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Andrew Williams

realisation that was made explicit in the PWP discussions in the United States and Britain. This in turn led to a greatly expanded economic institutionalisation, especially after the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944 and the ‘compromise of embedded liberalism’.1 The economic ideas of the NWO had their roots in the classical liberal capitalist tradition of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The ideas of the ‘harmony of interests’ and what came to be called economic ‘interdependence’ have long been recognised by liberals as the key motor for the reconciliation of nations

in Failed imagination?
Navigating between trouble and promise
Gustaaf Geeraerts

domestic and foreign affairs; mutual interference in (traditional) domestic affairs and mutual surveillance; the rejection of force to resolve disputes and the consequent codification of rules of behaviour; the growing irrelevance of borders; and security based on transparency, mutual openness, interdependence and mutual vulnerability (Chen, 2016). In due course, the EU had developed an identity as a transformative power (Grabbe, 2006), founding its policies on values, institutions and co-operation rather than power politics. The ambition was to reshape the power

in The European Union in the Asia-Pacific
Fulvio Attinà

. Briefly, the EEC states relaunched the economic and monetary union strategy as the condition for rescuing the state from the heavy costs of the growing world economic interdependence that were curtailing the privileged position the European economies had enjoyed in the world market in the last two centuries. This economic and monetary union strategy was started to respond to the first oil crisis and was renewed in the late 1980s by the single market strategy launched by Jacques Delors, the President of the European Commission, to respond to the effects of the

in The European Union in the Asia-Pacific
Abstract only
William J. Clinton

final crafting of the Good Friday Agreement cannot be overstated and will never be forgotten. It was within this context that, as the inaugural speaker of the Tip O’ Neill Lectures in Peace, Clinton chose as his theme three of the most important lessons learned by Tip O’Neill over his long and distinguished political career and applied them to Northern Ireland and other areas attempting the path towards conflict resolution at that time, within the global context of ever-increasing interdependence. Firstly, he said, when things are difficult that is when you must work

in Peacemaking in the twenty-first century
Inter-regionalism in a new era
Julie Gilson

precedent in engagements like dialogue between the European Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the 1990s saw the most significant developments of “regions” as global actors, in the face of the need to create economies of scale and respond to trans-border problems (Grugel, 2004; Katzenstein, 2000). Despite its “elusive” nature, Mansfield and Milner set out the parameters of regionalism as issuing from “a period marked by substantial economic interdependence, a desire by countries to mediate trade disputes, and a multilateral framework that

in The European Union in the Asia-Pacific
Miguel Otero-Iglesias

-trading partner (€484 billion, 14.2 per cent), and China comes second (€428 billion, 12.5 per cent) (Business Europe 2015: 3). Their economic and political interdependence is reflected in the strategic partnership that the EU established in 2003, the role that China has played in helping to stabilise the Eurozone during its 2010–12 existential crisis (Otero-Iglesias, 2014), and the launching of negotiations for a Bilateral Investment Agreement (BIA) in 2012 (Godement and Stanzel, 2015). Traditionally, the EU has always been one of the biggest FDI providers to China, but slowly

in The European Union in the Asia-Pacific
Abstract only
Claire Sutherland

]ld regionalism is characterized by the tendency towards integration, federalism, and diminishing national sovereignty. On the other hand, two other tendencies drive new regionalism – nationalism and interdependence’. It remains to be seen whether this captures the interplay of nationalism and regionalism from the perspective of nation-building in Germany and Vietnam. Would-be citizens of a nation-state are naturalised into the

in Soldered states
Britain, 1940–43
Andrew Williams

Britain written a year later – ‘I know there were some of my friends in the Labour Movement who found it difficult to accept the need for force. I know there were many Conservatives who could not have accepted the necessary interdependence of peace and social justice [implicit in the Atlantic Charter].’ Although Attlee understood these feelings, he still felt that Sumner Welles, whom he singled out (rightly) as a major architect of the Charter and the Four Freedoms idea, understood the nature of the future world they would have to live in together – the problem would

in Failed imagination?
Andrew Williams

seen as its major symptom, excessive armaments. The great literary defence of this idea can be found in a book by Salvador de Madariaga. His major classical liberal argument against armaments is almost the same one used by Angell (see Chapter 7): that ‘the world has reached such a degree of interdependence … that international cooperation has become essential … the only self-supporting region of the world is the whole world … Only one opinion and only one market cover the face of the earth.’26 Armaments were therefore an economic absurdity, and war a tragic net cost

in Failed imagination?
Abstract only
Elizabeth Dauphinée

known and partially unknown, partially knowable and partially unknowable. Our accounts of ourselves are always already enmeshed with the accounts that Others might give. Thus, the mainstay of my existence is not autonomy, but dependence and interdependence in an inherently social frame. It is this very sociality that denies me my autonomy. ‘In a sense, my account of myself is never fully mine, and is never fully for me . . . If I try to give an account of myself, if I try to make myself recognizable and understandable, then I might begin with a narrative account of my

in The ethics of researching war