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Normative underpinnings: from Dayton to the Stability Pact Dayton agreement: democracy, human rights and multiculturalism for Bosnia? The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina , initialled in Dayton, Ohio in November 1995 and formally signed in Paris one month later, brought to an end the armed conflict and initiated a process of peace-building in Bosnia. The
success depends on them . . . you will perhaps concur that an increasing threat to the regional stability prompts us to think in this direction as well.15 At the same time, four leaders in the region – Heydar Aliev (Azerbaijan), Robert Kocharian (Armenia), Eduard Shevardnadze (Georgia) and Suleyman Demirel (Turkey) – supported the development of some kind of stability or security pact for the Caucasus. Following up on this proposal, the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels drafted a Stability Pact for the 212 2504Chap11 7/4/03 12:41 pm Page 213 The Black
Council are convinced that the EU shall play its full role on the international stage’). Meanings at the EU level concerning the nature of EU actorness can therefore not be said to be fixed. POLICY PRACTICE The policy activities of the EU have so far concentrated on the civilian aspects of foreign policy (stability pacts, trade and cooperation agreements, political conditionality, declaratory
futures: unachievable goals? The normative bases of the Dayton agreements, UNSC Resolution 1244 and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe all promote democracy in conjunction with a civic model of nationalism that is distant, if not alien to, ethnic national identities in South East Europe. On this crucial issue of nationalism, the gulf in understanding between the recipients and givers of norms lies at the crux of
the EMS in 1993, France saw itself as being forced into the kind of machinations that culminated in the conclusion of the unpopular ‘Stability Pact’ in 1997. The important controversial debate on the social costs of monetary integration began at that time.8 This forcefully split parties, separating the ‘integrationnistes’ from so-called ‘souverainistes’, namely national republicans and social Gaullists, who built a coalition against a so-called neo-liberal ‘pensée unique’. In the 1995 presidential election, concerns about the preservation of a high level of social
limits their scope. (Henry Kissinger)1 Summary As the EU and NATO enlarge, prospects for overall economic growth and peace are good, even if tensions both within and without the enlarged circle of EU and NATO member states could cloud the picture, as over Iraq in 2003. Prospects for peace and prosperity improved in South-Eastern Europe under a Stability Pact for the region, involving major international assistance. Continuing EU and NATO enlargement will mean an eastward shift of Europe’s ‘centre of gravity’, with a major role for Germany. That country is, however
, be said to have 8 been covered by the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, while awaiting the day when their economic (and political) maturity might be such as to qualify them for candidate status. Meanwhile, the EU was to reform itself in order to be ready in its turn to receive new members. An Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) would be set up in 2000 and given until 2002 to finish its work (i.e. one or two years before the first expected enlargement). The main task was to make sure that a much larger EU could work efficiently and reach decisions. MUP
amendments permitting. For instance, opposition to the stability pact limiting budget deficits to 3 per cent ‘privent [Les Quinze] des moyens budgétaires d’impulser une véritable politique de l’emploi à l’échelle européenne’.5 Similarly, the lack of democratic checks on the European Central Bank raises fears of excessive monetarism on the part of European economic policies. This again demonstrates the need to differentiate between bases to Euroscepticism, and certainly this is not limited just to the Greens. In the case of the PCF, for instance, shifting positions on
the three-stage plan to build EMU, developed in the 1970s under the leadership of Pierre Werner, as this played an important role in the field of financial policy. In the late 1990s, the negotiating skills of the Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker brought about German–French agreement at a time when the stability pact on budget deficits was being developed, and thus helped to further EMU. Luxembourg’s European policy focuses primarily on a deepening of the integration process while safeguarding vital national interests. During the 1996–97 IGC, the government
Maastricht of 1992 included provisions for harmonising the economic and monetary policies of EU member governments (articles 99–104). The four policy areas were: interest rates, inflation, government budget deficits and accumulated indebtedness. The Growth and Stability Pact (GSP) of July 1997 set out the maximum acceptable level of deficit for euro countries at 3 per cent of GDP, with the three non-euro EU members (UK, Denmark and Sweden) agreeing also to converge on this fiscal rule. The idea of a common fiscal stance was pressed especially by the German government to