settlement in Ireland (excluding time spent awaiting the outcome of an application for refugee status).
This chapter is interested in Ireland’s shift in emphasis regarding the meaning of citizenship and how it was expressed in the specific wording of the Constitution and in wider discourses of nationalidentity and civil rights. Going beyond that, however, it considers the ways by which the Referendum campaign (March–June 2004) and its associated discourses produced Irishness as a combination of characteristics unobtainable by people outside the diaspora. In order
devising and marketing new ways of thinking about Britain’s role in the world. Their repackaging of British nationalidentity involved challenging what they saw as widespread ‘anti-European’ modes of thinking and talking about the British in Europe (for a restatement see Blair 2010: 533–4). The paradox as they saw it was that anti-Europeanism denied the British a role in Europe at all. Combining insights from the literatures on discourse theory and norms, this section helps us appreciate what Blair and Brown were trying to achieve from a theoretical vantage point. The
mechanism of the Europeanist message than apparently it was able to. Studying the empirical position of the ‘pro’ groups would have the practical advantage of identifying the potential levers available to policy-makers in their quest to upgrade the ‘European’ element of British nationalidentity.
The second strand would be part empirical and part theoretical and would involve finding more out about the life-world inhabited by New Labour decision-makers. It may seem paradoxical to suggest this as a topic when the post-1997 Labour governments are surely the most
identity: Tom Nairn and Krishan Kumar. Both theorists sought to explain the ‘peculiarity’ of England’s political development and the effects of this on expressions of nationalism and nationalidentity in England. Implicit and explicit in both accounts are the concepts of abnormality and absence that powerfully shape how we understand nationalism in contemporary England.
Tom Nairn began theorising English nationalism long before mainstream social sciences in the UK turned their attention to this topic. Political science in particular was largely uninterested in
test of New Labour’s strategy for affecting a real and lasting shift in Britain’s relationship with the EU would therefore be a discursive one. Could the government unpick and restitch the webs of belief within which the British encountered Europe so that instead of existing in a permanent state of fear the British would feel at home living alongside their European neighbours? Could the British confidently adopt a nationalidentity that coexisted with a higher-order European identity? To answer this question we need to acquaint ourselves with the kinds of attitudes
opening-up to the left and civil society actors and the promotion of the new generation of black and North African-origin politicians such as Rachida Dati and Rama Yade. In 2012, on the other hand, Sarkozy was defeated in the second round of the presidential election on the basis of a much narrower programme of values and nationalidentity, the strategy that he adopted again for 2017. To be fair, the linking of immigration and insecurity represented a fairly consistent strand of his political trajectory: his role as a tough interior minister under the prime ministers
English nationalism, Euroscepticism and the Anglosphere
of this explanation about the diversion of an early form of English national consciousness into an official nationalism, whose function was to legitimise the British state and its Empire, can be found in Krishan Kumar’s account of the making of English nationalidentity. Building on comparative analyses, Kumar argued that imperialism did not so much inform expressions of English nationhood but instead inhibited it. It was Britain’s imperial mission that prevented anything resembling the nationalisms emerging in Continental Europe from forming in England during the
instance, narratives of American nationalidentity are among the most powerful and influential in the world.
It is ironic, then, that it is not possible to definitively state what the American nationalidentity is. That is because it is fluid, contested, and in motion. However, recurrent tropes are important in binding together narrative threads telling and retelling the country’s mutually agreed version of its national history. Two in particular have been notably productive as enduring constants in this process of national storytelling: the identification of
to relinquish power, on the other hand, the performance of passionate Serb patriotism to the soundtrack of folk music symbolised defiance to the global militaristic hegemony of NATO’. 59 Yet, as Cvoro notes, Naskovski’s staging of Apollo 9 in front of Belgrade’s McDonald’s may also be interpreted in the opposite way – as the ‘triumph of the West over Serbian values’. 60
4.11 Zoran Naskovski, Apollo 9 , 7 September 1999, Belgrade. Courtesy: Zoran Naskovski
Other artists in the region have explored the notion of nationalidentity in the wake of the rise
inheritance. 10 This was followed, in the late 1970s, by the development of Social Identity Theory in psychology, the focus of continuing research within the social sciences. 11 This theory posits that an individual has multiple social identities, and one of these is nationalidentity. How is nationalidentity created and maintained?
One of the most influential answers to this question came with the publication in 1983 of Imagined Communities by Benedict Anderson. The nation, he suggested, is ‘an imagined political community’, consisting of three dimensions. First of