External influences and continental shaping forces
and limited in the capacity to influence. The institutional framework
established to support the political dialogue in the JAES is top-heavy,
mostly removed from the political interests of the state, and at a distance
from other socio-economic interests, including the business community.
Dialogue between the AU and EU Commissions may well fail to take
account of political interests at the level of the state, or even the RECs.
There is inadequate research on the politics of integration in Africa in
terms of the interests of state (and non-state) actors, and of the
addition, they are ill-prepared to
deal with the dramatic growth of non-traditional and transnational security threats. The resulting erosion of African state power and its inability
to safeguard its citizenry is not the cause of this situation, but indicative
of the symptomatic failure of the state itself and its discredited approach
to building security. This vacuum has in turn propelled the entry of an
increasing and diverse number of non-stateactors into the security sector
and is forcing a critically needed reassessment of the role of the state.
Despite its flaws
in many aspects and wanted this to be recognised.
Al-Baghdādī also notably exacerbated his rhetoric in the upcoming months that saw intensifying fights between the still expanding Islamic State and the Iraqi and Syrian military, their international allies and various non-stateactors. The universalist language that had been characteristic of messages by the Islamic State's leadership was gradually superseded by a focus on particularities in terms of battlegrounds and groups referenced in the communiqués (see al-Baghdādī 2015
whether an attack by a non-Stateactor can constitute an armed attack giving rise to a right to self-defence. 23 Further, it remains controversial whether such an attack can justify a response in self-defence against a State which is ‘harbouring’ them, especially when it is unclear whether the State knew of or could have prevented such an attack. 24 Even assuming that a right to self-defence arises in response to an attack by non-Stateactors, the international law of self-defence imposes requirements of necessity and proportionality. 25 These requirements do not
). Furthermore, it is not just other states that are drafted in to do the border dirty work. Countries also co-opt non-stateactors, such as airlines and ferry operators, to manage their borders for them—threatening them with stiff penalties if they allow unauthorized travelers to use their services ( p. 35 ). This use of financial incentives and coordination with private companies “blurs the line between state and market,” illustrating yet another form assumed by the shifting border (hence the “Inc.” in my chapter’s title).
Importantly, Shachar emphasizes throughout her
Reconstructing modernity assesses the character of approaches to rebuilding British cities during the decades after the Second World War. It explores the strategies of spatial governance that sought to restructure society and looks at the cast of characters who shaped these processes. It challenges traditional views of urban modernism as moderate and humanist, shedding new light on the importance of the immediate post-war for the trajectory of urban renewal in the twentieth century. The book shows how local corporations and town planners in Manchester and Hull attempted to create order and functionality through the remaking of their decrepit Victorian cities. It looks at the motivations of national and local governments in the post-war rebuilding process and explores why and how they attempted the schemes they did. What emerges is a picture of local corporations, planners and city engineers as radical reshapers of the urban environment, not through the production of grand examples of architectural modernism, but in mundane attempts to zone cities, produce greener housing estates, control advertising or regulate air quality. Their ambition to control and shape the space of their cities was an attempt to produce urban environments that might be both more orderly and functional, but also held the potential to shape society.
of the UN Charter, a provision that empowers the Security Council to adopt sanctions against states, although it has further developed this power to promulgate targeted sanctions against individuals and other non-stateactors (NSAs). The move away from general sanctions against states, such as Rhodesia, Iraq, Serbia and Libya, is analysed, especially for their impact on the human rights of the population (for example the right to health). The applicability of human rights norms to the UN is discussed. The Security Council has, more recently, favoured targeted
From the governance perspective, this equates to the construction of institutions
which support the multi-level character of EU governance, including key roles for
non-stateactors. The introduction of devolution and the new institutions created
by the 1998 Belfast Agreement bear witness to some of the features associated with
EU governance. However, they also formalise, institutionalise and perhaps even
strengthen state involvement in the process of regional governance. Suggestions
therefore, that the EU has assisted in the promotion of ‘new politics’ in
insurgency, “guerrilla war,” and “irregular war” as synonyms.38
Insurgencies are a form of unconventional warfare to the extent that conventional warfare is thought to involve militaries facing each other on battlefields.39 Insurgent groups are non-stateactors employing irregular forces
and small-war tactics against conventional armed forces, or the armed forces
of a state. Insurgents are the armed actors who engage in the low-intensity
conflict or irregular warfare associated with insurgencies.
The tactics of insurgent groups include terrorism and guerrilla tactics, or
Itinerant death at the Ground Zero Mosque and Bali bombsite
made on other places –
causing bombsites to shrink. How should we consider this mobility and
mutation? As I will explain in this chapter, it is the practice of
security undertaken by non-stateactors to mitigate the presence of
mortality that sometimes causes the constitution of disaster space to
I will explore the contingency of post-terrorist space in