The superpower’s dilemma: to appease, repress, or transform transnational advocacy networks?
The superpower’s dilemma: to
appease, repress, or transform
transnational advocacy networks?
he tale of transnational advocacy networks (TANs), as told by students
of international politics, is typically one of non-stateactors reshaping
world politics through the power of persuasion and principled ideas. In
its most familiar telling, global partnerships of activists, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), scientists, and technical experts play the foil to unrestrained national interests, developing, diffusing, and monitoring compliance
Contested narratives of the independence struggle in postconfl ict Timor-Leste
people, the majority of them unarmed civilians (CAVR 2005).
The complex politics of remembrance has led to competing readings of the nation and the struggle. Whereas others have done an
excellent job exploring complexities between national, NGO and
personal-level narratives (Harris-Rimmer 2010; Kent 2011; Sakti
2012) I will focus on alternative narratives of the nation and the
independence struggle as articulated through the dead by the state,
non-stateactors and individuals. The three processes I will focus on
are the ways in which the nation is
participatory nature of the international legal system, see J d’Aspremont , ‘ International Law-Making by Non-StateActors: Changing the Model or Putting the Phenomenon into Perspective? ’ in M Noortmann and C Ryngaert (eds), Non-StateActor Dynamics in International Law – From Law-Takers to the Lawmakers 171 (Routledge 2010 ).
2 Also in this regard see International Law Commission, Michael Wood, Special Rapporteur, First report on formation and evidence of customary international law, UN Doc A/CN.4/663, paras 13–15 (17 May 2013); International Law
Kirsten Forkert, Federico Oliveri, Gargi Bhattacharyya, and Janna Graham
’ (Kalyvas 2001; Newman 2004; Kaldor 2012, 2013)
and we have become accustomed to a proliferation of ever fragmenting conflicts. At the same time, non-stateactors have become central
players in the map of global conflict. We, the public, have become
accustomed to new vocabularies of war, with an easy if anxious
acceptance of the existence of smart weapons, asymmetrical warfare,
collateral damage and, even international terrorism. These shifts
in understanding are reflected in news coverage and consumption,
with, ironically, the move to register civilian impacts militating
conception of EU politics based on an altered relationship between state and
non-stateactors, where the latter have become increasingly influential. MLG
is synonymous with the idea of a movement from government to governance.
NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE EU
It is also often associated with undermining or bypassing the role and power of
the central state.
The introduction of devolution in Northern Ireland, under the terms of the
1998 Belfast Agreement, provides a ready case study for examining the application and accuracy of the MLG model. This chapter
what we may call the hybridization of diplomacy; state and non-stateactors become more similar, they face similar cooperation problems as did other constellations of diplomatic agents before them, and they partake in shifting alliances. The central role of states will probably not fade, but states will increasingly have to work with and through other kinds of agents, rather than on them, as they usually did before. As always when a new tipping-point arises in social spheres, this is not totally new. In a social setting, as the example of how right-hand driving
’ political grievances. Then it discusses the notion of respect and disrespect, and the dichotomy between recognition and redistribution, arguing that the latter cannot replace the former and may even amount to mis-recognition: the framing of the Uyghurs’ problem as economic grievances precisely undermines their quest for recognition as an indigenous Turkic Muslim community in China's Xinjiang region. As the next part argues, being recognised in terms of one's own identity is essential to transforming Uyghur armed non-stateactors (ANSAs) into non-violent actors. In the
briefing by her at the Security Council’s Open Debate on ‘Working Methods of the Security Council’ (UN Doc S/2014/725): ‘Enhancing Due Process in Sanctions Regimes’, UN Doc S/PV.7285 23 October 2014.
160 Cortright, López and Gerber-Stellingwerf n. 66 at 213.
161 Ibid. 219.
162 Ibid. 224.
163 UN Doc A/RES/60/1 (2005) para. 109.
164 UN Doc S/RES/1730 (2006).
165 UN Doc S/RES/1904 (2009).
166 UN Doc S/RES/1822 (2008).
167 Mulgan n. 63 at 334.
168 See N.D. White, ‘Sanctions Against Non-StateActors’ in N. Ronzitti (ed.), Coercive
… increasingly visible’ in the practice of diplomacy.6 It serves to recognise citizens
as ‘assertive participants in international politics’ and embraces an ‘explosive growth
of non-stateactors’.7 He adds that non-official players in the diplomacy game have
proven to be swifter at mobilisation of support than the typically unwieldy foreign
policy bureaucracy. In international sport, certainly, this was true, and the increased
profile of non-stateactors has owed much to the networks that have created and
sustained international sporting encounters
A ‘new’ and ‘evolving’ threat to the European Union
as a form of crime and terrorism as an act
perpetrated by non-stateactors, in order to show how they help to construct
the radically threatening figure of the ‘terrorist’ other. In doing so, I draw on
representative examples from many of the documents identified in Chapter 2.
I also highlight instances of securitisation and point out where the ‘fight
against terrorism’ adopts the language of future-oriented threats, which
I argue makes possible a precautionary approach to security. The second half
of the chapter explores the functioning of the discourse, with a