Since 1990 the wolf has been a protected species in Germany; killing a wolf is a crime punishable by a prison sentence of up to five years. In Eastern Germany, where the political ground is shifting to the right, locals argue that the wolves are not German but Western Polish, undeserving of protection since they have invaded Saxon territory and threatened the local way of life. Many people in Eastern Germany feel that the wolf, like the migrant, has been a problem for years, but that nobody in power is listening to them. At a time when nationalist parties are on the rise everywhere in Europe, The wolves are coming back offers an insight into the rise of Eastern German fringe political movements and agitation against both migrants and wolves by hunters, farmers, rioters and self-appointed saviours of the nation. The nationalist Alternative for Germany (AfD) represents the third-largest party in the German federal parliament, with representation in the vast majority of German states. It draws much of its support from regions that have been referred to as the ‘post-traumatic places’ in Eastern Germany, structured by realities of disownment, disenfranchisement and a lack of democratic infrastructure. Pates and Leser provide an account of the societal roots of a new group of radical right parties, whose existence and success we always assumed to be impossible.
However, by the time Argentina and Brazil announced their intention to “return to the world” and re-embrace globalisation, globalisation itself had become elusive and entered in a deep crisis. When MERCOSUR sought to attract foreign investment and relaunch trade negotiations, no positive response was forthcoming from the rich world. International trade started to show growing signs of fragmentation, and, since 2016, the rise of new nationalist and far-rightpolitical actors has brought protectionism and contestation of multilateral institutions and rules. In this
hysteria’ and for being ‘alarmist’. This kind of discourse is intended to vilify the Greens. 16
The far right is frequently presented as engaging in overly affective politics by harnessing and amplifying a multiplicity of negative emotions. Far-rightpolitics is said to be characterised by the use of fear, 17 the rhetorics of rage and anger, 18 and expressions of hatred. 19 Yet a few problems arise from a dualistic and normative conception of the political affects on the far right. 20 Whilst negative emotions are considered only in the context of far-rightpolitics
thus not the wolf that is like the migrant but the migrant who takes on similar meanings to the cipher of the wolf. In far-rightpolitics, the wolf thus serves as a figure to construe a (predominantly) rural population as vulnerable to infiltrating populations of predators who have been invited in by urban dwellers who remain luxuriously far removed from the consequences of their decisions.
Rethinking the relationship between capitalism, communism, and democracy
they make it possible for farrightpolitical forces to channel popular discontent with the status quo in a reactionary direction.
This is not the only lesson that the left and humanity have to draw from recent history. The rise of neoliberalism has laid to rest the illusion, stemming from capitalism’s brief golden age immediately after World War II, that it is possible to humanize capitalism by subjecting it to democratic controls. The Cold War context of that period contributed to this illusion in a number of ways. On the one hand, it put pressure on capitalist
Nazi past would work as a political ‘handicap’ for far-rightpolitical agents. 33 Now, however, the stigma is used as a resource for far-right parties.
‘Germany – Never again!’
In Eastern Germany there has been a historically different understanding of the ‘problematic’ German nation that has led to a greater attention to the governance of problematic ‘leftist’ nationalisms. In particular, during reunification, a left-wing political movement called the Antideutsche Bewegung (Anti-German Movement) emerged that rejected every form of German nationalism per se
many people became unemployed, tens of thousands, practically overnight. If you go to Eastern Saxony today, right at the border to Poland and the Czech Republic, you’ll find a lot of abandoned houses, inner city centres which are empty, and only older people on the streets, because most of the young people left. We lost two generations actually here in the last twenty years. 56
A narrative of depopulation and ‘empty villages’ without any women left to reproduce becomes prone to being exploited by far-rightpolitics and filled with anxieties about the future. As the
fallback will become the position from which we shall sally forth to kick off the reconquista. 21
For these far-rightpolitical agents, ‘national rebirth’ has a time and a place: it is set in former Eastern Germany. Teleologically, the narrative ends not in the catastrophe of the Germans dying out but in salvation from the brink of catastrophe.
These narratives of ‘great replacement’, ‘national resistance’ and ‘national rebirth’ were not invented by the AfD. In fact, most of these ideas date back to the nineteenth century, and today, with the rise of the right we
-economic developments regarding neo-jihadism from 2017 to 2020, and within the global economic system. It incorporates comparative consideration of other political philosophies and movements, from anarchism and left-wing activism to the GWOT and a twenty-first-century rise in far-rightpolitics and (neo-)fascism. Furthermore, I elaborate a brief consideration of evolutionary developments within the phenomenon of neo-jihadism, including several forecasts of the political activities of AQ and IS.
Drawing on theoretical and strategic inferences about the variegated nature of neo
and recognition of the culture’s
origins were set against ‘tatty’ flying jackets, glue-sniffing and far-rightpolitics.46
Bushell, too, had begun to lose heart by late 1982, writing a provocative article
for Sounds that suggested punk had become formulaic, ghettoised and fatalistic,
losing its way to the libertarian sensibilities of anarchists like Crass that he felt
ignored the ‘class realities of contemporary British society’.47 Thereafter, he
continued to support bands fuelled by the same sense of working-class anger
that he had first recognised in punk, be it