Law and conflicts over water in the Krishna River Basin
relied heavily on the decisions of US courts where the social and
historical contexts of the dispute were very different. The Tribunal
also relied on the principles settled by the
International Law Association, the InternationalLawCommission and
other UN bodies in river-water disputes that had divorced the rules
from historical and political contexts in order to find
for example, has supported only projects that do not contravene international water law principles.56 WARMAP has likwise been involved in this
sphere: ‘Unlike the other aid projects with a technical focus, WARMAP had
a specific legal and institutional agenda to create a framework for water
sharing based on legal principles in accordance with the Helsinki Rules and
Extra-regional organisations have played an important role in providing
financial assistance to the region. The World Bank’s Vice President for
the London Charter and in the judgement of the
Nuremberg Tribunal should be formally codified; and in
December 1950 the General Assembly duly adopted a set of
those principles, as prepared by the InternationalLawCommission.51 Principle VI (c) – bearing visible relation to
Article 6 (c) of the London Charter – reads:
Crimes against humanity: Murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation and other inhuman acts done
against any civilian population, or persecutions on
political, racial or religious grounds, when such acts are
done or such persecutions are carried on
Reconceptualising states’ obligations in countering VAWH
Sara De Vido
precise result, with the consequence that ‘lack of due diligence is a breach of the
obligation of conduct.’23 The debate on the obligation of prevention surrounded
the question whether it was an obligation of conduct or of result, and it was not
clear at the time which position Ago had taken in that respect.24 The InternationalLawCommission departed from the notion elaborated by the Special Rapporteur,
and approved at a first reading this version of Article 23:
When the result required of a State by an international obligation is the prevention,
by means of
the International Legal Order (Routledge 2011) 178.
24 E. Zoller, Peacetime Unilateral Remedies: An Analysis of Countermeasures (Transnational 1984) 104–5.
25 Articles 41 and 54 ARS (2001). See J. Crawford, The InternationalLawCommission’s Articles on State Responsibility (Cambridge University Press 2002) 302.
26 Article 53 UN Charter. See C. Dominicé, ‘Co-ordination between Universal and Regional Organizations’ in N.M. Blokker and H.G. Schermers (eds), Proliferation of International Organizations: Legal Issues (Kluwer 2001) 82; U. Villiani
Convention on Human Rights.
46 See General Assembly Resolution 95(I) (1946) and the InternationalLawCommission’s formulation of the Nuremberg Principles (1950).
47 See G. Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity (London: Penguin, 2000).
48 See D. Turns and C. Byron, ‘The preparatory commission for the international
criminal court’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 50 (2001), 420–34.
49 H. Kelsen, ‘Will the judgment at Nuremberg constitute a precedent?’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1 (1947), 153–71; G. Lawrence (President
of the IMT), ‘The Nuremberg
1974, 13 I.L.M. 710; see also InternationalLawCommission Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of
Mankind, 1991, 30 ibid ., 1585.
Since none of the states involved in the US/UK
actions against Iraq is directed to this end, they might be
considered as outside the definition
operations. By Article 16 the Convention applies ‘without
prejudice to . . . the law of armed conflict and international
humanitarian law, including the provisions relating to the status of
combatants or prisoner of war’, so that a captured mercenary is
still not considered as a legitimate combatant. The InternationalLawCommission has now adopted a Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and
prevention of political entanglements is a mere illusion:
Only this last possibility [the initiation of prosecutions ex officio], which surprisingly was not included in the draft of the InternationalLawCommission, would
release the Court at least de jure from the exertion of political influence as to the
question of when and who is supposed to be prosecuted. Vesting the prosecutor
with the competence to investigate and prosecute ex officio would also represent
a major progress compared with former international criminal tribunals, as with
respect to the latter, it was
by the Charter of the Nuremberg
Tribunal. 169 It should be remembered, however, that this is only a
recommendation lacking any legal force, but possessing significant
political authority. Nevertheless, there is a tendency among the members
of the United Nations, as well as writers, to accept this resolution as
declaratory of customary law, especially as the InternationalLawCommission