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reconstruction and development in the Balkans. In addition, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, a framework for building co-operation and peace in the region, has gained prominence as a vehicle for transforming the region from conflict to peace and prosperity. 1 The Stability Pact Although the Dayton Accords 2 of 14 December 1995
The European Union (EU) has emerged as an important security actor qua actor, not only in the non-traditional areas of security, but increasingly as an entity with force projection capabilities. This book investigates how the concept of security relates to or deals with different categories of threat, explores the relationship between forms of coordination among states, international institutions, and the provision of European security and the execution of security governance. It also investigates whether the EU has been effective in realising its stated security objectives and those of its member states. The book commences with a discussion on the changing nature of the European state, the changing nature and broadening of the security agenda, and the problem of security governance in the European political space. There are four functional challenges facing the EU as a security actor: the resolution of interstate conflicts, the management of intrastate conflicts, state-building endeavours, and building the institutions of civil society. The book then examines policies of prevention, particularly the pre-emption of conflict within Europe and its neighbourhood. It moves on to examine policies of assurance, particularly the problem of peace-building in south-eastern Europe. EU's peace-building or sustaining role where there has been a violent interstate or intrastate conflict, especially the origins and performance of the Stability Pact, is discussed. Finally, the book looks at the policies of protection which capture the challenge of internal security.
Stability Pact, but also the transformation of the EU’s instruments, in the form of an increasing institutionalisation of the CSDP (see Chapter 6 ). Before examining in detail three case studies, a brief overview of the EU’s foreign policy in Bosnia during this period is in order. Despite the marginalisation suffered by the EU during the latter stages of the armed conflict (see Chapter 4 ), with the signing
Normative underpinnings: from Dayton to the Stability Pact Dayton agreement: democracy, human rights and multiculturalism for Bosnia? The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina , initialled in Dayton, Ohio in November 1995 and formally signed in Paris one month later, brought to an end the armed conflict and initiated a process of peace-building in Bosnia. The
to bring these countries closer within its fold through an enlargement strategy, as set out under the Stability Pact for south-eastern Europe (SP) and the Stability and Association Process (SAP). Enlargement, in this respect can thus be seen as a conflict prevention tool. Before the EU introduced a genuine regional approach entailing the prospect of enlargement, its policy approaches to the
in the transitional administration of the city of Mostar. The biggest transformation of the EU’s foreign and security policy in Bosnia took place in the years from 1999, with the launch of the Stability Pact, the prospect of membership and the deployment of CSDP missions in the country. However, the impact of these developments on coherence and effectiveness has been mixed. Notwithstanding the EU
launches the Royaumont Process. April 1997: Council of the EU adopts the Regional Approach for the Western Balkan countries. 1999: Stability Pact and Stabilisation and Association Process launched. June 2000: Feira European Council endorses Bosnia’s status of ‘potential candidate’ and the prospect of EU membership
instrument for the post-conflict reconstruction of the Western Balkans. The Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe was signed in Cologne on 10 June 1999. 20 The Pact established the ‘European perspective’, which confirmed the EU’s intention to draw Southeastern Europe ‘closer to the perspective of full integration’ and adopted the principle of conditionality (Cortright 2007 : 411). The Pact was designed to
‘stabilisation and association’ process (SAP) for South East Europe. The SAP would provide financial assistance and cooperation to the countries of the former Yugoslavia and Albania in order to ‘draw the region closer to the perspective of full integration into EU structures’. 5 In addition, in June 1999, G8 leaders endorsed the EU’s proposal for a ‘Stability Pact’ which would provide a political framework for
public opinion. 2 Officially, however, France supported the campaign and actively engaged in the negotiation of the international peace plan for Kosovo. Germany, which held the Presidency of the European Union at the time, played a vital role in the negotiations. Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer launched a peace plan and the idea of a Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe in April 1999. 3