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land in the Horn – of which many Gulf states are short – provides a means of ensuring self-sufficiency in the production of food. Of course, these efforts butt up against a broader pan-African search for food security, albeit the continent faces myriad challenges, not least of which stem from infrastructural and political issues. Similar political, economic, and security challenges are found among the Gulf states, notably in the UAE and Iran, as broader regional activity has come at a price, prompting the Emirates to withdraw from military
Arab countries were vying for influence on the continent. Mazrui argues that ‘black radical identification with the Arabs’ was because Israel was considered too much a part of the Western world and was connected with White-dominated southern Africa. The pan-Africanism movement had always been inclusive of North Africans, in particular Algerians. Furthermore, Arabs had been major players in movements for Third World liberation and anti-imperialism. 20 Mazrui makes a strong case for African countries breaking off
African states led by Cameroon, Liberia, Nigeria and Togo, which held a meeting in Monrovia on 8–12 May 1961. The ‘Monrovia group’ would soon include 22 African countries. These states were more moderate in their approach towards the Congo. In general, their insistence on pan-Africanism was not as ‘enthusiastic’ as that of the Casablanca group. 107 On 22 July 1961, the Congolese Parliament reconvened
(committed to a confederal model of African unity) challenged Nkrumah’s Casablanca Group (committed to a federal model of African unity) in the immediate years of independence. With the creation of the Organisation for African Unity, as opposed to the Union of African States, which Nkrumah had espoused, the Monrovia Group succeeded in its ambitions to prevent immediate African unification under a federal agency. Adjacent to this decision, RECs (such as the East African Community championed by Julius Nyerere) came to the fore – to the detriment of pan-African institutions
partnerships if a post-colonial pan-African strategic ambition remains achievable in practice, and not just on paper. Notes * Alex Vines is Head, Africa Programme, Chatham House and Assistant Professor, Coventry University. Claudia Wallner, during her placement at Chatham House, assisted in providing some research support. This chapter links to two others, referenced where appropriate: ‘To Brexit and beyond: Africa and the United Kingdom’, in D. Nagar and C. Mutasa (eds), Africa and the World