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A bamboo curtain descended on Upper Burma in May 1942. Little news filtered in or out. The warp and weft of everyday civilian life during the Japanese occupation is something of a mystery. In 1945 Rev. Stanley Vincent compiled an important booklet, Out of Great Tribulation , containing the wartime recollections of Burmese Methodists. 1 Two army chaplains (Acheson and Brown-Moffett) wrote brief accounts of separate visits they had made to the Chin States during 1944. In August 1945 Rev. U Po Tun wrote a long
Introduction Since around 2010, the prevailing perception of threat in Japanese public opinion and official policy circles has been centred on the possible dangers posed by a rising China. Specific incidents such as repeated Chinese maritime and aerial incursions into the Senkaku Islands, which are also claimed by Beijing, certainly reinforce these perceptions. The angst and anxiety of a declining Japan being eclipsed by its giant neighbour undoubtedly marked the so-called zeitgeist . In this sense, one might argue that traditional geopolitical
Introduction T he sharp change in Tokyo’s strategy towards regional security multilateralism well illustrates Japan’s decentring from the US after the Cold War, even while nonetheless serving, at least so far, to support, if not strengthen, the Japan–US alliance. This chapter examines how Japan has used regional multilateralism since 1991 for several purposes: to help keep the US engaged in the region; to reassure Japan’s neighbours that Tokyo would not again threaten their security, even as it began playing a
Introduction I n a March 2000 meeting between the foreign ministers of Japan and Vietnam, the Japanese side proposed the establishment of bilateral politico-military consultations ( Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2000 ). The proposal marked the entry of security cooperation with Vietnam on Japan’s public and official security agenda. While irregular bilateral working-level security consultations ensued in the decade to come, 2011 marks a turning point, as Japan–Vietnam security relations refocused
Introduction J apan–Europe relations were centred initially on cultural exchanges after World War II and then on the economy, in particular trade. Security ties, on the other hand, have emerged more recently as an area for cooperation. Symbolically, this emerged as an area for cooperation in 1991, when the European Community (EC) and Japan announced the Hague Declaration. Both sides agreed to ‘strengthen their cooperation’ in broader areas beyond trade. Included in the areas of cooperation were peace
Introduction W hen we think about Japan–India security relations as they stand today, it must not be forgotten that Japan is located far from India. It takes about 10 hours to fly from Tokyo to New Delhi. The database of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs points out that about 9,000 Japanese lived in India in 2016, while about 422,000 Japanese lived in the US; about 128,000 Japanese lived in China and about 19,000 Japanese lived in Indonesia ( Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2016 ). These factors that
actions undertaken by the major players to date – first and foremost, China and the US. But less emphasis has been given to what other, ‘lesser’ extra-regional powers have been doing in the grander scheme of things in the SCS thus far. But to call these ‘lesser’ players second fiddle to the Great Powers may miss the point. While carrying out their roles in the latter’s shadow, these players are no less significant. One of them is Japan. Though geographically distant from the SCS, Japan is a major player. One just needs to recall the keen
/disaster relief (HA/DR). By contrast, the key trend that has been emerging over the past few years, particularly since the inauguration of the second Shinz ō Abe government in December 2012, is that Japan and Australia are going beyond the first evolution and developing bilateral cooperation in more traditional security fields. This is what this chapter calls the second evolution of Japan–Australia security ties. Even though, to the disappointment of experts and officials in many quarters of both countries, Japan was not chosen as the primary partner
Introduction T he EU and Japan have – at least on paper – big plans as regards cooperation in international politics and security. The instrument and agreement through which such increased and institutionalised cooperation is envisioned to take place is the so-called Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA). The SPA will cover EU–Japan cooperation in regional and global politics and security and is envisioned to give the current EU–Japan ad hoc cooperation in the realms of politics and security an institutional
Introduction J apan’s approach to international relations has been highly influenced by the evolution of the global world order from a bipolar to a unipolar to a multipolar system, an acknowledgement of limited ability of traditional power projection (in particular in Japan’s case) and the realisation of the importance of ‘complex interdependence’ between nation states via the implementation of institutions and an increased number of trading agreements ( Keohane and Nye, 1998 ). In this context, since the end