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the economic governance of Tanzanian social insurance schemes produces a tension between the collective hedging against various contingencies and the extractive aspects of investments and the returns on capital. Here the bridge, rather than hedging, protecting and securing, instead might institutionalise new architectures of risk through unexpected (material, political and ethical) effects. The fund is understood as a social security infrastructure. It operates as a policy assemblage performing a number of bureaucratic tasks. Its operations aim
Asia. Yet the rise of China had revolutionised the economic realities of the region, with all of Washington’s main regional allies increasingly dependent on China for trade and investment. Moreover, since the arrival of Chinese President Xi Jinping, Beijing has promoted a comprehensive blueprint of economic governance in Asia, based on Chinese leadership, values and rules. The most evident manifestations of this Chinese attempt to build alternative forms of economic governance have been the promotion of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Asian Infrastructure
activity, its principal mode of rational calculation being suitable to all spheres of life. The market is the epitome of efficiency in the allocation of resources and is unfailingly superior to any other system of economic governance. The market is the best guarantor of reliable quality in products and services. The market guarantees sustained growth in standards of living in all countries, whatever their level of development. ● ● ● ● ● ● The power of the discourse operates in several modes: as political rhetoric, in business practice and through the ghostly role
unregulated segments of the national or international labour market, economic crises and the rapid growth of new service industries with lower trade union density, the balance of power has shifted in recent decades in favour of employers, which can have significant negative effects on job quality. This change has often taken place gradually as the various influencing factors have steadily accumulated, causing labour standards to be eroded slowly. The deregulation promoted by the economic governance framework of the European Union (EU) has accelerated this process. Jill
- CALLAGHAN TEXT.indd 80 3/8/09 12:13:34 French social democratic economic policy 81 credibility, in combination with the political context of a Franco-German axis on deficit forgiveness, created areas of room for manoeuvre, notably in revising the interpretation and implementation of the SGP to align more closely with French dirigiste preferences. French socialism and dirigiste aspirations for European economic governance In 1997, the Jospin Government’s attempts at institutional re-engineering of the supranational economic policy regime advocated a political role in
sometimes been argued that the shifts in the functions of economic governance actors associated with a focus on international competitiveness have been, or should be, accompanied by shifts in the levels of governance. The nation state, in other words, becomes increasingly ‘leaky’ as a ‘container of governance’ (Brenner et al., 2003). Its coordinating capacities are fragmented, with some capacity transferred upwards (e.g. supranational or transnational institutions providing competition rules) and some downwards (with subnational regions or localities charged with
institutional forms. It is at this point that networks become objects of economic governance. Questions of governance In Scott’s account, success in the cultural economy – given the role of networking, the degree of interdependence between firms, and the tendency towards agglomeration – is a collective rather than simply an individual matter. He therefore sees a key part for certain ‘agents of collective order’ (Scott, 2000, p. 27) in promoting economic efficiency and growth. The state, in other words – and in its various extended guises – encourages both competition and
finished the volume (and rewrote this conclusion) some time after the research was completed, at a moment when the COVID-19 global pandemic in the space of three months rewrote the script of normality. What had been normal in daily life, work life, state actions and economic governance was up for grabs. As the pandemic made global connections at a speed rarely anticipated, what happened in Wuhan suddenly became profoundly relevant in Tehran, in Madrid, in Lombardy, London, New York and New Orleans as much as in Cape Town, Kampala, Lagos, Dar es Salaam or Johannesburg
privatisation remains as a key strategy in installing a liberal peace, both guiding and operational actors within the DSI initially took a very cautious approach to privatising in Kosovo. However, such cautiousness was not a function of a limited commitment to liberal ideology, but rather a fear of the legal and personal ramifications for operational staff. Once legal concerns were addressed, the commitment to free market ideologies and technologies of economic governance was revived and implemented at rapid pace. The renewed commitment to this cornerstone of neo
) should be pursued –and what kind of actors should represent Greenlandic interests –are hotly debated in Greenlandic society (Nuttall, 2015; Wilson, 2015). Today, corporate actors are arguing for an increasing place at the table in questions of Arctic economic governance. Financial actors/banks who lend money to key Arctic projects play an instrumental role in setting and enforcing various standards of relevance to the Arctic natural and project environment (Alto and Jaakkola, 2015). More specific to the Arctic itself, the establishment of the Arctic Economic Council