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Ali M. Ansari

Introduction For a state that regards itself as the intellectual heir to the French Revolution it is unsurprising that the ideas of ‘terror’ and ‘terrorism’ remain central to the controversies surrounding the nature of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 1 From an American perspective, the seizure of the US embassy on 4 November 1979 transformed Iran from an intimate ally into the leading ‘state sponsor’ of terrorism; an appellation that even the thaw in relations under the Obama administration has done little to change. 2 The revolutionary state

in Non-Western responses to terrorism
Superpower rivalry
Author: Joseph Heller

Four questions stand before the historian of the cold war and the Arab-Israeli conflict: 1) Did Israel and the US have a 'special relationship'? 2) Were Soviet-Israeli relations destined for failure from 1948? 3) Was the Arab-Israeli conflict insoluble because of the cold war or in spite of it? 4)Was detente between the superpowers the key to solving the Arab-Israeli conflict? Israel failed to get a security guarantee from the US because if it were granted ally status the Arab states would turn to the Soviets. Instead of a security guarantee Kennedy used the nebulous term 'special relationship', which did not bind America politically or militarily. Relations with the USSR looked promising at first, but the Zionist ideology of the Jewish state made it inevitable that relations with would worsen , since the Kremlin rejected the notion that Soviet Jews were by definition part of the Jewish nation, and therefore candidates for emigration to Israel. As for the Arabs, they were adamant that the Palestinian refugees return en mass, which meant the destruction of of Israel. No compromise suggested by the US was acceptable to to the Arabs , who were always supported by the USSR.The Soviets demanded detente cover not only the Arab states and Israel, but Turkey and Iran as well. Consequently the Middle East remained a no-man's-land between the superpowers' spheres of influence, inexorably paving the way for the wars in 1956 and 1967.

This edited collection surveys how non-Western states have responded to the threats of domestic and international terrorism in ways consistent with and reflective of their broad historical, political, cultural and religious traditions. It presents a series of eighteen case studies of counterterrorism theory and practice in the non-Western world, including countries such as China, Japan, India, Pakistan, Egypt and Brazil. These case studies, written by country experts and drawing on original-language sources, demonstrate the diversity of counterterrorism theory and practice and illustrate that how the world ‘sees’ and responds to terrorism is different from the way that the United States, the United Kingdom and many European governments do. This volume – the first ever comprehensive account of counterterrorism in the non-Western world – will be of interest to students, scholars and policymakers responsible for developing counterterrorism policy.

The Memorandum of Understanding (1964–65)
Joseph Heller

This chapter shows how Israel persuaded the US to initiate the 'memorandum of understanding' which changed Israel's deterrent capabilities. First, Israel insisted that the balance of power had changed dramatically in terms of heavy armaments and the construction of Arab forces, due to greater Soviet support. Khrushchev's visit to Egypt aggravated anxiety of in Israel regarding a Soviet-Arab plot to destroy Israel in a surprise attack. The visit was not merely symbolic, but rather proofof Soviet solidarity with Arab intentions , including public support for the Palestinian cause. The US promised that the Sixth Fleet was ready to react to any Arab attack, but Israel had little faith in such promises, in view of the Arab summits which bid for military escalation. The Soviet made it clear that without the removal of the western bases in Turkey and the western courting of Iran, no settlement in the Middle East was possible.

in The United States, the Soviet Union and the Arab– Israeli conflict, 1948– 67
Politico-legal manoeuvres and political Islam
Bashir Saade

continue its Islamic Resistance against Israel, which was occupying large areas of the south of Lebanon. After a few years of occupation and after intense negotiations with Iran, the ‘pax Syriana’ 4 had to make room for an armed actor whose sole rationale for bearing weapons was to fight to free land from Israeli occupation. It is crucial to remember in this regard that relations between Hizbullah and Syria had been quite tense since the formation of the party and until 1992. Noteworthy was the massacre of Fathallah in 1987, where the Syrian army attacked a Hizbullah

in Non-Western responses to terrorism
Abstract only
Michael J. Boyle

constitutes some sort of threat to the authority of the state. The findings of this volume do not go that far. The case studies certainly acknowledge that there is a clear discursive element to terrorism. For example, Oscar Palma's analysis of how the term ‘narcoterrorism’ was created and sustained in Colombia in order to mobilize domestic constituencies and stakeholders in the American government suggests that the labelling process for terrorism is crucially important. Other case studies on Brazil, Algeria, Lebanon, Iran, Egypt and South Africa in this book suggest either

in Non-Western responses to terrorism
Joseph Heller

that unity in the face of the Soviet threat was the most important issue. 27 Dulles reported to the NSC that Egypt would not play a key role in defending the region. The problem was that the Arabs ignored the gravity of the Soviet threat. The new focus of the MEC should be the ‘Northern Tier’ – Pakistan, Turkey, Iran, Syria, and perhaps Iraq – and economic development in Iraq and Syria would make

in The United States, the Soviet Union and the Arab– Israeli conflict, 1948– 67
From Truman to Eisenhower (1948– 53)
Joseph Heller

first time the United States promised arms to Israel. 45 The foreign ministry warned that if Soviet aggression in Korea were not stopped it would spread to Indochina, Iran, Yugoslavia, Berlin, and West Germany. 46 Israel’s dependence on the United States was unprecedented. More than 40 percent of its imports were American and funds for development programs, debt

in The United States, the Soviet Union and the Arab– Israeli conflict, 1948– 67
Hussein Solomon

authorities believe that they were ‘trained terrorists’. Indeed, the Pakistani newspaper Dawn also stated that the South Africans had received training in Afghanistan and Iran. 35 Pakistan's law minister, Raja Basharat, stated that all of the twelve men arrested were operatives in Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network. 36 Media reports indicated that both South Africans had confessed to the Pakistani authorities that their mission was to carry out terror attacks in South Africa. Among the alleged targets were the Carlton Centre, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, Parliament

in Non-Western responses to terrorism
Joseph Heller

combat methods. According to Ben-Gurion, the IDF’s most pressing problem was arms. Israel, he said, should concentrate on purchasing arms from Western Europe, with US consent. 16 Ben-Gurion knew that the United States was a key factor in enabling Israel to offset Arab power and was angry with Eisenhower for doing nothing to stop Nasser from gaining control of the oil in the Arab states and Iran. Nasser

in The United States, the Soviet Union and the Arab– Israeli conflict, 1948– 67