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Between mental states and institutional objects
Sufyan Droubi

, State will (i.e. intention) – has in fact disappeared . 40 Looking at the wording of Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, Pellet argues that ‘acceptance … is, by no means, achieved by the expression of will of individual States, but a general, communal acceptance of some more or less openly expressed conviction by States or by international bodies’. 41 This prompts Pellet to emphasise the material element of customary international law and to reduce the importance of the will of the State. Pellet lays bare many of the shortcomings of

in International organisations, non-State actors, and the formation of customary international law
Michael Wood

international organizations in exactly the same way, 18 is unconvincing. As the International Court of Justice put it as long ago as in 1949, ‘[t]‌he subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their nature or in the extent of their rights’. 19 Third, the conclusions do recognize the potential role of international organizations in the formation of customary international law and indeed highlight it. To the extent that ‘such a role has never been captured by the modern categories of the doctrine of the sources of international law’, 20 then the

in International organisations, non-State actors, and the formation of customary international law
Dino Kritsiotis

September 2001, never more starkly so than on the eve of Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003, when President Bush noted that ‘All the decades of deceit and cruelty have now reached an end’ and informed Iraq that ‘Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours. Their refusal to do so will result in military conflict, commenced at a time of our choosing’. 14 It is worth considering the ‘idiomatic unity’ of the prohibitions contained in Article 2(4) of the Charter. 15 As the International Court of Justice put it in its Nuclear Weapons Advisory

in ‘War on terror’
Fabian Cardenas

that of States, 13 anchored in a classic view of international law as a juridical order regulating the relations (only) between States. 14 Although the referential clause contained in Art. 38 1 (b) of the International Court of Justice Statute does not specify whose practice and whose acceptance as law is to be looked upon, the Court’s jurisprudence and dominant scholarship has interpreted it as being limited to the practice and opinio of States. 15 The International Court of Justice has affirmed on this regard that ‘it is of course axiomatic that the material of

in International organisations, non-State actors, and the formation of customary international law
Catherine Brölmann

…] may arise from, or be expressed in , the practice of an international organization’ (Conclusion 12 (2) – emphasis added), as well as independent ‘[p]‌ractice of an international organization in the application of its constituent instrument’ (Conclusion 12 (3)), both with abundant examples from practice. 15 The commentary also points out how the authorship of legally relevant ‘practice’ might be even shared by the organisation and the (member) states, as was suggested by the International Court of Justice in the Wall Case when it subtly referred to ‘the accepted

in International organisations, non-State actors, and the formation of customary international law
Maruša T. Veber

le Processus Coutumier ( Pedone 2001 ); A Pellet , ‘ Article 38 ’ in Andreas Zimmermann et al (eds), The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2012 ); T Treves, ‘Customary International Law’ Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (MPEPIL), para 50; J d’Aspremont, ‘The Decay of Modern Customary International Law in Spite of Scholarly Heroism’ (2015) 2015 Global Community: Yearbook of International Law and Jurisprudence; J Klabbers , ‘ International Organizations in the Formation

in International organisations, non-State actors, and the formation of customary international law
Jean-Baptiste Merlin

law. As statements on the state or the evolution of rules of international law delivered by a principal organ of the United Nations within its mandate, legal opinions are neither decisions by a judicial organ nor teachings of the most highly qualified publicists under Article 38.1.d of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Some opinions may be purely advisory or may have legal effect, depending on the context in which they are delivered. 61 Moreover, when they assess the existence of a rule of customary international law legal opinions of the

in International organisations, non-State actors, and the formation of customary international law
Michael Banton

is a story of how issues that could be made subject to legal regulation were identified, and how States were persuaded to make this possible by ceding some of their authority. After the Second World War, new opportunities opened with the adoption in 1945 of the Charter of the United Nations. The Statute of the International Court of Justice is an integral part of the Charter. UN actions have been divided between those that are based on the Charter (mainly political) and those that are treaty-​based (where legal remedies have been developed). So UN action to combat

in Fifty years of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
Towards a transitional justice role
Lydia A. Nkansah

Statement:  Best Practices, Achievements and Challenges of the ICERD’ (2015), available at:  www.ohchr.org/​Documents/​HRBodies/​CERD/​ 50Years/​IMADR.pdf. 213 ICERD in the post-conflict landscape  213 22 States parties may seek recourse to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to resolve disputes under the Convention. Article 22 reads: ‘Any dispute between two or more States Parties with respect to the interpretation or application of this Convention, which is not settled by negotiation or by the procedures expressly provided for in this Convention, shall, at the

in Fifty years of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
General Assembly resolutions
Rossana Deplano

) of the International Court of Justice Statute 4 according to the interpretation given to each element (general practice and acceptance as law) by the International Court of Justice itself. 5 The decision of the International Law Commission, which is strongly supported by the Special Rapporteur, to equate the mandate of providing authoritative guidance to practitioners with fully endorsing the International Court of Justice’s pronouncements on formation and evidence of international customary law appears like a sensible attempt to bring together what is otherwise

in International organisations, non-State actors, and the formation of customary international law