The first thing to say about liberal order is that it hasn’t been that liberal. Since
the Second World War, the production of subjects obeisant to the rule of liberal institutions
has depended on illiberal and authoritarian methods – not least on the periphery of the
world system, where conversion to Western reason has been pursued with particularly millenarian
zeal, and violence. The wishful idea of an ever more open and global market economy has been
continuously undermined by its champions, with their subsidies
crises. Resistance aside for now, what’s often left out of this narrative is precisely how the organisation of violence takes considered financial and material investment to ensure its sustainability over time. Indeed, the very idea of a liberal peace that emerged through this progressive account of human cohabitation proved to be a complete misnomer, as it wilfully and violently destroyed illiberal forms of planetary life.
Violence is the Result of Difference
The idea of racial violence is part of a broader schematic that connects to competing claims to
challenged. The ground gained by so called ‘illiberal
democracy’ is prodigious, not merely in terms of the number of countries where illiberal
politics is alive and thriving, many of which are in the West (the US, much of the EU, the UK)
but in terms of the creeping legitimacy that attends right-wing solutions to ongoing social and
political problems. This is nowhere truer than in the major new power in the international
system, China, where a version of state-controlled capitalism co-exists alongside a principled
rejection of liberalism.
likely to commit violence against nonliberal states, possibly leading to a form of liberal imperialism (Doyle, 2005)
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Building a peace economy?
there is an underlying promotion of liberal democratic values and systems by
those who support the hypothesis. Simultaneous adherence to the range of
liberal norms is still seen as inherently pacifying, with liberal actors only
‘provoked’ into violence when faced with illiberal and thus disruptive regimes.
Concomitant beliefs in the power of civil society
for the DSI insofar as it provides a moral justification for separating
‘illiberal’ leaders from their people (Kelsall, 2004). Portraying leaders as
criminal as opposed to political actors justifies their removal and the insertion
of leaders more palatable, or favourable to liberal goals and stability. In this
sense, internationally led RoL measures can be seen as a tool which grants
external powerful actors a great deal of control over states and regions recovering from conflict.
Despite the fact that no senior elected politicians have ever been charged
political, social contestation (Craig and
This ideologically biased form of conflict programming, which focuses
largely on bringing stability (or negative peace) as opposed to substantial
transformation (positive peace) to post-conflict areas, is fundamentally a tool
for creating liberal regimes in previously ‘illiberal’ parts of the world. At least
four specific impacts of this approach on transformation programming have
been exposed. First, the standard critique of the liberal peace in this regard is
that local needs become secondary to global, or foreign
interrelated challenges to the existing human rights and humanitarian regime: illiberal states and ideologies; failed states; and globalization and business. It highlights that there are more vehicles for individuals to participate in human rights and humanitarian diplomacy and that diplomacy should be judged, not by how close it meets a particular ideal, but whether at a particular place and time, human dignity was preserved. As long as the status of human dignity is better than it was before, then diplomacy was successful.
Illiberal states and ideologies
from the right – were inclined to print banknotes to solve their short-term budget problems. It led to unsustainable inflation, which undermined the long-term development of the French economy. Between 1973 and 1982 inflation was never under 9.1 percent per year. 4 This changed radically when, in 1993, the French government decided to follow the German example and to make the central bank independent. Since that time inflation in France has never exceeded 2.8 percent, reached in 2008. 5
Independent bodies fulfill important functions in
himself from liberal democracy. “We have to state,” he said, “that democracy does not necessarily have to be liberal. Just because a state is not liberal, it can still be a democracy.” 16 Orbán continued: “We must break with liberal principles and methods of social organization, and in general with the liberal understanding of society,” concluding: “And so, in this sense the new state that we are constructing in Hungary is an illiberal state, a non-liberal state.” 17
Orbán’s remarks did not come as a complete surprise. In May 2014 the European Court of Human Rights
towards women, immigrants,
non-whites or homosexuals over the eighteenth, nineteenth and
twentieth centuries to see that the observation of the consequences of
associated human behaviour is open to the same error and illusion as
the perception of natural objects. The emergence of a public can also
not be equated with an a priori expression of correctness or justness. As
highlighted above, publics can emerge in response to other publics or
often come into conflict with one another due to incompatible interests.
This process itself can lead to the emergence of illiberal