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still encompassed technical cooperation agreements with Botswana, Sudan, Burkina-Faso, Benin, Gambia, Equatorial Guinea, Zambia, Tanzania, the AU, Rwanda, Swaziland, Sierra Leone and, as of 2009, agreements under negotiation with Ethiopia, Mali Comoros, Burundi, Liberia and Chad. This does not include major projects such as experimental farms, national public health system development, and anti-retroviral factories that were being pursued in countries such as Ghana, Senegal, Angola, Namibia and Mozambique. In an overview publication from 2009, ABC reported 115
many countries, including Morocco, Senegal, Niger, Benin, Gabon, Mozambique, Zambia, Tanzania, Rwanda, Kenya and Mauritius. Some have called this ‘stadium diplomacy’ and it is not limited to Africa, but has extended to Central and Latin America, the small Pacific island nations and Southeast Asia. China has also built national theatres and opera houses in Algeria, Cameroon, Ghana, Mauritius, Senegal and Somalia – they were all gifts, gifts in disguise some would say. 11 The PRC hopes to build 100 hospitals on the African continent; it is also building schools
worked with genocide survivors in Rwanda and Bosnia, expressed scepticism about the use of oral history in conflict settings. 23 Oral historians have also sought to understand the narrative forms in oral histories. In the United States Ron Grele drew attention to the ‘underlying structure of consciousness which both governs and informs oral history interviews’. 24 Grele’s initial contribution to this process was an in-depth analysis of two oral history interviews conducted as part of a larger project in New York. The two accounts, he argued, employed two different
reach, passes the comprehension of a historian, who tries to uncover the motives of human behaviour and to discern the interests behind the motives. 62 This view raises many important issues for historians because it claims that the Holocaust is literally beyond the abilities of historians to understand. However much one might sympathise with that view, one has to ask certain questions about it. How horrific does an event have to be before it passes human understanding? Can historians, for example, deal with the genocidal massacres in Rwanda in the late
such that any survey of their provisions is beyond the scope of this book. 36 In some parts of the world, especially Africa, regional treaties are important in realising the transit rights of landlocked States. In recent years a number of ‘corridor agreements’ have been concluded in Africa. The Northern Corridor Transit and Transport Agreement (2007) 37 provides transit rights for Burundi, Rwanda
state based, can only be derived from an exercise of power by the UN under Article 42 (Chapter VII) or, if regional organisations are involved, Article 53 (Chapter VII). After the end of the Cold War, the Security Council extended the authorisations of military enforcement actions undertaken by coalitions from cases of inter-state aggression to threats to the peace caused by a variety of factors such as: state collapse and starvation (US-led coalition in Somalia 1992), 40 civil strife (US-led coalition in Haiti in 1994), 41 genocide (French operation in Rwanda in
endemic problem of the Council’s selectivity, it being very proactive for instance against Iraq and Yugoslavia in the 1990s, but woefully inadequate in its response to the Rwandan genocide of 1994 and the brutal civil war in the Congo spanning the turn of the twenty-first century that, together, have caused the death of millions. While there is greater agreement between the P5 than during the Cold War, there is still the problem of the ‘hidden veto’, whereby a permanent member’s threat to use a veto if a proposal is tabled often means that it does not reach a vote
successfully combating Iraq’s aggression against Kuwait in 1990–91 must be contrasted with its divisive and failed attempts to bring peace to Somalia in 1992–93 and the former Yugoslavia in the period 1992–95, and its ineptitude in the face of the genocides occurring in Rwanda in 1994 and Srebrenica in 1995. 41 Most IGOs are founded upon a constitutional-type treaty, some (such as NATO) are not. This is not to say that most IGOs are founded upon perfectly conceived constitutional documents and structures. Weaknesses abound. Certainly, there is an incompleteness about the
August 1995, para. 2. 24 Ibid. para. 28. 25 Ibid. paras 15, 35–6. 26 Articles 7(2), 29 UN Charter 1945. 27 Schermers and Blokker n. 20 at 173. See further the Meroni case, Case 9/56, ECR 1957–58 at 151–2 (ECJ). 28 Tadic case n. 23 para. 37. 29 Ibid. para. 19. 30 UN Doc S/RES/827 (1993). See also the Kanyabashi case, ICTR-96-15-I, 18 June 1996 decided by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. 31 But see D. Sarooshi, The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security (Oxford University Press 1999) 97. 32 UN