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established in 2011 by Executive Order 13584 to coordinate messaging on counter-radicalisation from a whole-of-government perspective. 106 Drawing together representatives from across the national security bureaucracy, the CSCC expanded the DOT’s online effort to a 50-strong staff with a budget of 6 million dollars by 2014. 107 Operating accounts across Twitter, Facebook, YouTube and other social media platforms
believed to be lenient treatment of Chinese accused of killing at least two Uyghur workers in a factory in the southern province of Guangdong. These workers were reportedly killed, and hundreds injured, after a false rumour spread that the Uyghur men had raped two Chinese woman. News of this incident spread to Xinjiang through the Internet and social media, sparking the 5 July demonstration in Urumqi. When
photographs and social media postings. This consumption and reproduction of the post-terrorist sign of resilience and recovery trades upon the exceptional rendering of the site – it appropriates the excess that lingers after a mass killing and turns that disruption to its advantage. Tourists respond to the signification of the excessive space and visit – then reproducing the sign in their own communications
comprehensive approach to the threats of terrorism and violent extremism’. 28 UNSC’s CVE measures also included initiatives to control and censor social media and the internet, as stated in the same document. Here, it was also argued that ‘in order to effectively counter terrorist narratives, States and others must enter more fully into the “marketplace of ideas”’. 29 Another example may be Resolution 1624 (2005) , which called on states to prohibit incitement to terrorism ( apologie ), severely reducing freedom of expression ( Kundnani and Hayes, 2018 ). Grounded in
clearly oriented towards Muslim communities, encompassing the codification of individual terrorism, foreign fighters, recruitment, training (including passive), the use of social media for propaganda, the improvement of intelligence capacities (including online undercover policing) and the implementation of active CVE policies. However, the mentioned ‘eventful transition’ (2011–2015) had eroded ‘major’ political parties, leading to their being challenged from the margins. Catalan and Basque nationalist parties, and leftist parties Podemos and Izquierda Unida, refused
1993 , 1996 ; Hellmich 2011 ), and the US government’s unsuccessful Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC) campaign to contest IS and AQ’s social media propaganda, revealing the ‘hypocrisy’ of neo-jihadist organisations is often unsuccessful at reducing their support base (Richards 2016a, 2016b). This is because these approaches often reaffirm reductive Othering interpretations of such organisations, which neglect the root causes of political violence, encouraging both discrimination and the entrenchment of political divisions. At other times
established organisations – ‘as Daesh is becoming more fragmented ... there will be more organisations to proscribe as small splinter groups and organisations spring up’ (Shannon 2016a ); and – in more recent proscriptions – anxiety around the influence of social media and the internet as a ‘safe haven for terrorists and extremists’ (Brokenshire 2015 ). There is also, though, metaphysical and moralised condemnation in which terrorism and terrorists are equivalenced to historical threats – ‘al-Qaeda, Boko Haram and, above all, ISIS … form an international fascist movement
to difficulty in proving their acts constituted terrorism, as to prove this in court requires mens rea (intention or guilty mind) and actus rea (action). In this case, the prosecutor was only to prove an intention to engage in violence in Syria and Iraq, but not the action. The only proof that the prosecutors had was communication in social media. Furthermore, the abolition of ISA has produced great challenges for the government, and particularly the RMP. ISA was an effective tool in handling subversive elements perceived to be a threat to national
Israeli army from the south of Lebanon. Hizbullah's Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah appeared on television to make the case for fighting in Syria against what he argued was a new form of threat in the region. In this speech, Nasrallah also explained the rationale behind his organization's backing of the Assad regime, which mostly involved backing the ‘Axis of Resistance’ and confronting this new enemy, ‘the Takfiri’ threat. Takfirism, in the words of Nasrallah and as disseminated by the dominant press and social media, is a label given to those Sunni jihadi groups
‘Troubles’ far more recently. 4 In this sense, at least, ISIS is merely the latest target of a power with ancient roots. Other echoes of the past may also be seen in more recent proscriptions such as the listing of the extreme right-wing organisation National Action and its aliases Scottish Dawn and NS131. National Action was finally banned in the UK in December 2016 after publicly celebrating the murder of the MP Jo Cox. This celebration – and its public enthusiasm for other atrocities on social media and beyond – were deemed to constitute glorification of terrorism