This book explains theoretical work in postcolonial and postsocialist studies to
offer a novel and distinctive insight into how Yugoslavia is configured by, and
through, race. It presents the history of how ideas of racialised difference
have been translated globally in Yugoslavia. The book provides a discussion on
the critical race scholarship, global historical sociologies of 'race in
translation' and south-east European cultural critique to show that the
Yugoslav region is deeply embedded in global formations of race. It considers
the geopolitical imagination of popular culture; the history of ethnicity; and
transnational formations of race before and during state socialism, including
the Non-Aligned Movement. The book also considers the post-Yugoslav discourses
of security, migration, terrorism and international intervention, including the
War on Terror and the refugee crisis. It elaborates how often-neglected aspects
of the history of nationhood and migration reveal connections that tie the
region into the global history of race. The book also explains the linkage
between ethnic exclusivism and territory in the ethnopolitical logic of the
Bosnian conflict and in the internationally mediated peace agreements that
enshrined it: 'apartheid cartography'. Race and whiteness remained
perceptible in post-war Bosnian identity discourses as new, open-ended forms of
post-conflict international intervention developed.
–conservative and liberal national identity discourses most evidently in Slovenia (Mihelj 2005 ; Petrović 2009 ; Longinović 2011 ), but also elsewhere. Identity narratives at the north-west end of ‘nesting orientalisms’ (Bakić-Hayden 1995 ) trained racialising lenses south-east across the Balkans towards Muslim and dark-skinned refugees and migrants entering Europe. Slovenian and Croatian nationalism's performative rejection of Yugoslav state socialism and Yugoslav multi-ethnicity appeared to have also swept Yugoslav anti-colonial solidarities away.
refugees since World War II. Whilst it was first dubbed a ‘migrant crisis’, by the end of the same year, media outlets across Europe started referring to it as the largest ‘refugee crisis’ in the European Union (EU).
After the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s, EU Member States developed legal mechanisms, such as the Temporary Protection Directive,
founded on the idea of sharing responsibility in the case of greater numbers of people seeking asylum in the European Community
has been conducted on the position of stateless persons than on the status of refugees and other migrants (Belton, 2011 ; Foster and Lambert, 2019 ). Stateless people have also not been at the forefront of debates in the international community. Whilst 145 states are parties to the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, and 146 to the 1967 Protocol, only 91 are parties to the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, and just 74 to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. However, more recently there have been more
, 69). The antiziganism of western and eastern Europe still confronts south-east European Roma living in France or Britain but is less tangible in the USA.
Studies of South Slav diasporas – which consist of several waves, formed for different prevailing reasons during economic depressions, regime changes and war (Pryke 2003 ; Cederberg 2005 ; Colic-Peisker 2008 ) – have also started asking how migrants interpret their new countries' configurations of race. Hariz Halilovich's translocal ethnography of Bosniak refugees from Prijedor and
Sabotage as a citizenship enactment at the fringes
In this case, as the interviewee reflects, the problem was that the police did not protect her family as ordinary citizens of her country, but rather decided not to intervene on the basis of their interpretation of what Romani culture entails. This was not based on facts but on their racist ‘multicultural vision’.
Dani, a university-educated Romani man in his late twenties, was born into a family with refugee status in Germany. His parents had come to Germany from different parts of the former
promoted by including
externally affected interests in decisions made by particular governments and
by democratizing global governance regimes through the inclusion of non-state
actors and policy stakeholders (Macdonald 2008 ).
Globalizing national decision-making and democratizing global decision-making
in this way on issues such as climate change, refugee protection, global
poverty relief, international criminal justice, trade and finance is
On mediated unity and overarching legal-political form
and the movement of refugees across the world. That means breaking with
the conservatism inherent in plan-versus-market and nationalisation-versus-
privatisation approaches to the economy. But it also means re-examining, in
more general terms, the premises that continue to inform prevailing notions
of democratic statehood and citizenship, starting with the central theme of
The term mediated unity expresses the idea that, if there was no way
to bridge the political distance between citizens and the state through intermediary instances of public and
intergovernmental consultations and negotiations is only one. A second, and
increasingly important, response is government participation in the creation of
regional or global governance institutions on issues that systematically spill
across jurisdictional boundaries, such as climate change, refugee protection
and the persecution of crimes against humanity. 18 The third response is to directly represent
externally affected interests in
do is fully self-regarding – that is, has no perceptible
impact on anyone other than the agent herself.
Defenders of AAI will protest that I have caricatured their
principle by taking a case like the Mediterranean beach-bars. They are
concerned with much weightier instances in which governments take decisions
that impact outsiders – refugees, climate change, nuclear waste, and so
forth. What this reveals, however, is that any plausible