conflict, struggle and war; non-materialism; irrationalism and anti-intellectualism; nation and race; the leader and the elite; the state and government; fascist economic and social theory.
Conflict, struggle and war
Fascism attached an astonishingly
positive value to war. War was regarded as the ultimate conflict in a world
in which struggle was the essence of existence. Permanent peace was not only
nonsense, it was dangerous nonsense, as humans grow
enjoy a sense both of self-fulfilment and community with
others’ (248). The activity of being a citizen is intertwined with that of
being a whole individual, an individual who could see the beauty in nature,
enjoy music, and at the same time perform the duties of a virtuous citizen.
This, of course, was not a unique ambition for a great philosopher. Plato,
Kant, Hegel and even Mill (to name but a few) aspired to do the same.
Did Rousseau succeed in his endeavour? He recognised – like Burke –
that the advent of Godless materialism was undermining the moeurs, and
, and we move into a world
in which new media and faster communications create different networks
of kinship and organisation across much larger distances, Irish theatre
inevitably faces a huge crisis of identity, a deep question about who the
audience now is, and how it should be addressed.10
The fallout of the triumphalist materialism of the 1990s, coupled with
loosening bonds between nation and identity, continue to present a challenge for the new playwrights of the 1990s and those who follow.
Yet while the 1990s did herald a break with various aspects of
through the twin historicisms of cultural materialism and cultural
poetics (or ‘new historicism’).2 The periodising title early modern is part of a movement
away from notions such as ‘the English Renaissance’ or from ‘the Tudor period’,
although such names are retained by some of historicism’s adherents.3 That the emergence of the phrase ‘early modern’ seems to mark a strategic attempt to delineate what
otherwise appears to be a depressingly familiar ramification of what I suppose we must
now term ‘old’ historicism doesn’t diminish its institutional eﬀectivity.4
This book presents an overview of Jean–Jacques Rousseau's work from a political science perspective. Was Rousseau — the great theorist of the French Revolution—really a conservative? The text argues that the author of ‘The Social Contract’ was a constitutionalist much closer to Madison, Montesquieu, and Locke than to revolutionaries. Outlining his profound opposition to Godless materialism and revolutionary change, this book finds parallels between Rousseau and Burke, as well as showing that Rousseau developed the first modern theory of nationalism. It presents an integrated political analysis of Rousseau's educational, ethical, religious and political writings.
In May 1958, and four years into the Algerian War of Independence, a revolt again appropriated the revolutionary and republican symbolism of the French Revolution by seizing power through a Committee of Public Safety. This book explores why a repressive colonial system that had for over a century maintained the material and intellectual backwardness of Algerian women now turned to an extensive programme of 'emancipation'. After a brief background sketch of the situation of Algerian women during the post-war decade, it discusses the various factors contributed to the emergence of the first significant women's organisations in the main urban centres. It was only after the outbreak of the rebellion in 1954 and the arrival of many hundreds of wives of army officers that the model of female interventionism became dramatically activated. The French military intervention in Algeria during 1954-1962 derived its force from the Orientalist current in European colonialism and also seemed to foreshadow the revival of global Islamophobia after 1979 and the eventual moves to 'liberate' Muslim societies by US-led neo-imperialism in Afghanistan and Iraq. For the women of Bordj Okhriss, as throughout Algeria, the French army represented a dangerous and powerful force associated with mass destruction, brutality and rape. The central contradiction facing the mobile socio-medical teams teams was how to gain the trust of Algerian women and to bring them social progress and emancipation when they themselves were part of an army that had destroyed their villages and driven them into refugee camps.
This chapter considers the implications of recent developments around
object-oriented philosophy, the ontological turn and new materialism for the
study of maps. Drawing a line from critical cartography to contemporary
debates of non-representational and performative mapping, it argues for an
approach that goes beyond textual or representational readings to think
about how maps invent, affect and perform. With regards to time, this means
an examination not of its representation, but of how maps themselves produce
particular temporalities. A case study of the PathoMap describes how digital
visualisations in the ‘smart city’ help to produce a regime of preparedness.
As ‘device’, the map establishes a rhythm with the city, from emergence, to
detection, to intervention; closing down the horizon of possible futures. In
contrast to this pre-emptive elimination of uncertainty, it is suggested
that a critical object-oriented cartography can point to the potential of
maps to prompt the speculative provocation of possibility.
this section each address notions of being and becoming within different areas of anarchist theory and practice. Indeed, it is the ontological dimension of contemporary anarchism – especially the placing of Self
within a wider ecology of global relations, human and non-human – which distinguishes anarchism from radical perspectives that retain too much focus on
materialism and political economy. The fact that anarchism has largely premised
its critique on a psychological dimension to power relations, not just a material
one, has been an advantage in this respect
matter is grounded in the vital materialism of political ecologist Jane Bennett, who calls for more ethical engagements with ‘vibrant matter and lively things’ ( 2010 : viii). Departing from the human–human responsibility of social ethics, Bennett suggests that ‘perhaps the ethical responsibility of an individual human now resides in one’s response to the assemblages in which one finds oneself participating’ ( 2010 : 37). Aligned with strategies of new materialist, post-human and ecological discourses, Bennett’s framework shares a desire to dismantle ontological
’ (censorship as a repressive, external threat to essential
freedoms) that has been adopted by ‘political critics’ working on
the early modern period (particularly British cultural materialists),
which ‘makes available in the Renaissance a certain essentially
moral notion of critical opposition’. ‘By extension,’ argues Burt,
‘a similar kind of critical opposition becomes available in the
present.’4 This situation may well have come about, as Robert
Young has noted, because cultural materialism as a broadly leftist
critical practice has pretty much supplanted or displaced the