This book traces discussions about international relations from the middle ages up to the present times. It presents central concepts in historical context and shows how ancient ideas still affect the way we perceive world politics. It discusses medieval theologians like Augustine and Aquinas whose rules of war are still in use. It presents Renaissance humanists like Machiavelli and Bodin who developed our understanding of state sovereignty. It argues that Enlightenment philosophers like Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau laid the basis for the modern analyses of International Relations (IR). Later thinkers followed up with balance-of-power models, perpetual-peace projects and theories of exploitation as well as peaceful interdependence. Classic IR theories have then been steadily refined by later thinkers – from Marx, Mackinder and Morgenthau to Waltz, Wallerstein and Wendt. The book shows that core ideas of IR have been shaped by major events in the past and that they have often reflected the concerns of the great powers. It also shows that the most basic ideas in the field have remained remarkably constant over the centuries.
realisation that was made explicit in the PWP
discussions in the United States and Britain. This in turn led to a greatly
expanded economic institutionalisation, especially after the Bretton Woods
Conference of 1944 and the ‘compromise of embedded liberalism’.1
The economic ideas of the NWO had their roots in the classical liberal
capitalist tradition of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The ideas of
the ‘harmony of interests’ and what came to be called economic ‘interdependence’ have long been recognised by liberals as the key motor for the
reconciliation of nations
South China Sea could be an exception to the rule. It is an area where the US potentially cannot exercise its control due to China's resources and political position on the matter (Peterson 2016 ).
Latin America and the European Union
The EU and Latin America have developed over time a different degree of interdependence at both the political and economic levels. Over the years, and in particular since the membership of the Iberian countries in 1986, the EU has developed relations with Latin America, and the other way round
While for much of the world globalisation is associated with growing interdependence and the spread of ‘zones of peace’, in the Middle East the decade of globalisation was ushered in by war, was marked by intrusive US hegemony, renewed economic dependency on the core and continuing insecurity, and ended with yet another round of war in 2001.
In the early 1990s, prospects looked different to some observers: the end of the Cold War, the second Gulf War, and the advance of economic globalisation seemed to provide a unique
had long argued that a federation of states was the only sensible solution to Europe’s problem of recurrent wars. His argument was reflected in Schumann’s proposition to establish a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The ECSC would, first, bring under collective control the two key industries in the production of modern weapons systems – coal and steel. Second, integration of these important industries would be followed by integrative spinoffs in other industries and initiate a Continental development towards greater interdependence. 1
its strategic partners Brazil (2007) and Mexico (2009).
Both trade and political dialogues have in common that they are built no longer around regional or sub-regional schemes – according to the EU paradigm of “pure inter-regionalism” between two integrated blocs that speak with a single voice – but around multilevel formats, according to the changing nature of regionalism (Ayuso and Caballero 2018 ; Gratius 2021 ). Whilst political dialogue started in the 1980s, in the midst of the Cold War, in a context of global interdependence, from the
imperialist influence to establish a relatively autonomous regional system. Additionally, in the rise of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), south–south solidarity produced exceptional financial power that, while failing ultimately to raise the region from the economic periphery, arguably transformed the position of the swing oil producer, Saudi Arabia, from dependence into asymmetric interdependence. However, favourable conditions for regional autonomy have, particularly since the end of the oil boom and Cold War, been largely reversed. The West
experiencing an increasing degree of integration, he argued in his book Beyond the Nation-State ( 1964 ).
The analyses of Deutsch, Mitrany and Haas contributed importantly to the study of European integration. The theoretical core of their argument was simple; they had, in fact, revived the old, half-forgotten theory of interdependence (Seebohm 1871 ; Angell 1910 ). But they had also expanded upon it and refined it. Mitrany and Haas had, for example, used their observations to criticize federalist theory and pave the way for alternative theories of integration
Nationalism, industrialism and imperialism affected the behaviour of nineteenth-century states. Two additional factors also affected the behaviour of states – or rather, shaped the way statesmen and scholars perceived state relations: ‘interdependence’ and ‘evolution’. Both factors made deep marks on late nineteenth-century International Relations theory. Also, they informed the first efforts to build a science of international politics and they cast long shadows over International Relations International Relations theorizing for many decades
power’. Another is that of ‘interdependence’. These two mechanisms curtail the sovereignty of states and harness the anarchy of the system. To make the world even more orderly – to curtail the sovereignty of states even more – Lorimer proposed a third mechanism: namely, institutions of law which would regulate state behaviour through norms and generally accepted rules. Lorimer, in other words, formulated some of the most basic arguments of modern International Relations. He would have been a celebrated member of the International Relations Hall of Fame – if his