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political capital out of it [and] some are calling for a witch hunt. 2 Kenneth Younger, 1951 The Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ was an important dimension of Attlee’s foreign and defence policy. Stemming from wartime collaboration, relations with Washington were fraught and served to provide the Labour government with
This is the first monograph length study that charts the coercive diplomacy of the administrations of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford as practiced against their British ally in order to persuade Edward Heath’s government to follow a more amenable course throughout the ‘Year of Europe’ and to convince Harold Wilson’s governments to lessen the severity of proposed defence cuts. Such diplomacy proved effective against Heath but rather less so against Wilson. It is argued that relations between the two sides were often strained, indeed, to the extent that the most ‘special’ elements of the relationship, that of intelligence and nuclear co-operation, were suspended. Yet, the relationship also witnessed considerable co-operation. This book offers new perspectives on US and UK policy towards British membership of the European Economic Community; demonstrates how US détente policies created strain in the ‘special relationship’; reveals the temporary shutdown of US-UK intelligence and nuclear co-operation; provides new insights in US-UK defence co-operation, and revaluates the US-UK relationship throughout the IMF Crisis.
hard to deny the ‘special relationship between photography and humanitarianism’ ( Fehrenbach and Rodogno, 2015 : 4). Advances in technology, such as the portable Kodak introduced by George Eastman in 1888, secured this connection just before and after the turn of the nineteenth century, as images from multiple waves of Indian famine were disseminated (1876–78, 1896–97, 1899–1900) and ‘atrocity photographs’ distributed by The Congo Reform Association (1903–13) generated moral
2 Old and new British foreign policy after 1945 evolved within a strategic context of progressive imperial and economic decline, Continental moves towards the integration of Europe, and the ‘special relationship’ with the US. One of its central aspects, as the post-war period unfolded, was a desire on the part of British governments to establish closer ties with the US as a means of compensating for Britain’s decline as an independent Great Power. Yet relations with both Europe and the US remained variable during this time, and the problems of decolonisation and
played by the arch-enemy of the US in the conflict, focusing either on the al-Qaeda network, on its leader, Osama bin Laden, or on the phenomena of radical Islamic terrorism more generally.3 Set against this, analyses of Britain’s role in the war on terror, though vastly smaller in number, have been similarly variegated. Generally speaking, the focus has centred on specific aspects of Britain’s participation, New Labour and the new world order such as the nature of the ‘special relationship’ with the US or its involvement in Afghanistan or Iraq,4 or has set out to
preferential treatment in its dealings with the IMF so it could maintain its defence commitments. In essence, when the Labour government of James Callaghan needed the US–UK’s special relationship to deliver material benefits, it came up rather short. The context of the IMF crisis Whilst this chapter is focused predominantly upon the political–diplomatic US–UK relationship, the economic context to the IMF crisis needs to be explained in order to contextualise the wider political issue. Throughout 1974–76, the Wilson government had implemented a series of public expenditure
2002: 5) and do not have an independent foreign policy, Iceland is best regarded as the smallest of the European small states. It is the only Nordic state never to have applied for membership of the European Community (EC)/European Union (EU) and, distinctively in the region, has a special relationship with the United States through its 1951 Defence Agreement (Thorhallsson 2004). Altogether, the population of Norden today is just under 25 million (table 1.1). Each boasting well over 5 million inhabitants, Denmark and Finland have populations about the same size as
latest US Submarine Launch Ballistic Missile nuclear weapons system) would be sold to the UK, he refused to yield.91 Further to this, Kissinger also instructed US Treasury Secretary George Shultz to stop any special information being given to the British pertaining to ongoing monetary discussions. As he reasoned: ‘I want to get your area synchronized with ours so that they [Britain] can’t claim a special relationship 03_Strained_partnership_073-127.indd 88 06/11/2013 13:45 A year of discord 89 in one field and really put it to us in other fields’.92 In sum, under
training infrastructures (Pannier 2016 ). However, a key rationale for the British government was to develop regional defense ties outside the EU. Indeed, British governments had been gradually disengaging from the CSDP (especially CSDP operations and the EDA) since the mid-2000s, while at the same time constantly reasserting the centrality of NATO and the ‘Special Relationship’ with Washington as the cornerstones of the UK’s security (Pannier 2016 ). The UK and France have achieved significant results in cooperation since 2010, in armaments, nuclear cooperation and
Germans can claim to have a closeness to Russia that others do not. Their consciousness of guilt, still actively encouraged by Moscow, contributes to this sensation. Equally, Russians know Germany in ways others cannot. To this extent, there is a deep underlying special relationship between the two countries; they have shared historical memory not just of successful cooperation and murderous destruction but of the fine line between them. Germany’s policy thinking about Russia today turns on this duality in history. Germany naturally seeks to have as much friendly