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most. In this mix of continuity and change, the bargain has constantly evolved. More dramatic change came after the Cold War ended, but even in the 35 years between 1954 and 1989, a number of things changed. The allies, acting unilaterally in some cases and in concert in others, made conscious changes in and amendments to the bargain. Some of these changes were inspired by developments over which the allies had little control (such as the Soviet Union’s drive toward nuclear parity with the United States, calling into question NATO’s nuclear strategy), while
Soviet challenge, was equally intent on rationalizing US commitments abroad as part of an overall program of economic austerity. The Truman administration had not been able to decide to what extent US strategy should depend on nuclear weapons, but the Eisenhower administration was inclined virtually from the outset to use nuclear weapons deployments to meet national security objectives while pursuing fiscal solvency. Dulles had attempted to reassure the allies that rationalization in no way suggested a US tendency toward isolationism. At the same time, the new
nature of being an autonomous legal entity on the international stage. The debate about the extent of the doctrine of legal powers is addressed through three case studies: the legality of peacekeeping undertaken by the UN (including a discussion of the Expenses opinion); the competence of the WHO and UN in relation to the possession or use of nuclear weapons by states (including a discussion of the Nuclear Weapons opinions); and the legislative powers of the Security Council (focusing on its counter-terrorism decision in Resolution 1373 of 2001). The doctrine of
that they do not look for any. One other ongoing military operation is completely anomalous to all this. Operation Relentless is the latest iteration of a mission that began in 1968; to maintain nuclear deterrent submarines on patrol constantly and without any breaks to ensure that one boat is always available and ready to fire its nuclear missiles if necessary. The crews of what the Royal Navy refers to as the ‘bombers’ maintain that they are always at war, cruising beneath the
The Cuban Missile Crisis introduced a new phase to the Cold War. Shaken by the sudden risk of nuclear war, the two superpowers developed new diplomatic institutions – conferences, summit meetings and new treaties and obligations – designed to harness the competition for international power and influence. The Cold War was marked by growing aspects of co-operation as well as of conflict. The transition to a new phase in the Cold War was accentuated by a shift in superpower leadership. In the USA the aged and formal President Dwight D. Eisenhower
Wall had come down, the heads of NATO governments issued the “London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance,” announcing a “major transformation” of NATO. 5 They offered to join the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact states in declaring that they were no longer enemy states and offered both friendship and cooperation to the former adversaries. Importantly, the leaders also agreed that NATO should revise its military system and its nuclear and non-nuclear strategy. They set in motion a major overhaul of alliance strategy, aimed at producing a “new
-being of their citizens as well as enhance the stability of the international system. From the signing of the treaty in 1949 until the end of the Cold War, troubles in the alliance were provoked primarily by nuclear and East–West issues, but the degree to which they threatened the solidarity of the alliance was undoubtedly influenced by the quality of relations within the West. The alliance, like any partnership, depended on the willingness of the partners to understand and respect what is motivating the others. Each had to walk a mile in the other’s shoes in order
and strategic positioning; they involved themselves in a race to control the territories of the world and influence their populations. 2 A third taproot of the Cold War concerned the development of atomic weapons. When the USSR tested its own atomic bomb in December 1949, the two super-powers become engaged in a nuclear arms race. This was to remain a characteristic feature of the superpower rivalry for the duration of the Cold War. During the 1950s, the USA and the USSR built new and more powerful nuclear-based weapons systems. The two rivals had soon
primarily non-Russian or generic threats from proliferation of ballistic missile technology as well as: nuclear and other weapons-of-mass-destruction technologies; other types of new weapons technologies that could end up in the wrong hands; terrorism; instability beyond NATO’s borders; cyber attacks; threats to vital communication, transport and transit routes, and energy supplies; and environmental and resource constraints. Throughout the two decades after the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the reluctance to use the term “threat
transatlantic defence arrangement that is still critical to Europe’s physical security. With its independent nuclear deterrent, it maintains the fact, albeit as a matter of coincidence, that the five permanent members of the UN Security Council are all leading nuclear weapons states. It is also true that Britain’s ability to coordinate its own policies and to make the most of its full range of diplomatic, military, economic and soft power resources, while not nearly as effective as governments always claim, is still