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by diplomats who prepared for a major conference to establish a robust, new world order. The new discipline was at first dominated by the mental furniture of the nineteenth century; in particular by the liberal internationalism of the Anglo-American peace movement, expressed by members of the British Foreign Office and by the US President Woodrow Wilson. But these theories were soon challenged by arguments formulated by strong, illiberal leaders on the Continent, such as Vladimir Lenin and, later, Adolf Hitler. This chapter ends with a discussion of Hitler and the
and divine presence. In Morgenthau’s case, it is hard to find a clear religious element in his political philosophy. There is, however, a clear element of transcendent morality there. This is apparent in a review which Morgenthau wrote in 1948 of Edward Carr’s most recent books. Although Morgenthau had admired Carr’s Twenty-Years’ Crisis and its diagnosis of Utopianism, he disagreed deeply with Carr’s illiberal prognosis in Conditions of Peace and Nationalism and After. These are disillusioned books. They rested on a Machiavellian analysis of naked
doctrinaire conservatives from the emerging fascists. But a clue to the difference between them lies in their origins. For whereas conservatism was a creation of the ailing, landowning nobility of the eighteenth century, fascism was a function of the crisis-ridden, illiberal, industrial mass-societies of the twentieth. Thus, fascism parted ways with conservatism on two important points. First, whereas conservatives preferred the popular masses to be passive, even docile, fascists envisioned a mobilized, dynamic population which actively supports an omnipotent state. ‘The