Mobilising the concept of strategic culture, this study develops a framework for understanding developments in German security policy between 1990 and 2003. Germany's contemporary security policies are characterised by a peculiar mix of continuity and change. From abstention in the first Gulf war, to early peacekeeping missions in Bosnia in the early 1990s and a full combat role in Kosovo in 1999, the pace of change in German security policy since the end of the Cold War has been breathtaking. The extent of this change has recently, however, been questioned, as seen most vividly in Berlin's response to ‘9/11’ and its subsequent stalwart opposition to the US-led war on terrorism in Iraq in 2003. Beginning with a consideration of the notion of strategic culture, the study refines and adapts the concept to the case of Germany through a consideration of aspects of the rearmament of West Germany. It then critically evaluates the transformation of the role of the Bundeswehr up to and including the war on terrorism, together with Germany's troubled efforts to enact defence reforms, as well as the complex politics surrounding the policy of conscription. By focusing on both the ‘domestics’ of security policy decision making as well as the changing and often contradictory expectations of Germany's allies, this book provides a comprehensive analysis of the role played by Germany's particular strategic culture in shaping policy choices. It concludes by pointing to the vibrancy of Germany's strategic culture.
views of John Stuart Mill and
Isaiah Berlin on ‘negative’ and ‘positive’
freedom. Then we focus on the central issue of freedom and the state,
concentrating on three major areas of dispute: conscientious objection,
state acquisition of private property, civil disobedience and terrorism.
We end with some observations on the cultural environment conducive to
freedom and reflect on the problems of freedom
label an ANSA, thereby trying to (re-)shape or undermine its identity, which may or may not entail a reframing of recognition claims on the part of the recognition-seeker. The most important label in the case of Hezbollah is ‘terrorism’, but ‘sectarianism’ and ‘foreignness’ (see also Toros and Sugal in this volume) play an important role, too.
The chapter does not attempt to position itself in terms of an ‘objective’ classification of Hezbollah but focuses on the discursive struggles over what this ANSA wants to be recognised, and is recognised, as
. One of the many eﬀects of that day was the emergence
of a fundamental diﬀerence between US and German perspectives
regarding the use of force and how best to combat the sources of global
terrorism. The transformation that US foreign policy underwent after
(and arguably even before) September 11 brought into focus the peculiarities and continuities present within German security thinking. The
Longhurst, Germany and the use of force.qxd
Germany and the use of force
next section discusses at some length the evolution of US
the PLO thus achieved international legitimacy could it afford to recognise Israel and in November 1988 it accepted UN Resolution 242, contingent on acquisition of a Palestinian state in the occupied territories. The consequent US decision to start a dialogue with the PLO after it renounced terrorism, presented a new opportunity but was taken by the Israeli elite to be a threat against which the Labour and Likud parties joined in a ‘wall-to-wall coalition’ government.
However, the two main Israeli parties were drawing apart. The Likud
more far-reaching reforms emerged,
with many of Germany’s allies and partners eager to see a greater commitment to modernise the Bundeswehr as well as increase defence
spending. Stimulus for change was then provided by the events of
September 11 2001 and the subsequent US-led war on terrorism, which
served to ﬁnally explode the longstanding assumption that national and
alliance territorial defence was central to the Bundeswehr’s mission and
Certainly, the Bundeswehr at the start of the twenty-ﬁrst century is
a very diﬀerent entity from that of the Cold War
’ war altogether. It is the war of every Muslim in every place’ (al-Baghdādī 2015 ). Conversely, this recognition of the plight of Muslims in the countries mentioned by the Islamic State's leadership opens up a host of new venues for recognition of the Islamic State as the legitimate defender of Muslims’ rights everywhere, and consequently a significant increase in its global prestige that mirrors its increased sense of political status.
In focusing on global affairs, al-Baghdādī also seeks to shield the Islamic State from accusations of terrorism
on the use of force
became, especially in the context of the expansion of the US-led war
against terrorism in 2003, more reminiscent of the restrictive, amilitaristic, foreign policy style of the pre-1990 Bonn Republic. This
mixture of change and continuity also pervades the structure of the
Federal armed forces and the pace of defence sector reforms. While the
Bundeswehr, Germany’s armed force, has become better equipped for
modern out-of-area missions, its post-1989 process of transformation
and modernisation remains limited and largely inadequate due to the
Risks and opportunities for conflict transformation
Maéva Clément, Anna Geis, and Hanna Pfeifer
Internal wars are the prevalent contemporary type of violent conflict (Sarkees and Wayman 2010 ). Many violent conflicts involve armed non-state actors (ANSAs) such as insurgents, rebels, guerrillas, warlords, militias, paramilitaries and private security companies. In addition, the so-called ‘global war on terrorism’ indicates that transnational terrorist networks are considered to be one of the major security threats today. Whatever label is used for a certain armed actor by a government, official
unequivocal sense. Justice belonged entirely to one side and injustice to
the other. In the mind of the President, it seems, this is what a just war
entails. Many would agree with him.
In the current ‘war against terrorism’, President George
W. Bush appears to share his father’s (and, ironically, Osama bin
Laden’s) absolutist view. This is a war dubbed immodestly (but, as an
indicator of underlying moral assumptions, revealingly