of the EU as rooted in much longer-term decision-making. It begins with an exploration of the long-term preparations that were made to create a single currency encompassing a large part of the European Union. The book then examines the different ways in which the European Union seized the initiative from the European nation-state, from the formation of the Coal and Steel Community to the Maastricht Treaty. It focuses on the role of France and Germany in the EU. Difficulties that have arisen for the EU as it has tried to foster a new European consciousness are discussed next. The increasingly strained relationship between the EU and the democratic process is also examined. The book discusses the evolution of the crisis in the eurozone and the shortcomings which have impeded the EU from bringing it under control. It ends with a portrait of a European Union in 2013 wracked by mutual suspicions.
-quarter in the previous four years. 3 As for the eurozone, its unemployment level had reached 12 per cent and its gross domestic product in the second quarter of 2013 was 3 per cent below its precrisis peak. 4 Short of pouring on to the streets, it is hard to see how populations, confronting an alarming future over subsequent decades, can bring meaningful pressure to bear on decision-makers, who in practical terms rarely show empathy with the plight of the millions of casualties of the crisis. Crisis summits have succeeded one another, involving people with big jobs
disadvantage millions of others. The formation of a single currency was portrayed as a seminal event. It was supposed to be the culmination of a series of top-down efforts to forge an embryo European state, one shaped around deepening economic integration. But it turned out to be a policy error as monumental as any which could be associated with imprudent national democracies. By the end of its first decade in existence, the eurozone had shown itself to be a collection of different currencies pretending to be a cohesive monetary union. Its political architects had shrunk
, Spanish and Portuguese have benefits for the unemployed. (OPZZ leader Jan Guz on the 14 November 2012 European Day of Action and Solidarity) Poland is a non-member of the Eurozone. Despite this, the Polish labour movement was exposed to pressures associated with Europeanization. This was particularly the case at tripartite level; scholars at one point predicted that Polish tripartism would ready the country for membership of the euro (Meardi, 2006 ). Given this concern, a key issue is the extent to which Polish unions
, not just the biggest ones. The Commission was on the sidelines when, on 16 March 2013, the fateful decision was taken to confiscate a proportion of the savings of depositors in Cypriot banks in order to raise funds to rescue Cyprus. Early in the eurozone crisis, bank deposits had been guaranteed across the eurozone so that citizens would not be compelled to move funds from country to country. Outrage in Cyprus and incredulity across much of the world led to the raid on savings below €100,000 being annulled. But it was now clear that there was influential backing
Economy Minister Arnaud Montebourg, September 2014) France occupies an intermediate position in the Eurozone. Trade unions in the country are weak and divided, which raises the question of the manner in which unions in inauspicious structural positions respond to Europeanization. After the introduction of EMU, such incapacity meant that unions tended not to participate in wage moderation. Challenges associated with the single currency were partly resolved by a state incomes policy which limited potential loss of