decisions to achieve them. In practice it has created problems that are at least as awkward. The stability pact has not held because in 2003 France and Germany so conspicuously disregarded the rules, despite having voted to enforce them two years earlier against Portugal. In so doing, they inflicted grievous damage on any notion that the authority of the EU institutions over monetary union could be impersonal or an agent to realise a European common good. But without some faith among the politicians and citizens of the euro states that monetary union will not produce
which put primary emphasis on implementation of the PCA that had only just entered into force in 1998 (Chirila, 2002: 53–55). From 1998, Moldovan governments continued to pay attention to European integration in their programmes, maintaining it as a strategic objective (Klipii, 2002: 9–26). Moreover, since the launch of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe in 1999, the Moldovan authorities made efforts to join this new EU initiative. They hoped that joining the Balkan group of potential EU candidates would provide Moldova with a clear perspective of EU
Council are convinced that the EU shall play its full role on the international stage’). Meanings at the EU level concerning the nature of EU actorness can therefore not be said to be fixed. POLICY PRACTICE The policy activities of the EU have so far concentrated on the civilian aspects of foreign policy (stability pacts, trade and cooperation agreements, political conditionality, declaratory
-track’ approach, combining a ﬁrm commitment to NATO’s aerial bombardment, together with intensive diplomatic eﬀorts aimed at averting military action. Inherent in Germany’s diplomatic behaviour were strong traits of multilateralism through the use of international institutions and bodies (i.e. G8, the EU, Quint) as means towards a solution. Through the special Kosovo summit in April in Cologne particularly, Germany, as president of the EU, took forward the idea of a broad stability pact for South-East Europe, promoting the importance of bringing the countries of the region into
Summit in June 1993 they were transformed into a perspective on enlargement of the European Union. A so-called Stability Pact was designed in order to de-escalate potential conflicts in the Central and Eastern parts of Europe. Furthermore, the Eastern enlargement can be regarded as a huge foreign policy initiative significantly increasing the scope of innumerable European regimes, from the entire acquis communautaire to administrative
the sense that they are able to explain and justify their actions. Thus a logic of appropriateness is seen to grow out of duty rather than of habit. 5 These lessons also inspired agreement on a French plan for a Stability Pact in Europe. The Pact was a forum in which the Central and Eastern European applicants were strongly encouraged to
covered in this volume, participate in the EU’s Regional Cooperation Council which superseded the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe in 2008. Turkey has its own bilateral relationship with the EU and has had an AA since 1963. For reasons of space we have not looked at the operation of these in detail in this chapter but many of the problems of the external governance approach of the ENP also apply to these relationships.