MUP FINAL PROOF – <STAGE>, 01/16/2014, SPi 4 An overview of Far Right political parties in the Balkan region and political party selection The aim of this chapter is to describe the overall Far Right scene in the region and indicate cases for further analysis. In order to be preselected for further investigation, the party must have been depicted by researchers as a Far Right party and must have gained at least one seat during parliamentary elections in the 2000–2010 period. The Far Right in Croatia In 1999, Ivan Grdešić noted that the presence of the Croatian
Since 1990 the wolf has been a protected species in Germany; killing a wolf is a crime punishable by a prison sentence of up to five years. In Eastern Germany, where the political ground is shifting to the right, locals argue that the wolves are not German but Western Polish, undeserving of protection since they have invaded Saxon territory and threatened the local way of life. Many people in Eastern Germany feel that the wolf, like the migrant, has been a problem for years, but that nobody in power is listening to them. At a time when nationalist parties are on the rise everywhere in Europe, The wolves are coming back offers an insight into the rise of Eastern German fringe political movements and agitation against both migrants and wolves by hunters, farmers, rioters and self-appointed saviours of the nation. The nationalist Alternative for Germany (AfD) represents the third-largest party in the German federal parliament, with representation in the vast majority of German states. It draws much of its support from regions that have been referred to as the ‘post-traumatic places’ in Eastern Germany, structured by realities of disownment, disenfranchisement and a lack of democratic infrastructure. Pates and Leser provide an account of the societal roots of a new group of radical right parties, whose existence and success we always assumed to be impossible.
is not just far right politics but that of Government and mainstream opposition. Further, asylum seekers have been demonised in parts of the media and, perhaps more startlingly, under-protected by law. The result is that we lock up far too many of these desperate and vulnerable people. We lock them up for far too long, in some cases up to ﬁve years. We lock them up with their children. We lock up lone children with adult strangers (while we argue about their true age). We lock up victims of unlawful past imprisonment, and of rape and torture. We provide inadequate
political party (in Montenegro’s case, DPS; in Croatia, HDZ) which left no space for Far Right formations. The tactics and strategy of HDZ and DPS were important determinants in the failure of the Far Right parties in these countries. Both parties openly promoted independence. HDZ even secretly negotiated for the division of BiH and the creation of Greater Croatia. The chief political players promoted nationalism and left no space for Far Right political parties. Albania, with a large Albanian population outside its borders could present a grand opportunity for the Far
MUP FINAL PROOF – <STAGE>, 01/16/2014, SPi 6 External supply side: the roots of success and political opportunity structures in successful cases This chapter is devoted to variables which might potentially influence the success of Far Right political parties. After reviewing scholarship focused on the roots of success and political opportunity structures, we will closely explore the Serbian, Bulgarian and Romanian milieu and try to apply potential variables for these cases. Some scholars suspect the good fortune enjoyed by the parties has mostly resulted from a
and public discourse (Berger 2014 ). The most vocal Islamophobic leader was Geert Wilders, the most prominent figure after Fortuyn in Dutch politics. He was not only popular in the Netherlands but was seen as a vanguard against the tidal wave of Islamisation sweeping across Europe. He also worked with other European and American far-right political figures and groups (Hafez 2014 ). Fortuyn had warned against the Islamisation of the Netherlands, but Wilders took these warnings a step further by proposing the de-Islamisation of the Netherlands. He advocated that
The tensions and rifts between France and the Muslim world, whether domestic or regional, may be analysed as resulting from various historic dynamics. The most important of these rifts is an internal one. It is by far the most structural – and the most decisive. Above all, it is rooted in the contemporary, post-Revolutionary history of French society. This rift has, however, been made more explicit and amplified by recent political power struggles, particularly since 2018. Like many of their European counterparts, for several decades, French political forces had thrown themselves into defiant electioneering one-upmanship against their fellow citizens descended from Muslim backgrounds. Since 2018, this posture has no longer been the sole preserve of far-right political forces. It has become the position of a quasi-majority of the political landscape. Far more consequentially, it has become the policy of the government of President Emmanuel Macron. This chapter examines the historical roots of Islamophobia in the French context, as well as how the issue of Muslims and Islamophobia has become deeply politicised in France.
hysteria’ and for being ‘alarmist’. This kind of discourse is intended to vilify the Greens. 16 The far right is frequently presented as engaging in overly affective politics by harnessing and amplifying a multiplicity of negative emotions. Far-right politics is said to be characterised by the use of fear, 17 the rhetorics of rage and anger, 18 and expressions of hatred. 19 Yet a few problems arise from a dualistic and normative conception of the political affects on the far right. 20 Whilst negative emotions are considered only in the context of far-right politics
know how to retain their jobs in a fast-changing, globalized world revise their value system, bringing about a ‘silent counterrevolution’. The term encompasses the rise of Green and post-materialist parties under generational, ecological and societal change. With the rise of Far Right parties in Western Europe and the fall of the Iron Curtain, researchers began to set their sights on the countries of the former Eastern Bloc. In so doing, significant questions arose: is the Far Right political family of Eastern Europe comparable to that of Western Europe? Is the same
and values from far right political parties? A sixth issue is about the notion of a knowledge economy. Is there more than one knowledge economy (Shore and Wright, 2017)? Are there knowledge cultures as well as knowledge economies? Is higher education for a knowledge economy a good or a bad thing? What has happened to knowledge for its own sake –is that an unrescuable property? Should lifelong learning move well away from notions of knowledge economies? Finally, where do research and interdisciplinarity fit into lifelong learning? Is research only for the privileged