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president to use America’s military might because, ultimately, ‘It’s what our fathers taught us’? 6 These shows make powerful, resonant, and consequential discursive interventions into policy debates, as is demonstrated by the fact it was to these shows that these three giants of American politics turned in explaining their lives and the challenges facing the US and its government. This chapter traces the interventions and impact of Homeland, 24 , and The West Wing on America’s world politics, with a particular focus on how Americans think and feel about counter-terrorism
Under Vladimir Putin, the Russian leadership has consistently sought to shape a strategic agenda. This book discusses the strategy planning process and the legislative and policy architecture that has taken shape. It explores the nature of the agenda itself, particularly Putin's May Edicts of 2012, which set out Moscow's core strategic agenda. The book examines the questions raised by the numerous problems in planning and the extent to which they undermine the idea of Russian grand strategy. It explores what the Russian leadership means by a 'unified action programme', its emphasis on military modernisation, problems that Russian observers emphasise, strategy undermining, and the relation of mobilisation with the Russian grand strategy. The book argues that Russian strategy is less to be found in Moscow's plans, and more in the so-called vertical of power. The broader picture of Russian grand strategy, and the leadership's ability to implement those plans, is examined. The book discusses patriotic mass mobilisation often referred to as the 'Crimea effect', and the role of the All Russian Popular Front in the implementation of the leadership's plans, especially the May Edicts. It talks about the ongoing debate in the Russian armed forces. Finally, some points regarding Russian grand strategy are discussed.
American television was about to be revolutionised by the advent of video on demand in 2007, when Netflix, having delivered over one billion DVDs, introduced streaming. This book explores the role that fictional television has played in the world politics of the US in the twenty-first century. It focuses on the second golden age of television, which has coincided with the presidencies of George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald J. Trump. The book is structured in three parts. Part I considers what is at stake in rethinking the act of watching television as a political and academic enterprise. Part II considers fictional television shows dealing explicitly with the subject matter of formal politics. It explores discourses of realpolitik in House of Cards and Game of Thrones, arguing that the shows reinforce dominant assumptions that power and strategy inevitably trump ethical considerations. It also analyses constructions of counterterrorism in Homeland, The West Wing, and 24, exploring the ways in which dominant narratives have been contested and reinforced since the onset of the War on Terror. Part III considers television shows dealing only implicitly with political themes, exploring three shows that make profound interventions into the political underpinnings of American life: The Wire, The Walking Dead and Breaking Bad. Finally, the book explores the legacies of The Sopranos and Mad Men, as well as the theme of resistance in The Handmaid's Tale.
that their political system could be forcefully transplanted into countries whose existing systems had been banished but which had no historical experience with or traditions of democracy. The conflicts, which became part and parcel of a war on terrorism, drained the West not only of resources but also of confidence in the future. The Arab Spring gave reason for optimism concerning the overthrow of autocratic regimes in the Middle East. But the optimism was short-lived as, in most cases, more liberal structures failed to take root. The Great Recession of 2007
As President I wanted to share with Russia … which I have the right to do, facts pertaining to terrorism and airline safety … plus I want Russia to greatly step up their fight against ISIS & terrorism.” 1 Donald J. Trump, after sharing highly classified intelligence with the Russian Foreign Minister and Moscow’s Ambassador to the United States How can we see Islamist terror and Russian aggression as companion threats to the West when terrorists target Russia as well as the United States and its allies? Isn’t this why President Trump has argued for
Hello, everybody. This is not Frank Underwood, it’s Barack Obama. Barack Obama 1 Introduction This book analyses the period since the turn of the millennium – television’s second golden age. This period covers the world politics of the US during the presidencies of Bush, Obama, and Trump. When George W. Bush came to power in January 2001, it was far from obvious that he would pursue two large regional wars and an extensive counter-terrorism campaign. He was elected on the basis of a promise to do less in the world, if at all possible. His
“I alone can fix it.” Donald J. Trump, accepting Republican nomination for President of the United States 1 The second major 2016 shock for transatlantic relations came in the United States with the Republican nomination and then electoral victory of Donald Trump – someone who had selfidentified as both a Democrat and Republican over the years and donated money to candidates of both parties. Trump raised concerns throughout the campaign as someone who played on the fears of Americans concerning both terrorism and their own financial well
’s first paragraph in an essay on terrorism: Terrorism is a fundamental contemporary issue that ‘exploded’ onto the scene following the 9/11 attacks (Fortna, 2011). Since then it has become the subject of intricate analysis determining what causes certain groups to turn to violent tactics. Terrorism is a highly complex phenomenon and previous literature has found little consensus as to what constitutes terrorism (Smelser, 2007; Della Porta, 2008; Gibbs, 1989; Crenshaw 2005; Fortna 2011; Goodwin 2006; Edwards; 2013). As a consequence of its ambiguity I
internal disorder or disease, crime and terrorism, cyber threats to its infrastructure or threats to its pillars of prosperity, military threats in its region or to its allies, challenges to its essential interests abroad, right up to wars of aggression against it. Governments have to manage the relative risks they pose by assessing both the severity and the likelihood of their occurrence. In 2008 the British government began producing a National Risk Register and a three-tier ‘national security risk assessment
budgets are unfeasibly low, since so much is hidden in other budget lines or simply not reported. Britain, however, follows NATO’s long-established guidelines in the way defence budgets should be presented. Nevertheless, the cost of ‘security’ for Britain also involves defending the country from international terrorism, cyberattack, organised crime, illegal migration and disorder abroad. Other budget lines might be regarded as part of what the country pays for its security (Chalmers 2015 ). These are