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inescapable, as enshrined, for example, in international humanitarian law (IHL), including the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977 and 2005; the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC); and customary international law ( Brooks, 2015 ). On the other hand, the interview findings of this study reveal a widespread sense of frustration among aid workers over the perceived inefficacy of the law in practice for the protection of humanitarian action. Even in light of the existence of not only international courts and tribunals but
Bibliography on International Law until 1945 and the following works reviewing the literature: A. Rougier, ‘La théorie de l’intervention d’humanité’, Revue générale de droit international public , 17 (1910), 468–97; E. C. Stowell, Intervention in International Law (Washington, DC: John Byrne, 1921); J.-P. L. Fonteyne, ‘The Customary International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current Validity Under the U
), 37–8; W. G. Grewe, The Epochs of International Law (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2000, translated and revised by M. Byers), 493; J.-P. L. Fonteyne, ‘The Customary International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current Validity Under the U.N. Charter’, California Western International Law Journal (1973–74), 235; M. Finnemore, ‘Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention’, in P. J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of
The book explores the relationship between violence against women on one hand, and the rights to health and reproductive health on the other. It argues that violation of the right to health is a consequence of violence, and that (state) health policies might be a cause of – or create the conditions for – violence against women. It significantly contributes to feminist and international human rights legal scholarship by conceptualising a new ground-breaking idea, violence against women’s health (VAWH), using the Hippocratic paradigm as the backbone of the analysis. The two dimensions of violence at the core of the book – the horizontal, ‘interpersonal’ dimension and the vertical ‘state policies’ dimension – are investigated through around 70 decisions of domestic, regional and international judicial or quasi-judicial bodies (the anamnesis). The concept of VAWH, drawn from the anamnesis, enriches the traditional concept of violence against women with a human rights-based approach to autonomy and a reflection on the pervasiveness of patterns of discrimination (diagnosis). VAWH as theorised in the book allows the reconceptualisation of states’ obligations in an innovative way, by identifying for both dimensions obligations of result, due diligence obligations, and obligations to progressively take steps (treatment). The book eventually asks whether it is not international law itself that is the ultimate cause of VAWH (prognosis).
gender-based violence against women has evolved into a principle of customary international law,’ and that ‘General recommendation No. 19 has been a key catalyst for this process.’31 The question is in fact two intertwined questions, as follows: does an international custom prohibiting gender-based VAW exist? If so, what is the content of this norm? The Committee has proved courageous, and the GR will probably spur the consolidation of a custom to that effect in years to come. For the time being, however, I consider this argument with caution, respectfully contending
M. Ganji, International Protection of Human Rights (Geneva: Librairie E. Droz, 1962), 24–6; J.-P. L. Fonteyne, ‘The Customary International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current Validity Under the U.N. Charter’, California Western International Law Journal (1973–74), 208–9; M. Finnemore, ‘Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention’, in P. J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security (New York
–400; Dakin, The Greek Struggle for Independence , 182–3; Crawley, The Question of Greek Independence , 75–6; Jelavich, Russia’s Balkan Entanglements , 81–2; Hinde, George Canning , 456–7. 115 Treaty of London, in Modern History Sourcebook, http://www.fordham.edu/Halsall/mod/1827gktreaty.asp . 116 J.-P. L. Fonteyne, ‘The Customary International Law Doctrine of
, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. The categories overlapped to some extent and were not carefully distinguished by the Tribunal. The second and third categories have formed 110 War crimes trials before international tribunals the conceptual basis for the development of international criminal law since 1945.35 War crimes was an accepted category in 1945 both in terms of treaty law and customary international law. Crimes against peace and crimes against humanity were much more controversial in terms of whether they violated the principle of nullem crimen sine
Russe dans la question d’Orient’, Revue du droit international et de législation comparée , 9 (1877), 49–50. 131 Mandelstam, ‘La protection des minorités’, 376–7. 132 Ganji, International Protection of Human Rights , 29–33. 133 J.-P. L. Fonteyne, ‘The Customary International Law Doctrine of
‘there is no “right” of humanitarian intervention in either the UN Charter or customary international law’. 89 Friedrich Kratochwil generally takes a similar line, coming to the conclusion that no right of humanitarian intervention exists save in the cases of the ‘institution of the protection of nations’ or authorised under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 90 As noted earlier, major states such as China and Russia opposed NATO