international institutions have on
encouraging cooperative and sustainable management structures should
not be overestimated.
Understanding the limitations of institutions
Regional and internationalorganisations have had mixed success in managing Central Asia’s water. Cooperation on water issues is attainable as long as
Transboundary water management
other, more deep-seated political differences can be managed. To a great
extent the failings in regional water management are indicative of the
broader political context. While
problems (Stein 2008 : 209). Moreover, the support of hegemonic states may be needed to create internationalorganisations and regimes (Young 1982 ). And the states creating an international institution exercise a form of power by altering the status quo and the available options and by excluding non-members from benefits (Stein 2008 : 211; Downs et al. 1998 ). Indeed, as Richardson ( 2008 : 227) remarks, although the term ‘co-operation’ remains positively connotated, states co-operate to maximise gains and minimise losses, so institutions remain ‘of the privileged
diverse contexts of peace and (in)security, including their political significance in these scenarios.
Since 2015, internationalorganisations such as the UN have advanced towards increasing the opportunities and support for young people's involvement peacebuilding endeavours, locally and globally, including, for example, the passage of UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 2250 (2015) and 2419 (2018) on Youth, Peace and Security. Passed unanimously
This book explores the way in which the Anglo-American new world order (NWO) debate changed by 9/11, and the encouragement this has given to the 'neoconservatives' or 'neocons' within the George W. Bush Administration. It examines the policy-making process as it developed before the Versailles Conference of 1919. An extensive literature exists on the 'lessons of Versailles' and particularly on the 'failure' of the League of Nations (LON), one that started even before the signature of the Treaty of Versailles. The book then explores how the Conference and the LON attempted to frame the immediate problems of the post-war period. It shows how NWO architects' thinking developed in what might be called the area of 'global security' from the period of the First World War until the present. The clear evidence is that the American thinking on the NWO had a huge impact in Britain's processes in the same direction. President Theodore Roosevelt shared a deep suspicion of British motives for the post-war settlement in line with most Americans. He attributed blame for the inter-war crisis as much to British and French intransigence and balance of power politics at Versailles as to German aggression. The results of the Versailles settlement hung like a cloud over Allied relationships during the Second World War and gave a powerful impetus in American circles for an attitude of 'never again'. The variety of historical archival material presented provided the background to the current and historical American obsession with creating the world order.
it lowers the costs compared with acting unilaterally (Williamson 1978, 1985
Three assumptions form the backbone of the rational choice institutionalist approach (see e.g. Hall and Taylor 1996 ; Pollack 1997 ). First, states are treated as the primary political actors. Although this does not imply that internationalorganisations, such as the UN, and their bureaucracies are seen as ‘passive mechanisms with no independent agendas of their own’ (Barnett and Finnemore 1999 : 705), they have traditionally not been
place in the European concert of powers, seemed to prove that theoretical point. Borchard conjoined his realist critique of international law with an argument for American isolationism. American involvement with internationalorganisations and treaty regimes was hazardous, he argued, because it would drag the US into international conflicts in which it had no stake. The alternative that he promoted was a return to the balance of power politics of the pre-1914 era, with the US intervening abroad only when its vital interests were threatened. Unlike other classical
found new applications in the peacekeeping scholarship, while peacekeeping has become a source of conceptual development and empirical innovation in the IR literature. This is an overdue development, considering the political and material resources that member states, internationalorganisations, and civil society actors have invested in peacekeeping.
This volume analyses UN peacekeeping as an international institution in the broad meaning of the term. International institutions have been defined as ‘persistent and connected sets of rules
balance of power. The most important political actors in this framework are states. By contrast, the study and practice of peacekeeping is vested in solidifying peace through co-operation, which is structured by internationalorganisations and agreements. In its more ambitious incarnations such as conflict transformation and peacebuilding, peacekeepers aim even to transform the context of conflict through crafting peace settlements. They might also engage in extensive social and political reforms that aim to suppress violent conflict through fostering economic growth
third party internationalorganisations and actors.
Defining security in a comprehensive way, the BSEC has become engaged in
disseminating security concerns in fields such as environment, energy and
Institutions of security governance
How has the utility of regional cooperation through the BSEC come about
in this new era in terms of security provision? How can we place the BSEC
within the broader institutional framework consisting of actors such as the
UN, NATO, the OSCE and the EU? What should one reasonably
it was necessary to control them if possible) and duplicity by foreign powers, it was also necessary to address the
economic and political causes of discontent. Hence the most important
clauses of the Charter are about the need for freedom of commerce and the
need to encourage self-determination and decolonisation. Roosevelt wanted
to make sure that the internationalorganisations, or whatever mechanism
was needed to implement these aims, had to lock in the democracies for the
post-war period. His was, in Reynolds’ words, a ‘realistic Wilsonianism’.15