This book provides an introduction to the technical aspects of nuclear energy and nuclear weapons. It considers nuclear weapons from varying perspectives, including the technology perspective, which views them as spillovers from nuclear energy programmes; and the theoretical perspective, which looks at the collision between national and international security involved in nuclear proliferation. The book aims to demonstrate that international security is unlikely to benefit from encouraging the spread of nuclear weapons except in situations where the security complex is already largely nuclearised. The political constraints on nuclear spread as solutions to the security dilemma are also examined in three linked categories, including a discussion of the phenomenon of nuclear-free zones, with particular emphasis on the zone covering Latin America. The remarkably consistent anti-proliferation policies of the United States are debated, and the nuclear non-proliferation treaty itself, with special attention paid to the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards system, is frankly appraised.
Nuclear weapons and
This chapter is about nuclear technology and the technical interconnections between commercial and military nuclear programmes. It is also
about the spread of nuclear technology and the use to which it has been
put by a number of states, both inside and outside the NPT, to bring them
close to or even take them over the nuclear weapons threshold.
The scope of nuclear energy
Nuclear energy has peaceful applications and non-peaceful applications.
The centrepiece of all political efforts to curb the spread of nuclear weapons
The purpose of this chapter is to identify the properties of an ideal
nuclear-weapon-free zone (nuclear-free zone for short) and then to compare it with actual nuclear-free zones in being or seriously proposed.
An ideal nuclear-free zone should ﬁrst of all be worth having; that
means it should do a job of work in solving a multilateral security
dilemma, by maintaining a desirable level of international security for the
participating states in the face of temptations on the part of individual
states within the zone to improve
Nuclear weapons and
In 2000, almost every state in the world (all except Cuba, India, Israel and
Pakistan) publicly subscribed once again to the principle that the spread
of nuclear weapons to states not already possessing them is dangerous
to international security and that it should therefore be energetically
discouraged.1 The occasion was the latest review conference of the 30year-old NPT, the chief international instrument for restricting nuclear
proliferation, and for reversing such proliferation as has occurred, if its
T HE A SIA -P ACIFIC IS
ONE of the most intensely nuclearized regions in the
world. It is the only region where nuclear weapons have been used in
attack, it has elicited grave international concern about nuclear
proliferation – namely in India, Pakistan and North Korea
– and it is home to three key recognized nuclear weapon
on threats, such as
nuclear brinkmanship, to gain concessions from the international
community. The latest such attempt began in the autumn of 2002, when
Pyongyang admitted to a secret nuclear weapons programme and
subsequently withdrew from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT). From that point the situation rapidly deteriorated. By early
2003 both the US and North Korea
United States policy on nonproliferation and the Nuclear
The history of the attitude of the United States towards the spread of
nuclear weapons has been one of continuous opposition, tempered now
and then by the judgement of the government of the day as to whether
in particular instances the exigencies of the moment outweighed the force
of the general principle.
From Baruch to Eisenhower
The starting point or the rough ﬁrst draft for the US policy of hostility
towards the spread of nuclear weapons is the Baruch Plan, presented
This book is made up of a series of partially self-contained, partially
overlapping chapters, each looking at an aspect of the question at hand.
Each chapter attempts to illuminate the whole or a goodly part of the
spread of nuclear weapons and how to curb it, but from a particular
perspective. The chapters are like a series of photographs of a particular
three-dimensional object taken from different angles. In one way this
should make the book easier to read, in that it can be dipped into piecemeal. Even so, a reader encountering an unsupported
In the shadow of nuclear war, the alternative to communism, it would
seem utopian.”84 Therein, says Müller, lies the moment’s utopian aspect.
It is not the pardon instead of the execution that is utopian, but the idea
that that the pardon is the “realistic solution.” “Realistic” means possible, even probable, but not necessarily the sole possibility. What is
utopian in Müller’s view, is that the pardon has the “degree of realism
of the execution,” that it is just as realistic, which is to say, possible or
probable, as the execution.
By implication and
When John F. Kennedy entered the
White House, Israel’s nuclear reactor in Dimona was the subject of
considerable discussion in Washington and Dean Rusk, new Secretary of
State, told the State Department and US intelligence to monitor it. 1 France told the
United States that it had pressed Israel into accepting the
International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) standard of