Under Vladimir Putin, the Russian leadership has consistently sought to shape a strategic agenda. This book discusses the strategy planning process and the legislative and policy architecture that has taken shape. It explores the nature of the agenda itself, particularly Putin's May Edicts of 2012, which set out Moscow's core strategic agenda. The book examines the questions raised by the numerous problems in planning and the extent to which they undermine the idea of Russian grand strategy. It explores what the Russian leadership means by a 'unified action programme', its emphasis on military modernisation, problems that Russian observers emphasise, strategy undermining, and the relation of mobilisation with the Russian grand strategy. The book argues that Russian strategy is less to be found in Moscow's plans, and more in the so-called vertical of power. The broader picture of Russian grand strategy, and the leadership's ability to implement those plans, is examined. The book discusses patriotic mass mobilisation often referred to as the 'Crimea effect', and the role of the All Russian Popular Front in the implementation of the leadership's plans, especially the May Edicts. It talks about the ongoing debate in the Russian armed forces. Finally, some points regarding Russian grand strategy are discussed.
nature of being an autonomous legal entity on the international stage. The debate about the extent of the doctrine of legal powers is addressed through three case studies: the legality of peacekeeping undertaken by the UN (including a discussion of the Expenses opinion); the competence of the WHO and UN in relation to the possession or use of nuclear weapons by states (including a discussion of the Nuclear Weapons opinions); and the legislative powers of the Security Council (focusing on its counter-terrorism decision in Resolution 1373 of 2001).
The doctrine of
. Some exploit the legitimate grievances of the Palestinian people under occupation by Israel, and conceal prejudice against the Jewish people behind the formula of ‘anti-Zionism’. We oppose this type of racism too, as should go without saying.
9 United against terror
We are opposed to all forms of terrorism. The deliberate targeting of civilians is a crime under international law and all recognized codes of warfare, and it cannot be justified by the argument that it is done in a cause that is just. Terrorism inspired by Islamist ideology is widespread today. It
internal disorder or disease, crime and
terrorism, cyber threats to its infrastructure or threats to its pillars
of prosperity, military threats in its region or to its allies,
challenges to its essential interests abroad, right up to wars of
aggression against it. Governments have to manage the relative risks
they pose by assessing both the severity and the likelihood of their
occurrence. In 2008 the British government began producing a National
Risk Register and a three-tier ‘national security risk
unfeasibly low, since so much is hidden in other budget lines or simply
not reported. Britain, however, follows NATO’s long-established
guidelines in the way defence budgets should be presented.
Nevertheless, the cost of ‘security’ for
Britain also involves defending the country from international
terrorism, cyberattack, organised crime, illegal migration and disorder
abroad. Other budget lines might be regarded as part of what the country
pays for its security (Chalmers 2015 ). These are
open propaganda of hatred and enmity in social networks’. The aim was obvious, he suggested: to ‘strike a blow at [Russia’s] sovereignty’. 15
The Russian authorities link such concerns to questions of terrorism. On one hand, they state that extremism is used as one of the tools of regime change: financial, political and informational support for terrorists is used to undermine and attack states, including Russia itself. On the other, they argue that the result of regime change operations is the eruption of chaos and instability, conditions in which terrorism
safeguards, the elevation of the great leader; and of turning a blind eye to all this so as, supposedly, not to give comfort to enemies on the political right. It should know better, but it doesn’t.
What am I talking about? I’m talking about a Marxist left from within which after 9/11 there came voices ready to make excuses for an act of mass murder that the whole left should have forthrightly condemned. And which, more generally, is always free with forms of ‘understanding’ of terrorism – by another name, murder of the innocent – in a shallow root-causes sociology of
the president is responsible for the NG’s activities, and that the NG is one of the forces that the authorities can call on in the event of a state of emergency. 8
The NG has a dual function. The first involves civil disobedience management. The Kremlin’s spokesman, Dmitri Peskov, has stated that the NG will engage in the enforcement of public order and participate in anti-terrorism operations. 9 Altay Krai’s regional NG commander suggested at a public briefing that the structure was established to combat revolutionary ferment and a ‘fifth column’, particularly
forms the government.
Sources of the constitution
Moran (2006) notes the eclectic nature of the British constitution:
‘Normal’ statutes. These are laws passed affecting the power of the state. For example, habeas corpus, codified by an Act of 1679, limits the right of the state to detain anyone without trial. Since then, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1974 was passed to increase state powers in relation to those suspected of terrorist offences; as it was a ‘temporary’ measure, it has been renewed every year since and was further strengthened by the Anti-terrorism
multilateral inter-state agreements, which include treaties designed to tackle threats such as terrorism, and treaties that purport to give rights to all individuals. As Security Council measures increasingly affect, or even target, individuals the range of potentially conflicting treaty obligations is broadened, as the following case studies show. Should Article 103 be interpreted as a ‘supremacy’ clause to be interpreted expansively to cover all inconsistent obligations (including those imposed on states to protect human rights) and, possibly, to cover obligations under