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reconstruction and development in the Balkans. In addition, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, a framework for building co-operation and peace in the region, has gained prominence as a vehicle for transforming the region from conflict to peace and prosperity. 1 The Stability Pact Although the Dayton Accords 2 of 14 December 1995
The European Union (EU) has emerged as an important security actor qua actor, not only in the non-traditional areas of security, but increasingly as an entity with force projection capabilities. This book investigates how the concept of security relates to or deals with different categories of threat, explores the relationship between forms of coordination among states, international institutions, and the provision of European security and the execution of security governance. It also investigates whether the EU has been effective in realising its stated security objectives and those of its member states. The book commences with a discussion on the changing nature of the European state, the changing nature and broadening of the security agenda, and the problem of security governance in the European political space. There are four functional challenges facing the EU as a security actor: the resolution of interstate conflicts, the management of intrastate conflicts, state-building endeavours, and building the institutions of civil society. The book then examines policies of prevention, particularly the pre-emption of conflict within Europe and its neighbourhood. It moves on to examine policies of assurance, particularly the problem of peace-building in south-eastern Europe. EU's peace-building or sustaining role where there has been a violent interstate or intrastate conflict, especially the origins and performance of the Stability Pact, is discussed. Finally, the book looks at the policies of protection which capture the challenge of internal security.
Normative underpinnings: from Dayton to the Stability Pact Dayton agreement: democracy, human rights and multiculturalism for Bosnia? The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina , initialled in Dayton, Ohio in November 1995 and formally signed in Paris one month later, brought to an end the armed conflict and initiated a process of peace-building in Bosnia. The
to bring these countries closer within its fold through an enlargement strategy, as set out under the Stability Pact for south-eastern Europe (SP) and the Stability and Association Process (SAP). Enlargement, in this respect can thus be seen as a conflict prevention tool. Before the EU introduced a genuine regional approach entailing the prospect of enlargement, its policy approaches to the
Council are convinced that the EU shall play its full role on the international stage’). Meanings at the EU level concerning the nature of EU actorness can therefore not be said to be fixed. POLICY PRACTICE The policy activities of the EU have so far concentrated on the civilian aspects of foreign policy (stability pacts, trade and cooperation agreements, political conditionality, declaratory
Maastricht Treaty criteria for economic growth, above all symbolised by the adherence of the ECB to the pursuit of narrow monetarism (as opposed to job creation) and by the enforcement of the 1997 Stability Pact, which forced countries to slash public spending. Hudson summarises the five key principles which would underpin EL policy as ‘full, qualified and secure employment; a leading role for public financial intervention; a sustainable economic model; defence of the public sector and public services; and guaranteed secure incomes and pensions at a level ensuring human
personal interests happened to be at stake. More fundamentally, a lack of reform, at least in economic and social areas, was due to the failure of the hoped-for economic growth to materialise, which was necessary given the constraints of the public debt and the EU’s Growth and Stability Pact. All this added grist to the mill of critics who found Berlusconi’s leadership wanting – as well as supplying an additional reason for the entrepreneur to attempt to shore up his decreasingly convincing claims in this area by complaining that not only the ‘communist’ opposition but
-track’ approach, combining a firm commitment to NATO’s aerial bombardment, together with intensive diplomatic efforts aimed at averting military action. Inherent in Germany’s diplomatic behaviour were strong traits of multilateralism through the use of international institutions and bodies (i.e. G8, the EU, Quint) as means towards a solution. Through the special Kosovo summit in April in Cologne particularly, Germany, as president of the EU, took forward the idea of a broad stability pact for South-East Europe, promoting the importance of bringing the countries of the region into
Summit in June 1993 they were transformed into a perspective on enlargement of the European Union. A so-called Stability Pact was designed in order to de-escalate potential conflicts in the Central and Eastern parts of Europe. Furthermore, the Eastern enlargement can be regarded as a huge foreign policy initiative significantly increasing the scope of innumerable European regimes, from the entire acquis communautaire to administrative
the sense that they are able to explain and justify their actions. Thus a logic of appropriateness is seen to grow out of duty rather than of habit. 5 These lessons also inspired agreement on a French plan for a Stability Pact in Europe. The Pact was a forum in which the Central and Eastern European applicants were strongly encouraged to