and power of the member states. Moravcsik refined his earlier work on
intergovernmental institutionalism by adding to his theory of interstate bargaining an explicit theory of national preference formation grounded in
liberal theories of international interdependence (Moravcsik 1991, 1993).
Moravcsik employs these two theoretical approaches to test his claim that
European integration depends on macro-level interstate bargains negotiated
by member states with the aim of managing economic interdependence.
Moravcsik treats the key intergovernmental players as
qualification for European competitions is achieved through championship
or cup performance. In essence therefore, the pyramid structure implies considerable interdependence between the levels. This ‘open’ model contrasts
with the ‘closed’ procedures in the USA where championships are closed and
sport is governed by many federations.
The European ‘model’ has emerged out of the traditional culture of amateurism in European sport whilst the US ‘model’ represents professionalism.
In this respect, European sport has traditionally not been practised as an
implications can still be caught
within the scope of competition law.
Third, do sports rules have the potential to prevent, restrict or distort
competition in the EU? Rules which have a minor impact on competition are
not subject to EU competition law. Nevertheless, as in any other sector, horizontal and vertical sporting agreements do have the potential to be caught
within the scope of competition law. Of course competition in the sports
sector is not necessarily the same as in other sectors due to the unique interdependence within the sector. This leads to a supplementary