states were relegated to a secondary power status under the US defence umbrella. US-backed
trade liberalisation promoted growing Western European interdependence in the
post-war decade, while alliances (NATO, the Warsaw Pact and other pacts internationally) transformed global security.
The first chancellor of the FRG, KonradAdenauer, inherited an occupied and
provisional state that was mistrusted by its neighbours because of its recent history and its strategic weight. He chose an unqualified Western orientation and
adopted a policy of reconciliation and
1 The Statist, 26 January 1962, pp. 261–8.
2 KonradAdenauer Stiftung, Sankt Augustin, Pressedokumentation, file: Staaten, Irland,
1951–83, Press cutting, Bulletin, nr. 197/S.1663, 23 October 1962.
3 FitzGerald, Protectionism to Liberalisation, p. 134.
4 See Maher, Tortuous Path, pp. 123–6.
5 AA-PA, Bestand B31, Band 221, Beitritt Irlands zur EWG, Note & aide-mémoire,
Harkort to Müller-Armack, 3 July 1961; ibid., Note, Jansen to Lahr, 4 July 1961.
6 TNA, FO 371/158220, M6114/24, Memo, Gallagher to Wilford, United Kingdom
and the Six
unremitting Irish criticism of the artificial division of post-war Germany.
The anti-communist convictions of Irish society and Dublin’s aversion to relations with the Soviet Union guaranteed that Ireland instinctively fell in with
Bonn’s preferences, but there was an emerging utilitarian consideration too –
access to the West German market for agricultural products. Antipathy towards
Moscow was principally a product of the pronounced Catholicity of Irish society.
It inclined towards German Christian Democracy under the aegis of KonradAdenauer rather than the Social
-serving chancellor, Dr KonradAdenauer, engaged in policies that went a long way to solving
traditional West European rivalries. The newly minted West Germany, with its
capital in Bonn, embraced international rehabilitation and integration into the
democratic fold. West Germany’s position as the strategic fulcrum of Cold War
Europe, its economic rebirth and the opportunities presented by West European
cooperation smoothed its relative normalisation in little more than a decade.
Adenauer consciously restrained the FRG’s freedom of action by enmeshing it
deeply in multilateral
both the CSU and SPD after
the inconclusive Landtag Election of November 1950.71 The party
also responded positively to KonradAdenauer’s overtures to join
the coalition he formed after the Bundestag Election of September
1953. In fact, two GB/BHE politicians gained ministerial positions,
Theodor Oberländer as Minister for Expellees and Waldemar Kraft
as Minister without Portfolio. However, the GB/BHE’s influence
Integration of refugees into (West) Germany, 1950–
on Federal refugee legislation should not be
Lower Saxony Schleswig-Holstein
Source: Adapted from: Forschungsinstitut der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung
(ed.), Wahlergebnisse in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und in den
Bundesländern 1946–1988, pp. 3, 5, 11 (Sankt Augustin 1988); BSL (ed.),
Die erste Bundestagswahl in Bayern am 14. August 1949, Beiträge zur
Statistik Bayerns, No.150, p. 42 and Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der
Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn (AdsD), LV S
market on economic grounds. He preferred a free trade area in which
German industry would flourish. It was KonradAdenauer who persuaded
Erhard to acquiesce in the arrangements for a common market. Adenauer’s
main aim was to achieve a reconciliation between West Germany and its
west European neighbours; France was crucial to this. Adenauer, just as
with the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Defence
Community, was determined to continue his west-oriented policy of embedding the Federal Republic in Western Europe. Very similar reasoning
Debating Cold War anxieties in West Germany, 1945–90
left-wing Social Democratic Party (SPD)
perceived the ‘atomic age’ as positive, as a future characterised by a limitless supply of cheap electric energy.13
The prospect of nuclear destruction became a hotly contested topic
in West German politics only in the wake of German rearmament.
Public debate on this issue had started in 1950, and until the founding of the Bundeswehr rebuilt German armed forces within the framework of NATO in 1955. A crucial prerequisite of Germany’s return to
(still limited) sovereignty, and its rearmament, was Chancellor KonradAdenauer’s
. Steinberg, ‘Right-wing historian Ernst Nolte receives the KonradAdenauer Prize for Science’, 17 August 2000, www.wsws.org/articles/2000/aug2000/nolt-a17.shtml .
64 Lipstadt, Denying the Holocaust , p. 213.
65 Ibid., p. 210.
66 R. Braun, ‘The Holocaust and problems of representation’, in Keith Jenkins (ed.), The Postmodern History Reader (Routledge, 1997), p. 421.
67 M. Kustow, interview with Richard J. Evans, Red Pepper , 72, June 2000. Quoted in T. Helms, ‘Holocaust Day must be scrapped says Muslim leaders’, Daily Telegraph , 12 September 2005.
., Report, Holmes to Cremin, The Border in Germany, 12 October 1959.
40 Political Correspondent, ‘Aiken to pay Official Visit to Bonn’, Irish Times, 13 August
1960, p. 1.
41 KonradAdenauer Stiftung, Sankt Augustin, Pressedokumentation,file: Staaten, Irland,
1951–83, Bulletin, Bulletin des Presse und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung,
No. 159, August 1960, pp. 1553–4.
42 ‘Aiken’s Visit to Germany ends’, Irish Times, 29 August 1960, p. 7.
43 ‘Aiken’s Visit: Bonn Promises to Support Industry’, Irish Times, 26 August 1960, p. 1.
44 Kennedy, “ ‘Persuade an