The rapprochement between Germany and Israel in the aftermath of the Holocaust is one of the most striking political developments of the twentieth century. German Chancellor Angela Merkel recently referred to it as a ‘miracle’. But how did this ‘miracle’ come about? Drawing upon sources from both sides of the Iron Curtain and of the Arab–Israeli conflict, Lorena De Vita traces the contradictions and dilemmas that shaped the making of German–Israeli relations at the outset of the global Cold War. Israelpolitik offers new insights not only into the history of German–Israeli relations, but also into the Cold War competition between the two German states, as each attempted to strengthen its position in the Middle East and the international arena while struggling with the legacy of the Nazi past.
Memory, leadership, and the fi rst phase of integration (1945– 58)
Peter J. Verovšek
One must know the past [ das Gestern ], one must also think about the past , if one is to successfully and durably shape the future [ das Morgen ].
KonradAdenauer, speech at the University of Frankfurt (1952)
Memory and the founding of Europe
In the introductory section I argued that ruptures in historical time allow communities to reshape how they link the past to the future through the present by drawing on collective memory as a cognitive , motivational , and justificatory resource for social transformation. This chapter begins to apply
Contemporary dynamics of EU–LAC inter-parliamentary relations
Bruno Theodoro Luciano
foros de Reflexión, Hamburg.
Saraiva , M.
( 2015 ). “ Brasil, América Latina e a União Europeia diante de novas agendas globais ”, in Dane , F.
Lazarou , E. and Luciano , B. T. , A União Europeia alargada em tempos de novos desafios. KonradAdenauer Foundation .
Socialists and Democrats ( 2017 ). “ Progressives in the EU and Latin America move forward towards the EU–CELAC summit ”, Press Release
Egypt’s counter-terrorism policy post-9/ 11 and beyond
NGOs have been shut down. These NGOs include: KonradAdenauer
Stiftung (KAS), National Democratic Institute (NDI), International
Republican Institute (IRI), Freedom House, and International Centre
for Journalists (ICFJ) (Human Rights Watch, 2011 ). State media were ambiguous in covering the shutdowns
to reduce public sympathy toward NGOs, and reinforce fear and hate
toward them (Human Rights Watch, 2012
Mercosur ”, Nueva Sociedad .
Freytag , A.
Draper , P.
Fricke , S.
( 2014 ). The Impact of the TTIP: Economic Effects on Transatlantic Partners, Third Countries and the Global Trade Order . Vol. 1 . Berlin : KonradAdenauer Stiftung
as President, defeating Le Pen on second ballot by 82.2 per cent to 17.8 per
Bundestag elections, changes
of government and election of federal presidents
14 August 1949 Bundestag
election. CDU–CSU are largest party.
12 September 1949 Theodor
Heuss (FDP) elected as first federal President.
15 September 1949 KonradAdenauer
days’ time. At about the same
time, a handwritten letter describing the proposal was handed to the German
Chancellor KonradAdenauer. Although Adenauer had no forewarning, he saw
that it resolved a number of problems between France and West Germany, and
so he immediately answered: ‘I approve wholeheartedly.’ Everyone was now
At 4 p.m. on 9 May, in the gilded Salon de l’Horloge at Quai d’Orsay,
Schuman announced ‘his’ plan to create a European Coal and Steel Community.
The press conference attracted around 200 journalists, who heard the minister
to render war service involving the use of arms.’
In both its exogenous and endogenous manifestations, the eﬀects of
Stunde Null were diametrically opposed to the rearming, in whatever
way, of the ﬂedging Federal Republic. However, the imperatives of
rearmament rapidly accelerated and, together with KonradAdenauer’s
disposition towards the regaining of sovereignty through alliance
with the West, the task in hand became not so much if or when
rearmament would occur, but how.
Longhurst, Germany and the use of force.qxd
Stunde Null and
Communities to reject de
As a result of his talks with German Chancellor KonradAdenauer in 1958,
de Gaulle understood that an institutionalisation of the bilateral interaction
between France and Germany was a necessity. After the failure to construct a
political union of the Six in 1962, de Gaulle realised that the future of Europe
would depend on Germany's fate: cooperation between France and Germany had
to be at the centre of a new Europe, and Germany had to choose between a
European Europe and an American Europe. During de Gaulle's visit to Germany