interrelated challenges to the existing human rights and humanitarian regime: illiberal states and ideologies; failed states; and globalization and business. It highlights that there are more vehicles for individuals to participate in human rights and humanitarian diplomacy and that diplomacy should be judged, not by how close it meets a particular ideal, but whether at a particular place and time, human dignity was preserved. As long as the status of human dignity is better than it was before, then diplomacy was successful. Illiberal states and ideologies
and to minimise diasporic acts of dissent against the ruling regime of the sending-state. In contrast, Egypt's diaspora policy has evolved more inclusively: while acts of repression are not unheard of, the main tenets of Egyptian policy have revolved around the desire to engage their citizen diaspora groups into the country's development ambitions since the 1970s. The chapter discusses these policies in detail and employs the tenets of the illiberal paradox , as described in Chapter 1 , in order to shed light on the rationale behind this divergence
constituents (especially Parliament and politicians). Taking these themes together, we contend that these debates help to (re)produce a relatively straightforward antagonistic relationship between, on the one hand, a liberal, open and responsible UK self which is mindful of cultural and religious difference, and both cautious and moderate in its actions. And, on the other, a series of illiberal, irrational and extremist terrorist others steadfast in their determination to wage immoral violences. Importantly, although there are examples of genuine dissent in these debates
With a selected focus on Europe and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Knowledge production in higher education presents a reflexive understanding of how Europe is taught and studied at MENA universities and how knowledge about the MENA is produced in Europe. This focus is based on the observation that higher education is rarely an apolitical space and an acknowledgement of how ‘every view is a view from somewhere’. It therefore explores the politics of institutes of higher education in view of often competing scholarly practices. Furthermore, it examines the historical evolution of French, German and Italian scholarship on the MENA; analyses the cases of Malta, Palestine and Turkey with their respective liminal characteristics in between the MENA and Europe, and how these impact on higher educational approaches to the study of the Other; considers critique as the driving force not only of the higher educational establishment but of liberal and illiberal contexts, with a specific focus on Denmark, the Netherlands and Egypt; and examines influences upon knowledge production including gender, the COVID-19 pandemic (with a focus on the UK and Syria) and think tanks.
This chapter investigates the reception of narratives about the rise of a multipolar order in Japan, a state once touted as a potential pole of power in a post-Cold War multipolar order in its own right. Instead, the chapter argues that the central framing of debates over multipolarity today in Tokyo is one of fear – fear of the end of unipolarity and the rise of multipolarity signalling an end to the assured peacefulness and prosperity of Northeast Asia, Japan’s immediate neighbourhood. It argues that there is a complex and important interaction between the explanatory and normative sides of the Japanese discourse on multipolarity. How the global distribution of power does and should manifest itself in polarity terms is often difficult to disentangle. Significantly, the chapter highlights the larger debates about order – in particular a specific conception of a liberal rules-based order – that Japanese decision-makers and analysts bring to bear on debates about a future multipolar distribution of power. This implies that the unipolar, US-led order is itself defined by a liberal outlook that needs to be preserved as the global order becomes increasingly multipolar. This chapter highlights the difficulties for Tokyo in holding on to this narrative through the Trump administration’s decidedly illiberal path in its foreign policy and its aftermath.
understanding of autocracies’ management of emigration and diaspora. This section introduces Hollifield's ( 2004 ) concept of the ‘liberal paradox’ as a starting point. It argues that its expansion to illiberal contexts would make it more suitable for cross-regional comparisons that depart from Western liberal democratic norms. By placing Hollifield's work into conversation with Hirschman's seminal work on ‘exit’ and ‘voice’ (1970), it offers a useful framework in order to understand migration policymaking in authoritarianism. Almost twenty years ago
no average difference in knowledge between the groups. 38 More broadly, national populism has spiked in almost all Western countries; these contexts are diverse and many lack illiberal tabloid presses. This suggests that the worldview has a function. Appreciation of national-populist values helps us understand this function. The work of psychologist Jonathan Haidt, which identifies five moral foundations (care, fairness, loyalty, authority and sanctity), shows the importance of loyalty and authority to national populists. 39 Though liberals and left
the name of national security and the fight against terrorism. The early admitted crude and overtly violent Spanish attempt at illiberal practices intended to shore up a still shaky new liberal State would arguably be eschewed by most liberal States today even if it is not unreasonable to suppose that most if not all intelligence services deploy similar borderline or entirely illegal practices. Covert operations have become a fundamental, arguably banal feature of foreign policy. The use of military force not only against so-called terrorists but
Belloni (2012), hybrid peace governance grasps the fact that peace processes feature a series of liberal, illiberal, international, local, formal, informal, war and peace elements. Hybridity is therefore an analytical alternative to the liberal peace. But beyond its analytical purchase, hybrid peace governance also implies for Belloni a rejection of the universal value and applicability of the liberal peace, a rejection of the ‘patronizing top-down approach’ and an alternative to ‘Western social engineering and paternalism’ (Belloni 2012: 34). Hybridity is therefore not
Europe where no fewer than fourteen high-ranking Spanish police officers and senior government officials, including the Minister of the Interior himself, were arrested and condemned for counter-terrorism wrongdoings and illiberal practices. It is also safe to say that, even a full thirty years after its last known action, the GAL remain very much alive within Spain and across the Basque country. One could even say that they went beyond enduring in collective memory, as their initiators had surely hoped it would. The 1980s GAL episode periodically