interhuman recognition and awareness of moral
universalisms filter through diplomatic discourse, interstate
political rhetoric and non-stateactor campaigns. Debates within
international organizations evidence reflection in ways that
discount the value of state borders and parochialisms when human
well-being and human development are persistently at stake.
compromises. These include shared coercive and extractive capacity
with foreign countries, state and non-stateactors. The DRC case illustrates that
state authority is seen as paramount to other post-conflict strategies like democratisation, economic reconstruction and even peace. However, it also illustrates
that state authority may be represented, mediated, shared or compromised by
other institutions, actors and even other competing state authorities.
This sociological understanding of peacebuilding goes beyond the hybridity
accounts. It analyses how macro, micro, present
institutions (particularly if associated with an increase in non-stateactor involvement), she uses the example of the ‘comprehensive
security’ and ‘human security’ discourses elaborated
by the Japanese government and ASEAN to point to the continued
centrality of the state (rather than individuals) and the extent of
limits in a regional context to fundamental change in security
conceptions and practices
context in which they are placed. To the extent that the International Law Commission addresses the role of other non-Stateactors in the formation of custom, the same question pertains to them too.
Thus, the International Law Commission should have taken one step back and pondered on the fundamental question of the relationship between subjects and custom in international law. One does not clearly understand whether international organisations matter in principle in the formation of customary rules since the International Law Commission did not provide a legal
upon the pleadings and observations submitted by both parties. From the moment when international tribunals opened the door for direct access by non-Stateactors, private persons acting as claimants actively began to affect the formation of international law through the tribunals. Such international tribunals are commonly created under a special treaty regime; however, their decisions may be extended to the interpretation and identification of a specific rule of customary international law as long as such an argument is raised by the claimant and it falls within
to, specifically those in the Middle East and African regions. China's counterpart
to the General Atomic MQ-9 Reaper, the CH-5 Rainbow, sells for about half the
price (Chen 2017 ). Moreover, the frequency of reports
indicating that non-stateactors, such as ISIS, are in possession of armed drones
is increasing and it is likely that this will be a trend that is difficult to
bring to a halt.
In all arenas where lethal drones are employed, it is difficult to
Klaus Brummer, Sebastian Harnisch, Kai Oppermann, and Diana Panke
distinct from public policy (Sprout and Sprout 1956 ; Snyder et al. 1962 ; Allison 1971 ; Hudson 2005 ). While public policy usually concerns policies in the domestic sphere, such as health, labor market, or infrastructure policies, foreign policy is about how a country acts in the international arena, for example vis-à-vis other state or non-stateactors or within international organizations (IOs).
The two policy realms are also often seen to differ systematically with regard to the distribution of formal decision-making authority and the
How transnational pharmaceutical groups manipulate scientific
Isabell Hensel and Gunther Teubner
For the current discussion in Germany, see
Rüfner, ‘Grundrechtsadressaten’; in a
historical perspective, see Stolleis, Geschichte des
öffentlichen Rechts , vol. 4, pp. 216 ff. On the legal
position in Europe, see Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of
Non-StateActors . For international law, see Gardbaum,
‘“Horizontal effect” of constitutional
the Party’s traditional commitment
to a limited state.
However, once the scale and severity of the post-2008 economic downturn
became apparent, the Conservative Party’s stance shifted further, as Cameron
promoted the concept of the ‘Big Society’, whereby a range of non-stateactors
would be encouraged to ‘deliver’ sundry public services and welfare provision.
This would entail a burgeoning network of charities, not-for-profit organisations,
philanthropists, ‘third sector’ bodies and voluntary groups becoming involved in
administering some of the activities hitherto
-old rivalry between states. They can hold other state and non-stateactors to account; act as democratising agents, giving under-represented peoples a ‘voice’ at the global level; and put social and moral issues onto the global agenda.
The notion that global civil society, or (I)NGOs, can contribute to plugging the democratic deficit associated with global governance is echoed by many IGOs. Most of these institutions, such as the United Nations, have had longstanding arrangements in place to consult with groups of various types (Gordenker and Weiss