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The drug regulatory regime vs. criminal anarchy
Stephen Snelders

-national organizations, the League of Nations, and the United Nations) to the local level (legislation and policies of states) in order to control non-medical and recreational use of prohibited drugs. In doing so the regime created a reaction that went the other way: non-state actors such as criminal entrepreneurs and their networks started activities at the local level (e.g., cultures of smuggling in cities and provinces) and expanded internationally. This led to more global regulation and prohibition that led again to more opportunities for local entrepreneurs to expand their

in Drug smuggler nation
Open Access (free)
Potentials of disorder in the Caucasus and Yugoslavia
Jan Koehler and Christoph Zürcher

. The armed conflicts in the Caucasus and in Yugoslavia may have been fought in the name of the state and of ethnicised groups, but the fighters were more often than not private entrepreneurs. In all cases not only state actors were involved in the organisation of violence, but also a myriad of non-state actors, like paramilitaries, warlords, criminal gang leaders, militias and self-defence units, and the distinction between state actors and non-state actors was blurred. Grandits and Leutloff’s account of organised violence in the Krajina, MappesNiediek’s of Kosovo

in Potentials of disorder
Open Access (free)
Looking beyond the state
Anna Greenwood

. The present volume should be regarded not as an end point but as a starting point from which to think outside the boxes of state and non-state actors. It offers an academic springboard from which to move away from the compartmentalisations to which colonial historical debate is prone: black and white, elites and non-elites, heroes and villains, each operating in neatly delineated secular or religious

in Beyond the state
A comparative study of Boko Haram, Niger Delta, IPOB and Fulani militia
Michael Nwankpa

essentially provides opportunity for drawing generalisations and/or specificities regarding armed non-state actors (ANSAs) in Nigeria. The chapter draws on fieldwork research conducted in Nigeria between 2013 and 2016. In terms of analysis, the study applies interpretive judgement, using four recognition metrics: (1) the type of recognition struggle (type of ANSA); (2) population support; (3) forms of (mis-/non-) recognition (humiliation, disrespect, false representations of individual or collective identity, labelling/the deliberate withholding or denial of recognition

in Armed non-state actors and the politics of recognition
Endogeneity and exogeneity in the struggle for recognition in Somalia
Harmonie Toros and Arrliya Sugal

recognition of certain qualities, positive characteristics, competencies, achievements, or of their status within a specific group, a society, a political system, or the international political realm’ (Geis et al. 2015 : 3). This search for recognition and its successes and failures need to be understood as a ‘ gradual process’ rather than a clear binary (Geis et al. 2015 : 16). With regard to non-state actors specifically, investigations into recognition have focused particularly on the impact of recognition of such groups as ‘legitimate’ political

in Armed non-state actors and the politics of recognition
Michael Loadenthal

corporate offices), ATMs, phone booths, automobiles, and other civilian (i.e. non-government, non-military) manifestations of their criticism peppered throughout daily life. In general, through both the traditional studies of violent non-state actors and the observation of insurrectionary attack, both groupings seem to choose “targets that were congruent with their stated political ideology, but they mainly confined their target selection to areas with which they, verifiably, had familiarity based on their daily routines” (Becker 2014, 968). Though it may seem

in The politics of attack
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Alison Phipps

genders by state and non-state actors, as a strategy of repression, terror and control. It is a tool of ethnic dilution through forced pregnancy. Colonialism is not over. Feminists of colour, most of them members of the global proletariat, were behind various interventions into the Anglo-American mainstream of #MeToo that had a more intersectional and decolonial focus.44 The Alianza Nacional de Campesinas, and similar groups of domestic workers and female janitors, highlighted abuse in their industries. McDonalds workers in ten US cities organised a day-long strike

in Me, not you
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The end
Alexander Spencer

culturally embedded romantic narrative elements of these three non-state actors, or the lack of these elements, it holds that the dominant or marginal romantic narrative is the result of a discursive struggle between opposing forces over the interpretation of the given actor. These romantic narratives are by no means simply a passive reflection of dominant perceptions. Rather, these romantic narratives are fundamentally political and active in the sense that they contribute to the marginalization of other narratives. For example, in Chapter  2 the book argues that in the

in Romantic narratives in international politics
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James Greenhalgh

produce social outcomes through spatial manipulation. Crucial to understanding the role of corporations here has been a close examination of continuity and change alongside the interplay between the different levels of the state and various non-state actors. The instances covered in the preceding chapters can, of course, only form a series of case studies, but these are enough to suggest there is still much to be uncovered that might further clarify our picture of post-war modernism and urban development. The potential of comparison between local and national approaches

in Reconstructing modernity
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Prophet of Pan-African Integration
Afeikhena Jerome

poverty, according to World Bank sources. 11 Yet, not a single Western economist or Western researcher played an instrumental role in China’s economic reforms. 12 The objectives of development have broadened, from a narrow focus on per capita income growth, to include political empowerment, capabilities in the broadest sense, and even “happiness’’. The actors in the development discourse have changed too. Civil society organisations and other non-state actors are increasingly partnering with the state on poverty reduction, as developing

in The Pan-African Pantheon