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struggle against colonialism, in the UN General Assembly Resolution on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of people to self-determination. This resolution, which has been passed on an annual basis since 1986 (2005 being the exception), recognizes 134 Romantic narratives in international politics that the activities of mercenaries are contrary to fundamental principles of international law, such as non-interference in the internal affairs of States, territorial integrity and independence, and seriously
universality, to be applied in its daily operations.) The four foundation principles are firmly anchored in international humanitarian law, and all governments have affirmed these principles through their acceptance of United Nations resolutions (notably UN General Assembly Resolutions 46/182 in 1991, and 58/114 in 2004). A short definition of what is meant by each of the four principles is offered by the UN
The Arab–Israeli conflict has been at the centre of international affairs for decades. Despite repeated political efforts, the confrontation and casualties continue, especially in fighting between Israelis and Palestinians. This new assessment emphasizes the role that military force plays in blocking a diplomatic resolution. Many Arabs and Israelis believe that the only way to survive or to be secure is through the development, threat, and use of military force and violence. This idea is deeply flawed and results in missed diplomatic opportunities and growing insecurity. Coercion cannot force rivals to sign a peace agreement to end a long-running conflict. Sometimes negotiations and mutual concessions are the key to improving the fate of a country or national movement. Using short historical case studies from the 1950s through to today, the book explores and pushes back against the dominant belief that military force leads to triumph while negotiations and concessions lead to defeat and further unwelcome challenges. In The sword is not enough, we learn both what makes this idea so compelling to Arab and Israeli leaders and how it eventually may get dislodged.
original Charter. By General Assembly Resolution 1991 A and B (XVIII) of 17 December 1963, the number of members in the Security Council and ECOSOC was increased from 11 to 15 and from 18 to 27 respectively. This resolution entered into force on 30 August 1965. At first, the alteration of Article 109 Paragraph 1 was overlooked. This paragraph was later amended by General Assembly Resolution 201
specifically, with the way it was defined in the 1980s. For instance, Kouchner – who was again Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time – argued that “France invented the droit d’ingérence . …. The Security Council talks about ‘the responsibility to protect’. It is the same thing” (in Védrine 2009 , 245–246). Similarly, in 2010 Kouchner argued in front of the UN General Assembly that General Assembly Resolution 43/131 ( 1988 ) on “Humanitarian assistance to victims of natural disasters and similar emergency situations” and Security Council Resolution 688 ( 1991 ) on Iraq
realistic possibility, something reaffirmed by Amorim nearly three decades later, it contained a geopolitical logic irresistible to security thinkers in the region. The pressure to pursue some sort of localized cooperation approach to maintaining security in the area was dramatically heightened by the Falklands/Malvinas War of 1982, which ultimately pushed Brazil in 1986 to propose and win approval of a UN General Assembly resolution creating ZOPACAS. By 1994 the members agreed to a relatively inexpensive, but highly symbolic step to retrench ZOPACAS by jointly declaring
’s foreign policy in the MENA region? With a few exceptions, notably Tehran and Damascus siding firmly with Moscow, the immediate response of the MENA countries to the invasion appeared equivocal. Almost all of them approved the UN General Assembly resolutions on 2 March and 24 March – the first deploring Russia’s breach of Ukraine’s sovereignty and demanding Russia’s military withdrawal from Ukrainian
Assembly resolutions on the topic. Specifically, the UN expressed general concern that emerging technologies (especially cyber) might be used for nefarious purposes, “inconsistent with the objectives of maintaining international stability and security,” and the body proposed an expert panel to consider “possible cooperative measures to address them, including norms, rules, or principles” of states. 50 In 2015, the expert panel articulated a set of core norms to “prevent the proliferation of malicious information
provision in the Middle East and without any vested interests in the conflict, Saudi Arabia and the UAE initially appeared unwilling to accept the US position on Russia. The UAE, along with China and India, abstained in the first UN Security Council vote on 25 February 2022 aimed at denouncing the Russian invasion, but backed a similar UN General Assembly resolution on 2 March. NATO–Russia tensions over the 2022 war in Ukraine initially made it less likely that Russia would push Iran to support a new JCPOA with the US, and Russia sought assurances that US sanctions would
. For years, the Phnom Penh regime had not been seated in the UN. ASEAN-sponsored General Assembly resolutions had associated the Phnom Penh regime with the Vietnamese invasion, and steadfastly refused to confer official legitimacy to it. Vietnam, on the other hand, was widely considered an aggressor. Security Council action against Hanoi and Phnom Penh had been averted only by dedicated Soviet efforts. 53 As a