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ground. Brian Leiter ( 2002 ) identifies Nietzsche as a naturalist in two senses. He considers Nietzsche a naturalist on the grounds that he rejects supernaturalism, teleology, metaphysics, and God. This kind of naturalism Leiter terms s-naturalism . Leiter also sees Nietzsche as a naturalist in a narrower sense whereby philosophy should take its path from methods of science. He terms this form of naturalism m-naturalism . As Leiter explains, ‘the speculative theories of m-naturalists are “modelled” on the sciences most importantly in that they take over from
troubled’ he turns to Margo, who ‘sounded competent, convincing, even comforting’ (311). Thus he seeks out Margo’s divining skills. Obeah in the novel is characterised as the control and manipulation of supernatural forces through the use of material objects (dolls dressed like his opponents that he has to prick) and the recitation of spells and ritual bathing that he performs in Margo’s house to give him
. Indeed, the humoral understandings of melancholia originating in Greek science proved to be remarkably robust. The Galenic theories took hold in the post-classical Middle East, finding support in such figures as Ishaq ibn Imran, Haly Abbas, and Avicenna. By contrast, early medieval Christian writings, most notably those of the ‘Desert Fathers’ (Evagrius, Nilus, Johanis Cassian), shifted the causal bases of melancholic experience from the natural realm (as posited by the Greeks) to the supernatural. The temptation of acedia came to be a predominant concern for the
natural world events might well be seen as invoking ‘supernatural’, ‘mystical’, or ‘occult’ substances ( 2017 : 7). That the issues raise difficulties is something of which Parfit is keenly aware, and this clearly lies behind his discussion of the concept of ‘existence’, where he distinguishes ‘narrow’ and ‘wide’ senses of something existing ( 2011a : 469–70) and claims that non-natural normative facts ‘exist’ in the ‘wide sense’. This is something that Temkin ( 2017 : 7) is also unhappy with, as am I. It not only raises insuperable problems as to the epistemological
this disclosure, however, provide a context in which to read just what it is that she is implicitly distancing herself from and, more importantly, what it might be within religious discourses with which in practice she aligns herself. In the preceding sentence she said of God something she has said many times throughout her career: ‘For me, the signifier Dieu . . . is the synonym of what goes beyond us, of our own projection toward the future, toward infinity’ (O’Grady, 1996–97). God cannot be understood as a supernatural entity in such a statement that tends to