after the 2004 elections, further
work was required to stabilise the economy, and structural change was still
needed to modernise the country. Greece could not afford to have the luxury of
resting on its laurels and taking a break; there was no time to take a step back
and admire the progress made.
New Democracy, however, did not appear aware of the need for continued
and coherent efforts. This is evident from its electioneering leading up to the
2004 contest. New Democracy promised that it would give everything that
PASOK could not. So it was hardly surprising that
Source: Centre for Economics and Business Research ( 2012 ).
6.2.2 Reasons for London’s
The emergence of London as an
international financial centre can be explained with reference to a
number of factors. The first is the time zone factor, with London
occupying a position mid-way between the western and
same time, as a result of the
detective work conducted by several agencies on both sides of the Atlantic,
detailed evidence of the nature and extent of Guerin’s malfeasance was made
available, resulting in a succession of court cases that meted out punishments
of varying severity.
Of course, while the multi-agency investigations only moved into gear
after 12 September, it is clear that Guerin and the Ferranti International
board had been made aware of enquiries into ISC much earlier in the year.
Indeed, the Ferranti International board had been informed as early as
For a number of decades our economy has failed to work for ordinary citizens. Stagnant wages have been combined with underemployment and rising costs of basic goods like healthcare, education and housing. At the same time, a small minority of the population make obscene profits, while in the background we continue to hurtle headlong into an environmental emergency. However, despite there being no shortage of anger and anti-elite sentiment expressed in what is often referred to as the ‘culture wars’, no significant challenge to the dominant economic model has broken into the mainstream. The pound and the fury argues that behind this failure of imagination are a set of taken-for-granted myths about how the economy works – myths that stifle debate and block change. The book analyses these myths, explores their origin, how they circulate and how they might be dispelled at a time when, away from the public gaze, economic theory is opening up new possibilities of economic action. Possibilities that, as we emerge from the chaos of Covid-19, could lead to the radical structural changes we desperately need.
This book explains the fundamental causes of the bank's failure, including
the inadequacy of the regulatory and supervisory framework. For some, it was the
repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act that was the overriding cause, not just of the
collapse of Lehman Brothers, but of the financial crisis as a whole. The book
argues that the cause is partly to be found both in weak and ineffective
regulation and also in a programme of regulation and supervision that was simply
not fit for the purpose. Lehman Brothers' long history began with three
brothers, immigrants from Germany, who sold selling groceries and dry goods to
local cotton farmers. Dick Fuld, the chairman and CEO, and his senior
management, ignored the increased risks, choosing to rely on over-valuations of
the firm's assets. The book examines the regulation of the Big Five
investment banks in the context of the changes which took place in the structure
of banking after the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act. It describes the
introduction of the European Union's Consolidated Supervision Directive in
2004. The book examines the whole issue of valuing Lehman's assets and
details the regulations covering appraisals and valuations of real estate,
applicable at the time and to consider Lehman's approach in the light of
these regulations. It argues that that the valuation of Lehman's real
estate assets was problematic to say the least, as the regulators did not
require the investment banks to adopt a recognized methodology of valuation, and
that Lehman's own methods were flawed.
8 Measuring Value
Previous chapters have set out the ways in which Lehman Brothers sought to value its assets and to hide its losses. Professional standards for the valuation of commercial and residential real estate existed at that time, but as the bankruptcy Examiner Valukas demonstrates in his report, Lehman showed little interest in conforming to them or hiring those who knew how to apply them.
Against that background it can be seen that the bankruptcy process did not itself cause the destruction of value, although it
inside the lobby, a waiting area with huge windows all the way round. I sit on one of the low-lying leather sofas in front of an oblong coffee table which has a scattering of magazines aimed at people who own property or enjoy high-octane adventure sports. People are smartly dressed but not all shirts are tucked in. When it's time for the interview I am let through the glass gates that permit access to the lift doors, enter the glass-walled lift and go up to the 9th floor. A sign directs me to the offices of the hedge fund I am here to visit. The companies lobby is all
The well-being of Europe’s citizens depends less on individual consumption and more on their social consumption of essential goods and services – from water and retail banking to schools and care homes – in what we call the foundational economy. Individual consumption depends on market income, while foundational consumption depends on social infrastructure and delivery systems of networks and branches, which are neither created nor renewed automatically, even as incomes increase. This historically created foundational economy has been wrecked in the last generation by privatisation, outsourcing, franchising and the widespread penetration of opportunistic and predatory business models. The distinctive, primary role of public policy should therefore be to secure the supply of basic services for all citizens (not a quantum of economic growth and jobs). Reconstructing the foundational has to start with a vision of citizenship that identifies foundational entitlements as the conditions for dignified human development, and likewise has to depend on treating the business enterprises central to the foundational economy as juridical persons with claims to entitlements but also with responsibilities and duties. If the aim is citizen well-being and flourishing for the many not the few, then European politics at regional, national and EU level needs to be refocused on foundational consumption and securing universal minimum access and quality. If/when government is unresponsive, the impetus for change has to come from engaging citizens locally and regionally in actions which break with the top down politics of ‘vote for us and we will do this for you’.
role of information and knowledge in the dynamics of the market process;
social consequences of market relations; and, finally, the relationship between
markets and competition.
Markets as institutions
The idea of markets as institutions, as habits, rules of social behaviour, is of
course not new. Yet, implications of this point await their full development in
terms of distinguishing between the market framework in general and markets in particular, and in distinguishing between the rules of the game at a
point in time and the generative processes through which those
course, if you had been paying close attention, it would have been obvious that it was there all along and was already in use through the quantitative easing programme. But in 2020 the magic money tree became public knowledge, as the state simply printed money to cover the costs of the sections of the economy that had been forced to close.
The question at the time of writing is what vision of the economy will the government opt for as we move into a post-pandemic world? Will be plunged into another ‘new age of austerity’,