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Kingdom could not see itself as any part of a European unity movement. Its European role in the 1950s was, in effect, an extension of its special relationship with the United States and a distraction from British global political and military involvements. Furthermore, British foreign trade with the Commonwealth remained more substantial than that with continental Europe. In the 1960s, a new generation of British politicians decided the United Kingdom should join the European Economic Community, but the commitment to Europe remained highly qualified. As a result
regional player during the referendum campaign, as if it had no interest in the world beyond Estonia. The concept of ‘Global Britain’ that emerged from Theresa May’s pro-Anglosphere Cabinet was itself undergirded by a memory of sovereignty predicated on ties with English-speaking peoples and an interpretation of a ‘swashbuckling’ past that, as we have seen in preceding chapters, resonated with the rehabilitation of Empire in English narratives. This emphasis on the past was also evident in Brexiteer interpretations of the ‘Special Relationship’ with the United
Britain applied to join when Suez revealed the limits of the ‘special relationship’ with the United States and the British economy began to decline relative to the rest of Europe. The 1959 and 1967 applications were vetoed by French President General Charles de Gaulle, who feared Britain would threaten the leadership of Europe and be a ‘Trojan horse’ for US influence. (Anticipating future Euro-sceptics, he had insisted on member governments having such a veto, to ensure the organisation could not over-rule sovereign nations.) The difficult General eventually died and
Iraq. The British–US bond: ‘special relationship’? Relations with the United States could scarcely be said to be harmonious in the eighteenth century, when George III was seen as a tyrant and a bitter war of liberation (1775–83) was required to establish the independence of the then thirteen states and the foundation of what was destined to become the world’s most powerful nation state. During the next century, economic rivalry between the established great power of Britain and the emerging one of the United States caused more than a few ripples but trade and
television is that of a non-specialist seeking a means of demonstrating how the arcane and erudite ideas of literary theory are seeping into the general culture, not because these two media have a special relationship; on the contrary, they seem as far apart as ever. Rather, the ideas of cultural literary theory form the basis for our ways of coping with daily life. Spider-Man 2 is a film about how our young people need a hero, as the subway riders tell Peter Parker, to cope with life in the Big Apple. The web spun by Spider-Man helped me explain Geertz’s concept of
producers and directors are interested in theory – I am sure they are not – or because theorists have a special relationship with films – I am sure they would agree with me that they do not. Rather, these ideas have become a part of the Zeitgeist , the spirit of the age, the world view, whatever term is selected to refer to the climate of thought characteristic of an era or a culture. Considering literary theory as a separate discipline distinguishes my work from similar books in the field. For instance, Mary M. Litch and Amy Karofsky’s Philosophy through
Committee, which was founded in 1914 to answer the specific need for help of the Jewish population struck by the wartime events in central and western Europe and the Middle East. The new association, which became known by the diminutive ‘Joint’, was set up by certain notable members of the New York bourgeoisie. Many of them were politically active and supporters of the Democratic president Woodrow Wilson, and they had already connected the name to philanthropic initiatives. This enabled Joint’s representatives to establish a special relationship with the US authorities
line, especially when the President of the United States was what his detractors thought was a ‘socialist’ or a ‘dictator’ (cited in Blake, 2015 ). The right of British politics had hitherto been the foremost defender of the ‘Special Relationship’, previously leaving criticism of that alliance to the left. But in this instance, the pro-Leave Anglosphere enthusiasts took their cue from criticisms voiced by the Tea Party and the ‘alt-right’. After Obama had said that Britain would be at the back of the queue for any FTA negotiations, Republican presidential candidates
Republic also fostered a special relationship with France. Since the Franco-German rivalry had been at the centre of three wars since 1870, this was an important contribution to European security. Whilst relations between the Federal Republic and the French Fourth Republic had been fairly amicable (despite diplomatic conflicts over the future status of the Saar: see Chapter 1 ), when de Gaulle came to power as president of the Fifth Republic Adenauer found almost a kindred spirit. Both had a patrician and mission-oriented style of governing; both were Catholics with a
our old, true friends in Australia and New Zealand’ (M-OA, 1982 : EEC Membership, Respondent 110). The Thatcherite memory of the Falkland Conflict was not just about reversing decline domestically, but also about restoring the ‘Special Relationship’ with the United States to its (from the Anglosphere perspective) ‘ideal’ place in the United Kingdom’s foreign relations hierarchy. But the Anglosphere came with its own hierarchies. The sixtieth anniversary of the Suez Crisis was not much remarked on in the United Kingdom given its origins, outcome and