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The rapprochement between Germany and Israel in the aftermath of the Holocaust is one of the most striking political developments of the twentieth century. German Chancellor Angela Merkel recently referred to it as a ‘miracle’. But how did this ‘miracle’ come about? Drawing upon sources from both sides of the Iron Curtain and of the Arab–Israeli conflict, Lorena De Vita traces the contradictions and dilemmas that shaped the making of German–Israeli relations at the outset of the global Cold War. Israelpolitik offers new insights not only into the history of German–Israeli relations, but also into the Cold War competition between the two German states, as each attempted to strengthen its position in the Middle East and the international arena while struggling with the legacy of the Nazi past.
One must know the past [ das Gestern ], one must also think about the past , if one is to successfully and durably shape the future [ das Morgen ]. Konrad Adenauer, speech at the University of Frankfurt (1952) Memory and the founding of Europe In the introductory section I argued that ruptures in historical time allow communities to reshape how they link the past to the future through the present by drawing on collective memory as a cognitive , motivational , and justificatory resource for social transformation. This chapter begins to apply
foros de Reflexión, Hamburg. Saraiva , M. ( 2015 ). “ Brasil, América Latina e a União Europeia diante de novas agendas globais ”, in Dane , F. Lazarou , E. and Luciano , B. T. , A União Europeia alargada em tempos de novos desafios. Konrad Adenauer Foundation . Socialists and Democrats ( 2017 ). “ Progressives in the EU and Latin America move forward towards the EU–CELAC summit ”, Press Release
NGOs have been shut down. These NGOs include: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), National Democratic Institute (NDI), International Republican Institute (IRI), Freedom House, and International Centre for Journalists (ICFJ) (Human Rights Watch, 2011 ). State media were ambiguous in covering the shutdowns to reduce public sympathy toward NGOs, and reinforce fear and hate toward them (Human Rights Watch, 2012
in NATO , 1 38 Buteux, The Politics of Nuclear Consultation in NATO , 4. 39 A. Messemer , ‘ Konrad Adenauer: Defence Diplomat on the Backstage ’, in J. Gaddis , P
Mercosur ”, Nueva Sociedad . https://nuso.org/articulo/ue-mercosur-europa-ganadores-perdedores-integracion/ . Freytag , A. , Draper , P. and Fricke , S. ( 2014 ). The Impact of the TTIP: Economic Effects on Transatlantic Partners, Third Countries and the Global Trade Order . Vol. 1 . Berlin : Konrad Adenauer Stiftung
-elected as President, defeating Le Pen on second ballot by 82.2 per cent to 17.8 per cent. Germany Bundestag elections, changes of government and election of federal presidents 14 August 1949 Bundestag election. CDU–CSU are largest party. 12 September 1949 Theodor Heuss (FDP) elected as first federal President. 15 September 1949 Konrad Adenauer
days’ time. At about the same time, a handwritten letter describing the proposal was handed to the German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. Although Adenauer had no forewarning, he saw that it resolved a number of problems between France and West Germany, and so he immediately answered: ‘I approve wholeheartedly.’ Everyone was now on board. At 4 p.m. on 9 May, in the gilded Salon de l’Horloge at Quai d’Orsay, Schuman announced ‘his’ plan to create a European Coal and Steel Community. The press conference attracted around 200 journalists, who heard the minister promise
to render war service involving the use of arms.’ In both its exogenous and endogenous manifestations, the effects of Stunde Null were diametrically opposed to the rearming, in whatever way, of the fledging Federal Republic. However, the imperatives of rearmament rapidly accelerated and, together with Konrad Adenauer’s disposition towards the regaining of sovereignty through alliance with the West, the task in hand became not so much if or when rearmament would occur, but how. Longhurst, Germany and the use of force.qxd 30/06/2004 16:25 Page 29 Stunde Null and
Communities to reject de Gaulle's plans. As a result of his talks with German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in 1958, de Gaulle understood that an institutionalisation of the bilateral interaction between France and Germany was a necessity. After the failure to construct a political union of the Six in 1962, de Gaulle realised that the future of Europe would depend on Germany's fate: cooperation between France and Germany had to be at the centre of a new Europe, and Germany had to choose between a European Europe and an American Europe. During de Gaulle's visit to Germany in