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inescapable, as enshrined, for example, in international humanitarian law (IHL), including the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977 and 2005; the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC); and customary international law ( Brooks, 2015 ). On the other hand, the interview findings of this study reveal a widespread sense of frustration among aid workers over the perceived inefficacy of the law in practice for the protection of humanitarian action. Even in light of the existence of not only international courts and tribunals but
The book explores the relationship between violence against women on one hand, and the rights to health and reproductive health on the other. It argues that violation of the right to health is a consequence of violence, and that (state) health policies might be a cause of – or create the conditions for – violence against women. It significantly contributes to feminist and international human rights legal scholarship by conceptualising a new ground-breaking idea, violence against women’s health (VAWH), using the Hippocratic paradigm as the backbone of the analysis. The two dimensions of violence at the core of the book – the horizontal, ‘interpersonal’ dimension and the vertical ‘state policies’ dimension – are investigated through around 70 decisions of domestic, regional and international judicial or quasi-judicial bodies (the anamnesis). The concept of VAWH, drawn from the anamnesis, enriches the traditional concept of violence against women with a human rights-based approach to autonomy and a reflection on the pervasiveness of patterns of discrimination (diagnosis). VAWH as theorised in the book allows the reconceptualisation of states’ obligations in an innovative way, by identifying for both dimensions obligations of result, due diligence obligations, and obligations to progressively take steps (treatment). The book eventually asks whether it is not international law itself that is the ultimate cause of VAWH (prognosis).
gender-based violence against women has evolved into a principle of customary international law,’ and that ‘General recommendation No. 19 has been a key catalyst for this process.’31 The question is in fact two intertwined questions, as follows: does an international custom prohibiting gender-based VAW exist? If so, what is the content of this norm? The Committee has proved courageous, and the GR will probably spur the consolidation of a custom to that effect in years to come. For the time being, however, I consider this argument with caution, respectfully contending
volonté et la force lui manquent, d’autres, de simple tiers, les rempliront à sa place dans les limites de leur intérêt’. Ibid ., p. 26. 72 M. Ganji, International Protection of Human Rights (Geneva, Librairie E. Droz, 1962), ch. 1, pp. 9–45; J.-P. L. Fonteyne, ‘The Customary International Law
.99 The tripartite structure and the theory of core obligations possess a lot of merit, despite being quite descriptive, in highlighting how each human right creates a wide spectrum of legal obligations, against which states’ actions must be assessed.100A possible solution to the impasse could be to conceive core obligations as obligations that have consolidated as customary international law, thereby binding all states without requiring ratification of a specific treaty, but it is not my purpose here to dwell on their nature; rather to reflect on the most suitable
See in that respect, S. De Vido, ‘The prohibition of violence against women as customary international law? Remarks on the CEDAW General Recommendation No. 35’, Diritti umani diritto internazionale 2 (2018) 379. 6 See also the Istanbul Convention, where the only reference to states’ policies in the field of health causing VAW could be forced abortion and forced sterilisation. 7 J.S. Mill, On Liberty (1859) (Kitchener, Ontario: Batoche Books, 2001), p. 13. 8 J. Feinberg, Harm to Others (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984). 169 DE VIDO 9781526124975