Search results

You are looking at 1 - 10 of 11 items for :

  • "transatlantic relations" x
  • Manchester International Relations x
  • Refine by access: All content x
Clear All
Reuben Wong

Pivot to Asia: Towards New Trilateral Partnerships. Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, pp. 109–24. Yeo, Lay. (2010). “The EU as a Security Actor in Southeast Asia”, in Panorama: Insights into Asian and Political Affairs. Singapore: Regional Programme Political Dialogue Asia, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. Yeo, Lay. (2016). “EU Strategy towards Southeast Asia and ASEAN”, in Changing Waters: Towards a New EU Asia Strategy. London: LSE Ideas, pp. 6–12. Yeo, Lay Hwee. (2014). “The EU’s Role in Security and Regional Order in East Asia”, in Peter Shearman (ed

in The European Union in the Asia-Pacific
Suetyi Lai
Li Zhang

Centres. The EU Centre was initiated in the middle of 1990s to strengthen transatlantic relations under the “New Transatlantic Agenda” (European Council, 1995) between the EU and the US, as “bridges across the Atlantic”. In order to enhance neutrality and credibility, the EU Centre initiative is incorporated into existing universities. As a result, twelve EU centres were established in American universities and three in Canadian universities in 1998. The establishment of EU centres is not only as a kind of promotion in education, but also as a complement to the work of

in The European Union in the Asia-Pacific
Britain, 1940–43
Andrew Williams

irritant in transatlantic relations. Truman’s decision still rankles today in Williams Chapter 4 134 23/10/98, 11:39 am 135 Roosevelt’s NWO: Britain many British hearts, but it was a sign that Britain would from now on have to dance to America’s tune, which, most of the time, it dutifully has ever since. The post-war dogma of ‘realism’ in international relations theory was thus not seen as central to the NWO debate during most of the war. Power and its holders were seen as a ‘given’ and all basically in harmony with each other. What mainly changed this was of

in Failed imagination?
From Afghanistan to Iraq
Kerry Longhurst

perspectives on the use of force within the changing context of transatlantic relations. The changing contours of transatlantic relations The change in German security thinking at the beginning of the twentyfirst century took place within an already evolving context of transatlantic relations. Developments on both sides of the Atlantic in the field of foreign and security policy were setting out quite different European and American agendas and perspectives on the use of force in international politics in the 1990s. Two processes stand out here as illustrative of the nature of

in Germany and the use of force
Abstract only
Steven Kettell

the US President, Franklin Roosevelt, were considered by many in senior political circles to have established a common and enduring bond that was unique among nations, both in kind and intensity. But the balance of power between the two countries was far from equal, and transatlantic relations were far from trouble-free.2 Notable weak points centred on the issues of Palestine and cooperation over nuclear weapons technology (particularly following the US decision to cease bilateral collaboration in 1946), while the ongoing themes of economic and international rivalry

in New Labour and the new world order
A political–cultural approach
Lisbeth Aggestam

. Furthermore, German policy-makers are always much more keenly aware of the implications that a deepening process of foreign policy integration may have on transatlantic relations. The German government favours a more cohesive European actor capacity to shoulder a greater burden of security, thereby becoming a more equal partner to the US. Nonetheless, this must not jeopardise the continued presence of American involvement in

in Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy
Thomas Robb

initiative was less than ideal given that the US Christmas bombing campaign of North Vietnam had been roundly condemned by Europe’s leaders. This soured Nixon’s opinion towards such critics and, indeed, made him re-assess the nature of the entire NATO alliance.28 As Nixon articulated in conversation, NATO ‘had been an alliance of interest and friendship’; now it was ‘just an alliance of interest’.29 Clearly the president’s personal feelings towards European leaders were less than ideal for re-affirming the solidarity of transatlantic relations, but the exception to this

in A strained partnership?
The external image of Germany’s foreign policy
Siegfried Schieder

ongoing eurozone crisis, the conflicts in Syria and Ukraine, the migration crisis as well as the uncertain development of European integration and transatlantic relations after ‘Brexit’ and the Trump presidency have pushed ‘German foreign policy into an international leadership role’, although Germany had not ‘actively sought such a role’. 97 Germany did not seek ‘greater responsibility in Europe after reunification’; rather, it emerged as a central player ‘by remaining stable as the world around it changed’. 98 However, the growing international demands on German

in Prussians, Nazis and Peaceniks
Umberto Tulli

negotiations because, as Kissinger later explained, “We didn’t want to break with our allies or confront the Soviets on it.” 138 Not only were CSCE negotiations consistent with Kissinger’s linkage strategy to obtain Soviet cooperation in other areas, but they could also have helped the United States reaffirm its leadership in transatlantic relations at a moment in which tensions on both sides of the Atlantic were multiplying. After all, Kissinger explained, American allies considered the “European security negotiations as their equivalent to SALT – as the vehicle by which

in A precarious equilibrium
Umberto Tulli

. Aunesluoma , “ Finlandisation in Reverse: The CSCE and the Rise and Fall of Economic Détente, 1968–1975 ”, in O. Bange and G. Niedhart (eds), Helsinki 1975 and the Transformation of Europe ( New York : Berghahn Books , 2008 ), pp. 98 – 113 . 82 J. Renouard , “ No Relief for a Troubled Alliance: Human Rights and Transatlantic Relations in the 1970s ”, in R. Haar and N. Wynn (eds), Transatlantic Conflict and Consensus: Culture, History and Politics ( Cambridge : Cambridge Academic , 2009 ), pp. 145 – 162 ; O. Bange , “ The Greatest Happiness

in A precarious equilibrium