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This book explains theoretical work in postcolonial and postsocialist studies to offer a novel and distinctive insight into how Yugoslavia is configured by, and through, race. It presents the history of how ideas of racialised difference have been translated globally in Yugoslavia. The book provides a discussion on the critical race scholarship, global historical sociologies of 'race in translation' and south-east European cultural critique to show that the Yugoslav region is deeply embedded in global formations of race. It considers the geopolitical imagination of popular culture; the history of ethnicity; and transnational formations of race before and during state socialism, including the Non-Aligned Movement. The book also considers the post-Yugoslav discourses of security, migration, terrorism and international intervention, including the War on Terror and the refugee crisis. It elaborates how often-neglected aspects of the history of nationhood and migration reveal connections that tie the region into the global history of race. The book also explains the linkage between ethnic exclusivism and territory in the ethnopolitical logic of the Bosnian conflict and in the internationally mediated peace agreements that enshrined it: 'apartheid cartography'. Race and whiteness remained perceptible in post-war Bosnian identity discourses as new, open-ended forms of post-conflict international intervention developed.
the Croatian journalists interviewed in 2006 by two Slovenian media scholars about how they had reported Croat war crimes against Bosniaks replied through discourses of the ‘We had to fight against Islamic terrorism’ type, with one commenting, ‘I think that Croatia had to fight against Islamic terrorists like America or the West … it is well-known that most of the Bosniaks are Islamic fundamentalists’ (Erjavec and Volčič 2007 : 14). Another recontextualised Croatian war aims in Bosnia as a campaign to prevent al-Qaida, specifically its then deputy leader Ayman al
forms of justice rather than geopolitical stabilisation. While genealogy as a method for analysing international relations has been a significant import into the discipline, some have drawn upon the ideas of archaeology. At a minimum, acknowledging a debt to Foucault, Hayward Alker and Thomas Biersteker ( 1984 ) sought to develop a framework for a ‘future archeologist of international savoir faire’. 32 Philippe Bonditti deploys an archaeological approach to discuss the relationship between terrorism
find it being expressed. The List of Issues the Human Rights Committee (HRC) gave in response to the UK’s seventh periodic report under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 2014, for instance, might have been expected to have chiefly addressed topics under the rubric of “negative” restraints on public power. And, indeed, it does raise concerns about the scope of anti-terrorism legislation, measures to prevent deaths in police custody, and the use of physical restraint in young offender institutions. 25 Yet the List of Issues also addresses
not need to look very hard for examples of this phenomenon. Beyond political community Here is another way of putting it: citizens may not have that much interest in collective self-governance in states. The security imperative that was once so central to state function (providing a safe space against hostile competitor states) has dissipated. Terrorism creates security needs, but the battle lines do not coincide with
facilitated a range of illegal practices that are invariably secret. 9 In 1989, following the G7 Summit in Paris, an international consortium of governments established a Financial Action Task Force to combat money laundering and financing of terrorism. Since the events of 9/11 regulatory requirements have intensified and a plethora of these instruments, some collective, others set up by individual western
explicitly racialised Islam. The conflation of historical myths about defence against Islam with contemporary transnational security discourses about terrorism and migration was widespread in post-Yugoslav Slovenia and, as they too built relationships with EU border security structures, the other successor states (Mihelj 2005 ; Petrović 2009 : 44–5). Tomislav Longinović, writing on 1980s–90s Slovenian identifications with Western Catholicism/‘Mitteleuropa’ and on interwar Yugoslav ideas of a ‘Dinaric race’, already reads ‘race’ and whiteness as
s state socialisms, from Hungarian aspirations to a bridging role in European security policy to Gorbachev's imagination of a ‘common European home’, at a time when elites might have been losing faith in the alternative global project of connecting the state socialist world and Global South (Mark 2015 ). Pragmatic–technocratic reformers, and strategists expressing fears of terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, were both ‘appropriating’ this position in Yugoslavia by 1989 (Kilibarda 2010 : 40). Late Yugoslav and post-Yugoslav ‘nesting orientalisms’ thus rejected
As we have seen, the Institute worked with a similar framing of the supersession of a competitive phase of capitalism. Nonetheless, the forty years since Poulantzas's book constitute a period as long as that between its publication and that of the Institute's Studien in the 1930s. Notwithstanding the recent rise of a ‘security state’ in the wake of international terrorism, the ‘intensified state control’ claim superficially jars with the legacy of subsequent neoliberal privatizations of state functions. Hall's authoritarian populism, however, appears to escape
social pathology which plagues ‘reflexive freedom’, that of morally inspired terrorism. For Honneth ( 2014 [2011]: 119), the actions of the Baader-Meinhof Group typify such a social pathology: a rigidity of social action exists which prevents healthy recognition relationships from forming. The possibility of a flourishing intersubjective recognition relationship, enabling communicative