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prescient in warning that the foreign policy of a United States that did not face an existential threat would become ‘capricious’ (Waltz, 2000 : 29). In any system, states will balance each other, rather than ‘bandwagon’. Waltz uses the term in the sense of ‘jump on the bandwagon’, in other words, align themselves with the most powerful, or ‘winning ‘state’. Bandwagoning is a characteristic of domestic politics, in that people are more likely to vote for a political party that they think is going to win, or will align themselves with the most powerful
. These regimes in also shared the basic anti-communist orientation of the Atlantic alliance, which was reflected in the fact that their foreign policies had been compatible with the EEC and NATO after the war. The transition to democracy from authoritarian forms of government fit well within the existing European narrative of overcoming Nazism. 64 The second phase of integration (1985–2003) Although the events of the 1960s and 1970s contributed to the classic narrative of integration, endowing it with the central image of Auschwitz, this was a period of
in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) has very recently come into view in scholarship ‘between the posts’ (Chari and Verdery 2009 ) of postsocialism and postcolonialism as an explanation for its ambiguities within global raciality. The autonomous foreign policy and Marxist ideology that Yugoslav Communists sought after the 1948 Tito–Stalin split led Yugoslavia to become a founder member of this self-declared geopolitical third force that emerged from the 1955 Bandung conference of anti-imperialist African and Asian states. Recovering Non-Alignment as a topic of
civilisational faultlines (Huntington 1996 ), or a phenomenon that alongside neo-Nazi attacks on refugees in Germany and sectarian violence in Northern Ireland revealed a resurgent, ethnic ‘new nationalism’ of ‘blood and belonging’ (Ignatieff 1994 ). These foreign-policy discourses were the background to how people from the Yugoslav region fleeing across, settling within, transiting over or temporarily crossing Western societies' borders were categorised – with implications for their legal and social status, the conditions on which they might belong or not belong within
. Sajo (ed.), Human Rights with Modesty: The Problem of Universalism (Springer, 2004), 51. 18 There is a vast literature on this topic. The most concise and well-known statement is B. Kausikan, “Asia’s Different Standard,” 92, Foreign Policy (1993) 24. 19 M. A. Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse (Free Press, 1991). 20 C. Thomas, “The Rights Revolution and America’s Urban Poor: Victims or Beneficiaries?” Address Before the Federalist Society and the Manhattan Institute (16th May 1994), in 60 Vital Speeches of the Day (1994
‘uninhibited and magnetic personality’ (Gonsalves, 2010b : xiii). Since Gonsalves combines the authority of an intellectual eastern Caribbean leader with a determination to follow his own diplomatic, aid and foreign policy paths, it is hardly surprising that American State Department analysts have taken an interest in his activities. In one report, he is
understanding the rise of totalitarianism and the problems associated with instrumental reason in the interwar years. Notes 1 K. Lowe , Savage Continent: Europe in the Aftermath of World War II ( New York : St. Martin’s Press , 2012 ); J. Habermas and J. Derrida , ‘ February 15, Or what Binds Europeans Together: A Plea for a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in the Core of Europe ,’ Constellations , 10 : 3 ( 2003 ), 293 . For more on total war, see J. Black , The Age of Total War, 1860–1945 ( Westport : Praeger Security International , 2006 ). My
increasingly do not remember the war either. This change is perhaps most obvious in the handover of the German Chancellorship from Helmut Kohl to Gerhard Schröder in 1998. Born in 1930, Kohl used his position as chancellor to deepen integration by laying the foundations for the EMU. By contrast, while Schröder accepted the EMU as a given, he admitted that it was not a high priority. Born in 1944, two decades after the forty-fivers, Schröder rejected the seemingly ingrained Europeanist instinct of postwar German foreign policy. He argued that it was time for Berlin to
condition of harmony’, Gray cites a whole host of examples, from the extreme to the mainstream, which include the Jacobin ‘terror’, Stalinism, Nazism, the unsuccessful attempt to engineer a market economy in post-Soviet Russia, as well as the neo-conservatism of George W. Bush and the United States’s recent foreign policy initiatives in light of the so-called ‘war on terror’.15 According to Gray’s account, all these phenomena were utopian in nature on the grounds of their patent impossibility, and as a result they were destined to fail. Conditions were simply not