pragmatic rather than principled in the first
place. They had evolved in an arbitrary and haphazard matter, usually reflecting different traditions within Whitehall departments.
Rawlings (2003) diagnoses four basic principles underpinning the Welsh
model of executive devolution enshrined in the 1998 Government of Wales
Act. These are the vertical division of law-making powers; the horizontal division between secondary and primary law-making powers; the overlapping of
powers with central government and the evolutionary character of the devolution process.
absurd to imply that the ebbing of formal British control over what had once
been a quarter of the world’s land surface left behind no residue. One huge legacy
from the ‘British World’ has been institutions, and in particular instruments of
government and administration. The emphasis placed on law courts, lawmaking
and legal administration in this study should have been suﬃcient to make
plain the fact that these institutional features and these forms of administrative
practice were early introduced into Gibraltar. Law, properly formulated by ordinances and orders
will advocate a highly politicised response. Special powers
will be introduced to police public events, utilising new
technologies such as facial recognition and the monitoring
of social media to collect evidence on large numbers of participants.3 Politicians and police will advise judges to hand
out harsher sentences, with separation between lawmaking
and the courts being denied even the customary lip service.4
Opinion pieces and talking heads will lament the decline of
British values or civic responsibilities, longing for the fantasy of a British past
the Constitutional Treaty and has made it to the Lisbon Treaty. The new
role of national parliaments in safeguarding subsidiarity, thus constituting
an extra accountability check on the initiatives of the European Commission, has not only been reiterated but slightly strengthened in the Lisbon
Treaty. Moving to QMV as a default procedure with exceptions in very
few policy areas represents a major step in simpliﬁcation and clarity in the
Union’s law-making, which is a positive point for identiﬁability.
In other cases, the Constitutional Treaty introduced new
expertise to be involved in the law-making process.
At least half the members of the House of Lords should be elected so that the upper chamber of Parliament has democratic legitimacy.
If both Houses of Parliament were elected it would become much harder for governments to get things done since both Houses could claim democratic legitimacy and neither would be willing to back down, bringing the risk of frequent stalemate.
Source: Populus, April 2006.
The responses are
degree of independence from electoral politics and allows people with a broad range of experience and expertise to be involved in the law-making process.’ Supporters of the existing House thus have grounds for claiming some public recognition of the work of the House and a desire not to lose the attributes that enable it to fulfil its work effectively.
Those wishing to retain the existing House also raise the issue of cost. Having an appointed House, it is argued, saves public money. There are two dimensions to this. One is simply in terms of running costs: the House
Public relations . Government has a large public relations machine at its disposal to counter or discredit messages which go against its interests. Alastair Campbell, for example, in his fight with the BBC in 2003, was ruthless in using every trick in the book to ‘win’ his side of the battle.
The law . Thatcher’s government changed the law so that unions could have their funds sequestered if they transgressed new laws on balloting members before strike action. This proved vital in defeating the miners in 1984–85. Labour also passed lawsmaking certain forms of
Corpse-work in the prehistory of political boundaries
circulate, I argue, accentuates
the climatic attributes of political time – attributes that must first be
sensed before their importance may be grasped. For if the primary
purpose of political community is to safeguard relations between
subjects, time becomes ‘weather’ precisely when the possibility of
property itself is placed in doubt.
The blunt touch of Sendero law-making often raised the question of why? Why so violent? Why so uncompromising? Why did
they impose such a rigid political programme?6 The movement’s
further he seems hesitant to attribute ‘autonomous law-making power’ to international organisations whatever that signifies. 32 On the other hand, he puts forward his belief that generally international organisation practice may be relevant, especially in cases when it pertains to activities akin to those undertaken by States, and when States have assigned competence to the international organisation. 33 The aforementioned proposal of the Drafting Committee encapsulates in its generality these ideas and so he proposes no amendments to it.
The Commission members
all in EMU and to opt out of the Social Chapter, although the opt-outs were assumed to be temporary, with opt-ins expected at a later time – as was true for the Social Chapter, into which Blair opted in 1997. Had the Maastricht Treaty not done this, it would never have gotten through. But in so doing, it established the legal machinery for the future, with structural differentiation occurring both at the time of law-making and at the time of its application, with the institutions of the EU made available to the selected group of member states going forward with