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Thomas Osborne

processes of the commodification of everyday life as well as aspects of social solidarity itself. What he calls the ‘ethics of the aesthetic’ entails what our terminology might adapt as the ‘morality of the aesthetic’ – not an embrace of the principles of art (in a narrow, aesthetic ist sense) but an emphasis on vitalism and creativity in more and more departments of life: ‘a creativity of common meaning, instinctual in some way, which serves as a sort of substratum for diverse social creations’. 11 With the apparent diminution of class allegiances and of narrow

in The structure of modern cultural theory
How social subsystems externalise their foundational paradoxes in the process of constitutionalisation
Gunther Teubner

: Augsberg, ‘Wissenschaftsverfassungsrecht’, p. 223. 10 On the debate about societal constitutions, particularly in the transnational realm, see Thompson, ‘Constitutionalisation of Everyday Life?’; Kjaer, Constitutionalism in the Global Realm ; Teubner and Beckers (eds

in Critical theory and legal autopoiesis
Thomas Osborne

snobbery towards the culturally well-off. And so on. There is something in this view. In Bourdieu’s work, taste is shown to be, in any case, basically a weapon of class differentiation. In liking golf, red wine, sports cars or orienteering we are not just signalling something about our own lifestyle preferences but rejecting others – we are distinguishing ourselves, engaging in strategies of distinction. Distinction itself is based on a massive empirical survey on taste in everyday life and culture conducted in the late 1960s. Bourdieu would have disliked the

in The structure of modern cultural theory
Open Access (free)
Entanglements and ambiguities
Saurabh Dube

Italian “micro-history” and German “Altagsgeschichte” (history of everyday life). 62 Finally, it is against this backdrop that such storylines sketch the problems and potentialities of social/cultural history, including the dialogue with anthropology or sociology, in diverse institutional contexts in the here and now. Once more, the difficulties with such storylines are not

in Subjects of modernity
Steven Earnshaw

mainly driven onwards by the reader’s desire to know what will happen next to Erwin and how it will all end. Such a response to the novel might be reinforced by the knowledge that Fallada’s work was associated with a ‘school’ of literature in the 1920s and 1930s known as die neue Sachlichkeit, ‘new objectivity’, where the emphasis was on the ‘factual’ recording of everyday life.2 A good example of this type of writing is Fallada’s earlier novel Little Man, What Now? (1932),3 which treats the lives of an ordinary young couple in Germany at the start of the 1930s in the

in The Existential drinker
Peter J. Spiro

-specific demoi, as Bauböck puts it (pp. 11–12). But nor are many non-state communities. The regulatory breadth of communities, state and non-state, is also contingent. States are constrained in their reach in various ways. Just as bye-laws set association rules, constitutions and other governing instruments set the limits of state power. In terms of effect on everyday life, state rules may be less intrusive than the rules of the non-state communities

in Democratic inclusion
Rainer Forst

– namely, to provide ultimate answers to speculative questions. Religiously based reasons for objecting cannot be overcome in this way. Nonetheless, the problem of the tolerant racist alerts us to an important insight into social progress: an increase in toleration is often a sign of progress, since those who are foreign or different are accepted with less narrow-mindedness; but sometimes less toleration is a mark of progress. Thus, racism itself should not be an object of social toleration, since it has a tendency to become entrenched in everyday life and to give rise

in Toleration, power and the right to justification
Abstract only
Allyn Fives

she calls for toleration in response to the ‘ordinary vices’ of everyday life in American society (Shklar 1984 , pp. 87, 88, 117). Better to tolerate these ordinary vices, better to accept that we will never achieve full adherence to our moral values, than to make life unbearable by striving (without any hope of success) to perfect humanity. As a sceptic, therefore, she focuses on the negative rather than the positive: on both the vices that we should tolerate, the ordinary vices of an imperfect society, and, also, those we must always fight against, namely the

in Judith Shklar and the liberalism of fear
Anastasia Marinopoulou

suffice to address the social accountability of every human creation. The self-​reflexive interpretation of social action becomes, for Garfinkel, the essential framework for interpreting human knowledge, which is the yardstick for understanding social action. Throughout Schütz’s work, ethnomethodology, and Garfinkel’s writings, it becomes obvious to me that their concern was to place knowledge within reality itself and to test cognition and the realization of knowledge against reality and everyday life, or in other words against the common sense of everyday knowledge

in Critical theory and epistemology
Abstract only
Foucault, Canguilhem, Jacob
Mark Olssen

to complexity in the context of life as it is lived. To err is to make a mistake or at least a wrong turn; related to the body it constitutes anomaly, disease, monstrosity, pathology, and death; related to the social, it introduces the realms of ethics, morality, and politics; in the domain of everyday life it results in unexpected developments, crises, or catastrophes. It presupposes at the most immediate level the type of genealogy that Foucault develops from Nietzsche’s and Canguilhem’s reading of the tasks of the life science process. Error allows for a break

in Constructing Foucault’s ethics