Attitudes towards subversive movements and violent organisations
THE DEMOCRATIC POLITY’S struggle against manifestations of extra-parliamentary extremism and political violence is accompanied by a similar and perhaps even more acute quandary than its contest with political parties. In this struggle the government possesses the means to substantially restrict the freedom of expression and association of its citizens, consequently harming a number of their democratic rights. However, in its struggle against extremism, violence and, at times, even terrorism, the democracy is sometimes impelled to employ
, in the direction of the ‘immunised’ pole by the very fact that, for the first time, the objective and powers of the Shabak, as well as the means of accounting for its actions, will now be more clearly defined. 2
Another step in the same direction can be detected in the Ministry of Justice’s repeated efforts to address state policy regarding the ‘incitement to violence’ offence and confine it to a legal framework, thus replacing the Ordinance for the Prevention of Terrorism and other widely used administrative measures. In the summer of 2001
The ‘defending democracy’ in Israel – a framework of analysis
Giovanni Capoccia, ‘Defending Democracy: Reactions to Political Extremism in Inter-War Europe’, European Journal of Political Research, 39:4 (2001).
6 For example: Peter Chalk, ‘The Liberal Democratic Response to Terrorism’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 7:4 (1995), pp. 10–44; Raphael Cohen-Almagor, ‘Combating Right-Wing Political Extremism in Israel: Critical Appraisal’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 9:4 (1997), pp. 82–105; Ronald D. Crelinsten and Alex P. Schmid, ‘Western Responses to Terrorism: A Twenty-Five Year Balance Sheet
’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 21:6 (1998), pp. 1096–115.
6 Sheri Berman, ‘Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic’, World Politics, 49:3 (1997), pp. 401–29.
7 William, L. Eubank and Leonard Weinberg, ‘Terrorism and Democracy within One Country: The Case of Italy’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 9:1 (1997), pp. 98–108.
8 Michael W. Foley and Bob Edwards, ‘Escape from Politics: Social Theory and the Social Capital debate’, American Behavioral Scientist, 42 (1998), pp. 550
national ideals in the textbooks devised by the Palestinian Authority in consequence of the Oslo Agreements. Raphael Israeli, ‘Education, Identity, State Building and the Peace Process: Educating Palestinian Children in the Post-Oslo Era’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 12:1 (2000), pp. 79–94.
14 Ichilov, Citizenship Education in Israel.
15 Statehood Education Act, paragraph 2, The Book of Laws, 131 (Jerusalem, 1953).
16 From an interview with Yitzhak Levy, former Minister of Education (13
disqualification hovered over their movement and accordingly were unprepared for debate on this subject. Further evidence of Kach’ s complacency in this regard can be found in the fact that Kahane himself did not attend the hearing, and in fact did not send any legal representative on his behalf.
The hearing itself focused principally on the notice published by the party in the newspapers and its election platform. Among the profusion of ideas presented there was a paragraph that advocated acts of terrorism against Arabs. The thrust of the Kach
military highways, built first by General Wade and then
by William Caulfield, which opened up certain parts of the Highlands (but
by no means all) to influences from further south, the Lowlands and England.2
As far as the Highlands were concerned, the most obvious changes were
social and cultural. As Allan MacInnes has put it, ‘The immediate aftermath
of the Forty-Five was marked by systematic state terrorism, characterised
by a genocidal intent that verged on ethnic cleansing . . . chiefs and leading
gentry abandoned their traditional obligations as protectors and